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ABSTRACT 
In the last three decades, Higher Education (HE) has experienced an unprecedented 
expansion worldwide. In many countries, governments have transferred the cost of HE 
from taxpayers to individuals and households as a means of increasing the provision 
on a financially sustainable basis. Most policies have attempted to address the issue 
of low-income students’ participation by setting student aid policies for those unable 
to afford HE costs. Nonetheless, the starting point of this thesis is that the goal of 
equity in HE should not begin with, or be confined to, HE policy but must address 
school education as well. I investigate the effect of the socioeconomic distribution of 
school achievement on HE enrolment rates in a cross-country framework. I find a mild 
but statistically significant negative association suggesting that the more school 
achievement is determined by socioeconomic factors, the less participation in HE is 
observed. Next, I evaluate the impact of a reform to the student aid system in Chile 
using household surveys and regression-based and differences-in-differences evaluation 
techniques. I find the reform increased the probability of access of low-income students 
to HE by 6 percentage points, or 20 per cent in proportional terms.   
After having researched the effects of inequality of school achievement, I focus on the 
design of student aid and its effect on persistence and dropout. In particular, I 
investigate the level of harshness of different aid programmes and its effect on 
students’ persistence, completion, and dropout rates. By specifying a logistic 
multinomial model, I compare the effect of two loan programmes, an income-
contingent loan and a mortgage-type, bank-managed, government-guaranteed loan. 
The harsher, mortgage-type loan was associated with increased persistence and higher 
completion rates but no difference in dropout rates. Nonetheless, this association was 
only observable for low-income students; loan harshness made no difference in 
completion rates for better-off students. In other words, harsher loans seem to be a 
deterrent only for poor students. This introduces an ethical dilemma: although harsher 
aid may be more effective, should student aid be disproportionately putting pressure 
on the poorest students? However, this may in turn reflect poor student’s relative 
higher ability rather than a differential deterrent effect.  
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1. EQUITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CORE ISSUES 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
In 1983, Burton R. Clark published his seminal work, ‘The Higher Education System’, 
(Clark 1983), which has been considered a milestone in sociology of higher education 
(HE). Amongst several contributions, Clark proposed a comprehensive model to 
analyse the HE system’s coordination mechanisms, the so-called ‘Clark’s coordination 
triangle’. The model approaches the HE field as shaped by three major forces: the 
state, the market, and the academic oligarchies. The state intervention in HE; the 
competition for students, academic staff, and funding (the market); and the influence 
of the organised academic profession have operated in any one HE system, and a 
particular combination of all three elements has been a feature of national HE systems 
historically. 
 
Clark’s model relies on an extensive historical and comparative analysis of HE, the 
main focus of which was to disentangle the fundamental features of one of the oldest 
and most resilient social institutions in the Western World: the University. Although 
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a model developed in 1983 would not be entirely appropriate nowadays (Brennan 
2010), it is important to remember that the presence of the market in HE is neither a 
recent nor an unique feature of US-like models, but a longstanding driving force in HE 
in general. Indeed, market mechanisms (e.g., academic staff recruitment, student 
selection, and competition for funding) not only influence privatised HE systems but 
are present in publicly financed and coordinated systems as well.  
 
Since the 1980s, HE coordination has moved from the state to the market. The 
increasing reliance of policy on market mechanisms is evident when analysing a 
number of changes in HE. Firstly, market coordination has replaced political 
negotiation mechanisms between the state and academic oligarchies. Take, for 
instance, the introduction of performance agreements between governments and higher 
education institutions (HEIs). Although terms might be negotiated between 
governments and HEIs, the room for political manoeuvre is limited because the state 
negotiates with individual institutions rather than a ‘sector’ or the ‘academic 
corporation’. Secondly, demand-side funding has become more important than 
institutional funding in many countries. In effect, governments have cut back or frozen 
block grants, forcing HE funding sources to diversify through the introduction or 
liberalisation of tuition fees as well as the involvement of the private sector in HE. In 
general, the trend has been to transfer costs from the state to individuals (though 
some countries still rely on general taxation to fund HE or, like Germany, have 
reinforced free HE). 
  
Thirdly, managerialism has become evident in HE. Indeed, actions such as setting 
academic output goals, imposing scientific productivity standards on academic staff, 
and moving student services towards meeting customers’ demands show how HE has 
adapted to a new environment deeply penetrated by the market and competition for 
resources. Although Clark’s original view stressed the contradiction between 
managerialism and the disciplinary nature of the academic authority, HEIs are 
currently managed in a business-like fashion: there is fierce competition for funding, 
and external pressures, rather than strictly academic concerns, have influenced 
academic priorities. 
15 
 
 
Finally, universities now attract students by using marketing strategies such as brand 
positioning, product differentiation, and strategic management techniques. The 
admission process starts taking place well in advance as marketing, outreach, and 
recruitment strategies are deployed earlier. As students and their families became 
customers, universities mimicked firms, and governments loosened their direct 
regulation over HE, handing it over to market forces through ‘soft’ or ‘distance’ 
regulations. 
 
Marketisation has arrived together with massification. The universalisation of 
secondary education, the diversification of the student body in educational and 
socioeconomic terms, and the promise of social mobility through HE has resulted in 
the highest HE participation levels ever seen. The political discourse on the need for 
countries to boost innovation and growth based on enhancing the skills of their labour 
forces and accumulating human capital has deemed HE as a central actor.  
 
Apart from efficiency considerations, marketisation relies, in part, on an equity 
argument (Dill 1997); that is, privatisation of HE’s provision and funding would allow 
for HE’s expansion without diverting scarce resources to those who truly benefit from 
HE – namely, those who are better-off to begin with (Psacharopoulos 2008). However, 
marketisation has raised concerns with regard to equity of access. Capital markets are 
often not prepared to lend money to the number and diversity of students sought, and 
students may not consider the whole benefit of HE when applying for aid either 
because they lack information or are risk averse (Barr 2012; Goodman and Kaplan 
2003).  
 
Provided that the costs of HE have been transferred to individuals:  How do HE 
systems deal with financial barriers to access? Which policies are effective? How does 
HE policy make sure that student aid policies – specifically loans – do not deter low-
income students from entering HE? To what extent does financial aid affect not only 
access but also persistence and course completion? The policy agenda and the political 
discourse stress the need for widening participation; marketisation seems – at the very 
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least – problematic to achieving that goal equitably. All of these concerns are common 
in literature and policymaking, as I shall discuss later.  
 
In this thesis, I shall examine several aspects affecting equity in HE with a special 
focus on student aid as the equity policy par excellence. While the general context 
described above refers mostly to changes in HE systems and policies, addressing the 
problem requires an approach that looks beyond the field of HE, as access to HE is 
also determined by prior education and social background, which are not affected by 
HE policies. 
 
Although most equity policies have focused on helping poor students overcome 
financial barriers to HE access, I argue that such policies would not have a relevant 
equalising effect unless student aid policies move beyond individual characteristics. 
There are, of course, individual characteristics such as ability, motivation, and prior 
academic achievement that may, in part, predict outcomes relevant to HE. Yet, more 
importantly, there are forces affecting HE participation that are not attributable to 
individuals: family background, exposure to education in the household, how valued 
education is in families’ day-to-day lives, neighbourhood, and student social 
environment also model HE participation. HEIs can support students at risk of 
departure by providing an environment for social and academic integration and by 
taking measures aimed at enhancing the student experience. Governments play a 
central role by designing programmes to promote a broader equity agenda, providing 
resources, targeting support for different social groups, and building the appropriate 
governance mechanisms concerning regulation and funding. The joint action of 
variables in the above factors should be taken into account when designing and 
assessing equity and inclusion policies. 
 
Apart from the above considerations, a central point of this research is that increasing 
equity and social inclusiveness in HE translates into weakening the relationship 
between socioeconomic origins and educational outcomes such as access, persistence, 
employability, or expected earnings. In other words, undermining this deterministic 
relationship should be a measure of policy effectiveness. Although normative, this 
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statement has sociological and philosophical implications that I would like to make 
explicit. Firstly, weakening the predictive power of social background on educational 
outcomes is at the heart of one of the main promises of HE in the Western World: 
social mobility. Nevertheless, the optimistic view that education will improve one’s 
quality of life contrasts with a body of research that has found participation in HE 
has remained highly unequal despite having increased dramatically. Secondly, the 
philosophical implication is that there needs to be a precise definition of equity in HE. 
The baseline definition I shall use is the following: two students with the same abilities 
and preferences should receive the same education, regardless of any other 
considerations in social, cultural, or economic terms.  
 
Equity is a multidimensional concept that needs to be studied according to its 
complexities. As such, I shall discuss what equity means and how it applies to HE.  
1.2. What is Relevant when Studying Equity in HE? 
 
According to Hansen (1972), equity is seen as normative, yet no analytical tools have 
been developed to study it. Le Grand (2007) distinguishes among equity of 
opportunities, processes and outcomes. Equity of opportunities and processes mean 
that, for instance, access to and permanence in HE should depend on factors other 
than income, gender, geography, and the like. This concept is similar to what Barr 
(2012) well defines: two persons with the same abilities and preferences (the only 
factors that matter) ought to have access to the same education. But Le Grand (1982) 
made a crucial point: tackling inequality starts by recognising that many differences 
arise from factors beyond one’s control, though the limits of such factors are highly 
contested -see, for example, the debate about talent and luck (Anderson 1999; Dworkin 
1981; Knight 2013).  
 
With a focus on HE, Lemaitre (2005) distinguishes four dimensions of equity. First, 
‘equity of study opportunities’, or whether the institutional settings regulating 
financial support, admissions, and geographical distribution of places in HE fulfil the 
requirements of poor students. Second, ‘equity of access’, which considers the 
distribution of HE enrolment across socioeconomic groups and the policies designed to 
18 
 
help poor students access HE. Third, ‘equity of persistence’, or the likelihood of 
students completing HE according to their socioeconomic characteristics. Finally, 
‘equity of results’, which considers how labour market outcomes are distributed 
according to socioeconomic origins.  
 
This thesis focuses on policies addressing equity of access and equity of persistence, 
applying the above definitions. 
 
Policies concerning equity in HE might be seen as importing from, and exporting to, 
the broader equity and social justice agendas (Brennan and Naidoo 2008). HE imports 
equity and social justice agendas from the wider society by addressing gender gaps, 
minorities’ participation, and socio-economic exclusion. On the other hand, HE 
contributes to equity and social justice agendas by improving social cohesion and civic 
engagement, and by making societies fairer and more equitable (e.g., graduates receive 
higher quality jobs and their living standards are far better than those of the previous 
generations).  
 
The more inequitable the socioeconomic composition is in HE, the more HE expansion 
relies on formerly excluded students. At the same time, HE provides opportunities for 
social mobility and improvement in living standards in any society. Although, as I 
shall discuss throughout this thesis, there is much promise left unfulfilled in the above 
statement, it is incontestable that HE is currently more equitable than three decades 
ago – anywhere.  
  
Nevertheless, there is much empirical evidence pointing out that there are unfair 
intergenerational transmission mechanisms affecting equity. One failure of the 
optimistic premise above is that it underestimates the effect of factors external to 
individuals and families. For instance, Bowles & Gintis (2002) tested the effect of IQ 
in the inheritance of socioeconomic status (SES). They found that factors other than 
IQ – wealth, schooling and race – better explained the correlation between 
intergenerational economic status. Though these findings do not exactly concern HE, 
they do express the main rationale behind this thesis: “a policymaker seeking to level 
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the playing field might use these results to design interventions that would loosen the 
connection between the economic success of parents and the economic prospects of 
children” (Bowles and Gintis 2002:22). 
 
Indeed, inequity has long been a concern in sociology of education. HE massification 
was the main educational phenomenon in the US in the 1960s, and it triggered major 
concerns regarding access and practices at college level affecting young people’s 
prospects of social mobility (Clark 1973). Walpole (2007) proposed the term  
‘economically and educationally challenged students’, to define low SES, working 
class, first-generation students. She identified prior educational experiences, SES, 
parental income, education, and occupation as core variables affecting access and 
outcomes in HE. In the UK, Gilchrist, Phillips & Ross (2007), on the basis of empirical 
models and research, hypothesised that low participation of working-class students 
was due to factors such as lack of information about HE opportunities, perceptions 
that foregone earnings would not be offset by HE, low entry qualifications, risks 
involved in financing HE studies, and even perceptions that HE would threaten class 
identity. 
 
McDonough and Fann (2007), by reviewing 114 journal pieces dealing with inequality 
of access to HE, divided the literature on college access research into three broad 
categories: individual, organisational, and field level. Research on college access tends 
to consider SES as the main influential factor, including family characteristics such as 
parental involvement, geographical factors, and aspirations. From an organisational 
standpoint, research identifies academic preparation, characteristics of secondary 
education, quality of counselling, influence of teachers, university recruitment 
practices, and diversity of HEIs with special reference to socio-economic segmentation. 
Interestingly, field-level analysis, by focusing the attention “on the macro-level changes 
in the institutions, professions, and technology of admissions in order to understand 
how student perceptions and actions grow from, as well as influence, organizational 
and institutional perceptions and actions” (McDonough and Fann 2007:77) has a 
strong explanatory power, as it contributes to a better understanding of the interplay 
between institutional and individual responses. The main critique from the authors to 
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the then-current research is the predominant focus on individual characteristics to the 
neglect of other influential explanatory variables.   
 
In contrast, the literature on student persistence and dropout has always paid 
attention to factors external to individuals. Student persistence is modelled by 
individual characteristics, but social and academic integration are crucial to 
understanding student withdrawal decisions (Tinto 1975, 2006). Other explanations 
have paid more attention to psychological mechanisms while still others have included 
economic considerations (Cabrera, Nora, and Castañeda 1992; Stampen and Cabrera 
1988), as well as explanations heavily based on choice and economic behaviour 
(Stratton, O’Toole, and Wetzel 2008). Other studies have highlighted that even 
though access to HE was equal in socioeconomic terms, it would not translate into 
equal outcomes such as graduation and dropout: low SES students are more likely to 
drop out and less likely to obtain a good degree (Crawford 2015).  I shall discuss this 
in more depth in Chapter 5. 
 
In the mid-nineties, Baker and Vélez (1996) reviewed the literature on access to HE 
of women and minorities and found a shift of the focus: family and class background 
have lost predictive power, whereas ability, school achievement, and financial aid have 
become more determinant. Nevertheless, changes in student populations – such as the 
increasing participation of mature students who are economically independent – have 
widened the study of social class, ability, and other social characteristics. The 
emergence of non-traditional students also challenges the traditional conception of 
student integration, which relies on building social ties between students and matching 
what HEIs and students expect from each other. 
 
1.3. Thesis Outline 
 
Many HE equity issues are well beyond the field of HE and rest, largely, in school 
education. The implications for research and policy are as follows. First, there is less 
space for HE policy to reach equity given that school education is critical for acquiring 
the necessary skills to succeed in HE and might, therefore, turn into the main source 
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of inequity. It is hardly possible to have an equitable higher education system and, at 
the same time, an unequal and segregated school education since high school 
achievement, the very precondition to HE entry, would be determined in 
socioeconomic terms. In summary, I seek to establish whether an unequal 
socioeconomic distribution of achievement in school can be seen as a barrier to HE 
expansion. 
 
Research has been prolific in studying the effects of student aid on access and 
persistence in HE, as I shall show in Chapters 4 and 5. Nevertheless, there are 
unexplored issues that may contribute to a better understanding of the influence of 
student aid on HE equity and what to expect from it. Firstly, research on student aid 
evaluation is scarce and hardly addresses issues at national levels. The complexities of 
student aid systems, regional specificities (which operate at the same time as national 
policies), and changes in HEIs eligibility for aid programmes make it difficult to assess 
policies at national levels. As I shall discuss in subsequent chapters, policy changes in 
tuition fees have triggered research on their impact on low SES students’ participation, 
the main question being whether and how the introduction (or increase) of fees affects 
the chances of poor students attending HE. Nevertheless, student aid is also in place 
in publicly funded and no-fee HE systems, so its relevance is not only confined to fee-
charging systems. Current approaches fail to explain what happened to countries like 
South Korea and Chile. In both cases, the private sector led HE expansion and 
governments had few tools to guarantee access to low SES students. However, 
inequality in access remains high in Chile but decreased in South Korea. I hypothesise 
that equity policies in HE are effective so long as there are well-timed policies, 
institutional mechanisms, and practices that contribute to ‘levelling the field’. These 
institutional mechanisms are to be found in school systems performance and the 
socioeconomic distribution of school achievement. 
 
Secondly, less attention has been paid to reforms whose aim is to restructure student 
aid by changing eligibility rules and introducing new designs. In relation to aid design, 
policies such as re-engineering student loans, changing the balance between grants and 
loans (e.g., scrapping grants and replacing them with loans), and building aid packages 
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tailored to the characteristics of different social groups define a new structure of 
incentives that may trigger behavioural responses. 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the following research questions:  
 
Question 1. In relation to how inequality of school achievement affects HE 
participation, this thesis asks: Is there a cross-country effect of inequality of school 
achievement on HE participation or it is a country-specific issue? Does inequality of 
school achievement limit the expansion of HE systems and, if so, how? Does the 
explanation hold once controlling for a number of country characteristics, institutional 
settings, and socioeconomic features? 
 
To answer Question 1, I have consolidated a cross-country panel for 63 countries, 
using the OECD Programme of International School Assessment (PISA) scores, 
UNESCO statistics, and World Development Indicators from the World Bank data 
centre. This dataset includes variables such as enrolment rates, school achievement, 
and socioeconomic characteristics of countries. This allowed me to use variables 
informing the general economic and social context and PISA performance, and those 
indicators dealing with socioeconomic issues, access to education, segregation of school 
systems, and persistence of SES in school achievement. 
 
Most investigations in the field have focused on studying an individual country or a 
handful of countries by using existing administrative sources and microdata and have 
compared, for instance, the effect of school achievement on HE entry as well as the 
persistence of SES on HE access. A key issue is that micro data and administrative 
records availability are mainly restricted to a small group of developed countries and 
this does not allow conclusions to be drawn beyond the countries analysed and their 
own contexts.  
 
On the other hand, it is common to find relevant research relying on macro data in 
the field of economics, for instance, with international comparisons of returns to 
education (Psacharopoulos 1988; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004) and the 
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relationship between education and income inequality (De Gregorio and Lee 2002). 
However, there is not a widespread use of international data to predict educational 
outcomes as seen in economic research. Macro analysis may make significant 
contributions since it is easy to streamline its results with policymakers’ interests. 
 
Question 2. In relation to student aid, this thesis carries out an impact evaluation 
exercise of a massive student aid reform that took place in Chile in 2005. The research 
question I address is: To what extent does widening access to financial aid enhance 
the chances of low-income students accessing HE? 
 
To answer Question 2, I review research on the effect of student aid on access to HE. 
Empirically, I study the Chilean reform to student aid in 2005, where a massive 
financial effort alongside a deep re-engineering took place. Nevertheless, Chile lacks 
long-standing administrative records, so linking HE access, school education, and 
socio-economic characteristics is not yet possible. In turn, I use comparable 
socioeconomic surveys for the period 1990 to 2013, the National Socioeconomic 
Characterisation Survey (CASEN), which represents the entire Chilean population. In 
order to evaluate the impact of student aid, I undertake a difference-in-difference (D-
I-D) analysis.  
 
The attractiveness of D-I-D is that it allows the impact of student aid to be evaluated 
over time by setting different aid packages. In 2003, aid was restricted to a small group 
of universities; after 2005, the government made more HEIs eligible for student aid, 
thus making it available to more students. The government also introduced a new 
loan scheme, relaxed the academic requirements for grants, and increased amounts in 
order to finance a higher proportion of tuition fees. 
 
Question 3. In relation to aid structure, I analyse the effect of aid composition on 
persistence and dropout. I specifically ask: How does debt structure (amount and 
composition) affect the probability of dropping out/ course completion? Do bank or 
harsher loans increase the probability of completing studies (or deter students from 
dropping out) more effectively than other student aid mechanisms? Does loan 
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structure have different effects for certain type of students (depending on income 
levels, prior achievement, or type of HEI)? 
 
To answer Question 3, I assess the composition of student aid on student persistence 
and dropout. I use administrative data containing information on students who have 
received a combination of loans and grants but due to a massive administrative error 
that ended up offering a new loan scheme (Crédito con Aval del Estado, CAE) to 
almost all students meeting the academic requirements without considering their 
socioeconomic situations. This provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of 
student aid on persistence and dropout because students from the entire socioeconomic 
spectrum took up loans not normally available to them. CAE students, in general, 
represent the new profile of Chilean students resulting from the universalisation of 
secondary education in the nineties and the sustained and expansive student aid policy 
since then. A number of students now come from low-performing schools, score lower 
in the university entry test (PSU), and are the first generation in their families in HE. 
I also linked records to school marks, PSU scores, previous schooling, and parental 
education. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
 
I start, in Chapter 2, by explaining why Chile presents a worthy case study. Chile 
introduced market-oriented reforms in 1981, where HE consisted of a few publicly 
funded universities and enrolment rates reached 5 per cent. In the last 25 years, Chile 
has quadruplicated its undergraduate enrolment and increased access to low-income 
students, although access remains highly unequal in socioeconomic terms.  
 
Chapter 3 is an empirical cross-country study aimed at studying the relationship 
between the distribution of school achievement and participation in HE. Its purpose 
is to test whether socioeconomic inequality of school achievement is an obstacle for 
countries seeking to expand HE. I have compiled data from a diversity of international 
organisations and development agencies such as World Bank, UNESCO and OECD.  
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I do find a mild, negative but statistically significant association between inequality 
of school achievement and HE enrolment rates.  
 
In Chapter 4, I estimate the impact of the student aid reform undertaken by the 
Chilean government in 2005. I use both observational and experimental approaches. 
Given the nature of the data, I obtain a relevant and significant estimate of the effect 
of student aid reform.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the effects of credit harshness on persistence, course completion, 
and dropout, featuring an original contribution I make to the study of aid in HE. I 
find no significant differences between students being totally funded with a state-
guaranteed mortgage-type bank loan (CAE) and those who used CAE to complement 
other forms of student aid. Nevertheless, when it comes to low-income students, 
privately funded students are significantly more likely to complete studies. This 
introduces an additional complexity to policymaking since private loans seem to deter 
only poor students from dropping out and/or delaying study completion. Is it fair to 
help the poorest students by virtually forcing them to complete their course?  
 
Chapter 6 outlines the main conclusions of the thesis, policy implications, and a future 
research agenda in the subject. 
 
The value added of this thesis lies in its following aspects. First, it addresses the 
relationship between inequality in school systems and learning outcomes, and the 
consequences for HE. This is at the centre of the policy debate since HE expansion 
crucially depends on the access of low-income and non-traditional students. Second, I 
present a new perspective on student aid by regarding aid packaging and aid 
composition as triggering different behavioural responses, which may be due to poor 
students being risk averse. Risk aversion needs to be studied beyond loan take up, but 
also as a determinant variable shaping the decision of persisting or dropping out. I 
undertake the first attempt to assess those factors at the country level and rely on an 
unprecedented approach to review the complexities of student aid design. Third, I 
open a new line of enquiry, as the natural continuation of this work involves other 
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disciplines such as economic psychology and behavioural economics in order to reach 
a better understanding of the mechanisms behind risk aversion and behavioural 
responses of low SES students.  
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2. CHILE AS A CASE OF STUDY 
 
2.1.Introduction 
 
Chilean HE has some unique characteristics: a high degree of privatisation, extended 
cost sharing, a high level of tuition fees relative to living standards, and a high 
persistence of socioeconomic background on school achievement and access. The 
country has experienced an explosive expansion of HE since the early nineties. Also, 
more than two-thirds of HE students are the first generation in their families to access 
HE, and many have even been the first generation to complete secondary education. 
 
Since the early 1980s, when the military dictatorship decided to restructure HE in 
depth, Chile has been seen as a paradigmatic example of privatisation, cost sharing, 
and increasing access to HE. The expansion of private provision was timid in the 1980s 
but has become the main driving force in HE growth since the 1990s. Low regulatory 
barriers to establishing new HEIs favoured the emergence and proliferation of 
independent private HEIs. On the other hand, non-university HEIs were created to 
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meet the demand for occupationally oriented courses, while the relative importance of 
public HEIs and their political influence decreased. 
 
Funding mechanisms moved their focus from supply to demand, with student aid 
becoming the most important component of public expenditure on HE. In fact, without 
considering R&D expenditure, student aid represents more than 40 per cent of total 
public expenditure in HE. The number of students being supported through loans and 
grants rose from 130,000 in 2005 to over half a million in 2015, whereas total 
undergraduate enrolment increased from 650,000 students in 2005 to 1,165,000 in 2015. 
This progress may not have been possible without the universalisation of secondary 
education that took place in the 1990s (MDS 2013). HE’s gross enrolment rate (GER) 
of the poorest household income quintile increased from 4.5 per cent in 1990 to 20 per 
cent in 2009, reaching 27 per cent in 2013 (MDS 2013). In other words, for the poorest 
young people, the chances of being enrolled in HE are currently 4.5 times higher than 
in 1990.  
 
Nonetheless, the Chilean school system is highly segregated and achievement is 
strongly correlated with social origins. Better-off students take most of the places at 
elite universities and courses leading to liberal professions, while low SES students are 
confined to low prestige and vocational HEIs, many of which are low quality. Although 
the rapid increase in coverage is often presented as a very successful policy outcome, 
many students attend university courses without the academic skills required in HE.  
 
A sensitive issue is that most academically disadvantaged students are supported by 
government-guaranteed loans and grants so, in fact, the government’s support is 
contributing to low-quality HEIs. At the same time, non-selective, second-tier HEIs 
present high dropout rates and an important financial dependence from student aid. 
This translates into a high degree of uncertainty for these HEIs because they are at 
constant risk of losing their accreditations and thus being unable to receive new 
supported students. Part of the late expansion of HE in Chile is due to a sharp increase 
of enrolment at ‘aid dependent’ HEIs. 
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2.2.HE Reforms in the 1980s 
 
In 1980, the Chilean dictatorship allowed universities to charge fees and incentivised 
the private sector to create new HEIs. At that time, Chilean HE was comprised of 
eight publicly financed universities, two of which were state-owned and six of which 
were private (though relying on public funding). The two public, national universities, 
-Universidad de Chile (UCH) and Universidad Técnica del Estado (UTE)- were 
divided into a number of new universities – currently 16-, which along with the pre-
existing private universities, constitute the Council of Rectors of Chilean Universities 
(CRUCH). In 1980, 119,000 students attended Chilean universities, representing a 
quite modest GER of 7.4 per cent of the 18-24 year-old cohort (Bernasconi and Rojas 
2004). 
 
There were economic, political, and ideological reasons behind the reform (Bernasconi 
and Rojas 2004). Economically, the reforms sought efficiency and equity by targeting 
public resources to school education and diversifying HE funding sources. University 
students came from better-off backgrounds and subsidies were considered unfair, thus 
charging fees was seen as justified on both equity and efficiency bases. On the other 
hand, private returns to HE were and still are quite high: a university graduate earns 
3.8 times more than a secondary school graduate, which is far higher than in any 
OECD country. Moreover, marginal rates of return coming from Mincer’s equations 
are as high as 20 per cent for an additional year of HE in comparison to secondary 
school graduates (Mizala and Romaguera 2004). Certainly, this is an average, but HE 
in Chile is still one of the most profitable investments an individual can make. 
 
In political terms, the government sought to atomise the main public universities, 
which were seen as housing the opposition’s political activism, by dividing them into 
many small, regional universities. The ideology behind this came from a combination 
of moral and political conservatism and the Chicago economic doctrine. Freedom, 
choice, and entrepreneurship were seen as a way to counter activism, protest, and 
debate.  
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The reforms granted a privileged role to the private sector, as it was allowed to 
establish new HEIs while public HEIs were not expanded. The Government also 
promoted the creation of a non-university sector; namely, Professional Institutes (IPs) 
and Technical Training Centres (CFTs).  CFTs were expected to offer vocational-
oriented, two-year programmes while IPs offered four-year professional programmes. 
Initially, three public IPs and two Teacher’s Training Academies were created by 
reorganising sections and regional branches of UCH and UTE. All public, non-
university HEIs turned into universities in the early 1990s. Thus, currently, the entire 
non-university sector is private. 
 
Under the dictatorship, new private institutions required a political ‘assessment’ given 
by the Chilean Home Office and a ‘technical’ authorisation from the Ministry of 
Education, thus assuring a certain ideological and political homogeneity and control. 
Quality assurance mechanisms were limited and set during the licensing period. 
Ordinarily, new universities were examined by existing ones, and after a probationary 
period, institutional autonomy was granted. In 1990, private HEIs could choose 
between this examination process or a new licensing procedure carried out by a public 
agency, which became the most popular. 
 
The reforms transformed Chilean HE into a multi-tier system: the university sector 
(made up of universities belonging to CRUCH or those newly created by private 
sector) and the non-university sector (IPs and CFTs). In addition, the reforms 
diversified funding, moving from purely block-grant funding according to historical 
considerations, institutional size and complexity, to a combination of block grants 
(AFD), indirect grants (AFI) depending on new entrants’ performances in the 
National Entry Test (PAA, currently PSU), and student loans (CF). As shown below, 
maybe the most important shift was the change from a purely supply-side funding to 
include demand-side financing (loans) as well as the introduction of competitive 
mechanisms (AFI). Private funding (through tuition fees) and a series of competitive 
mechanisms to finance research were also set. Interestingly, the original reforms 
undertaken by the military regime would have never considered public spending on 
the new independent HEIs they allowed to be created and promoted. 
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Following Clark’s (1983) framework introduced in the previous chapter, the Chilean 
HE system moved from a coordination scheme dominated by the state and the 
academic oligarchies to one based on the market (Brunner 1993; Brunner and Uribe 
2007). Nevertheless, the military government was never able to fulfil its own goals for 
HE funding (Arriagada 1989; Castañeda 1990; Lehmann 1990) as the 1980s’ economic 
crisis affected funding projections critically. The Government expected to increase 
CRUCH universities’ funding by 50 per cent in the period from 1980 to 1986: AFD 
would be cut by half, but AFI and CF would reach the same relevance as the first, as 
shown in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1. Relative share by public funding mechanisms (projected). 1980=100 
 
 
 
 
          
 
Source: Arriagada (1989) 
 
 
Projected funding was far from being fulfilled. This had an obvious impact in the 
medium and long term, as CRUCH universities became underfunded and student loans 
were, in fact, scarce. Consistently, Desormeaux & Koljatic (1990) found public 
contributions to HE fell by 41 per cent in real terms during the 1980s, while public 
expenditure in HE in relation to GDP plummeted dramatically (Arriagada 1989). 
2.3.The 1990s and 2000s 
 
The most relevant feature of higher education policy in the 1990s was the expansion 
and consolidation of the system. Most of the new private universities were established 
between 1989 and 1991 because the private sector feared that the new democratic 
government (Concertación coalition) would seek to undermine the private sector’s 
involvement in HE (Uribe 2004). However, these assumptions did not hold. The first 
Concertación, centre-left government, which took office in March 1990, prioritised 
resourcing to CRUCH universities by increasing funding as well as creating new 
funding mechanisms to foster investment in infrastructure. Concerning the student aid 
Type of Public funding 1980 1986 
AFD 100 44.35 (50)
AFI 0 7.3 (50)
CF 0 16.45 (50)
Total 100 68.1 (150)
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system, which had been left heavily underfunded by the military, the government set 
an income-contingent loan scheme in 1994 instead of the mortgage-type one operating 
since the early 1980s, and established a grant programme targeting the poorest 
students.  No aid was targeted to students attending new HEIs until the 2000s, despite 
the fact that a relevant proportion of low SES students were already attending these 
HEIs.  
 
Chilean HE became one of the most privatised systems in the world, whether 
considering enrolment or expenditure. Indeed, today, 78 per cent of students attend 
private independent institutions and 65 per cent of the total expenditure in HE comes 
from private sources, mostly tuition fees (OECD 2015a). As shown below in Table 2.2, 
Chile has concentrated on demand-side funding; institutional funding has increased at 
a very slow pace. In this scenario, student aid systems, defined as policies aimed at 
supporting young people to meet tuition and living costs, are critical because the 
government needs to devise cost-effective mechanisms. The evidence shows that 
Chilean student aid has contributed to enhancing access, but the mechanisms to 
achieve that access are not robust enough, as I shall show later. 
 
2.4.Shifting HE Funding towards Demand Side 
 
A new trend started in the 1990s, as an increasing share of governmental expenditure 
in HE went to student funding to the detriment of institutional funding. In fact, in 
1990, 74 per cent of public expenditure went to AFD and AFI. Later in 2000, the 
share decreased to 69 per cent, whereas institutional funding fell to 39 per cent by 
2010. This trend has been confirmed since 2000, as more generous financial assistance 
was set (through grants and loans), reaching few private institutions since 2001 but 
expanding massively after 2005, when student aid was opened to students enrolled at 
independent private HEIs, as shown in Table 2.2. 
  
33 
 
Table 2.2. Public expenditure in Chilean HE. Institutional and demand-side funding 
(Million CLP 2010) 
 
Type of Funding 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
AFD 82,059 116,284 135,568 144,422 177,936  212,170 
AFI 25,133 26,581 23,631 22,992 25,001  24,563 
Student Support (Grants 
and Income Contingent 
Loan) 6,368 22,088 54,791 82,916 234,200  554,755 
Institutional Development 
Fund 23,011 25,812 32,264  55,045 
State Guaranteed Loan (*) 277,292           415,951 
Other Institutional 
Funding 2,742 12,981 10,654 11,736 46,934  
 
16,330 
Total 116,302 177,935 247,655 287,877 793,628  1,278,814 
  
(*) This item is to repurchase portfolio and to pay guarantees. It should not be accounted as expenditure 
but as an asset but official statistics do include the item. 
Source: Ministry of Education (2015) 
 
Enrolment steadily increased from 245,000 students in 1990 to 1,265,000 in 2015. This 
expansion put pressure on public expenditure, not only due to the dramatic changes 
in size but, more importantly, because there were many more low SES completing 
secondary education and, in consequence, meeting the formal requirements to enter 
HE (Armanet and Uribe 2005; Espinoza, González, and Uribe 2009). 
 
The generous student support policy in the 1900s and 2000s, an increasing demand 
due to the universalisation of secondary education, and the creation of a state-
guaranteed loan system in 2005 created the conditions to make HE accessible to the 
very poor. Accordingly, and as expected, coverage rates in HE for the poorest students 
have consistently increased in the last 15 years. Participation, however, differs 
throughout the system, as student aid eligibility used to be completely restricted to 
CRUCH universities. Therefore, the private sector, especially universities, served 
comparatively more affluent students as no support was provided until 2006.  
 
When the government undertook an ambitious reform of HE student funding in 2005, 
there were two major developments. The first involved the introduction of a new 
student loan scheme, CAE, which was conceived to support students attending 
accredited private institutions (though students attending public and publicly 
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subsidised institutions were also eligible). The second consisted of a re-engineering of 
aid mechanisms for CRUCH universities. The government set student aid packages 
for those attending public and publicly subsidised HEIs, which consisted of a mixture 
of loans and grants, including a maintenance component for the poorest students: the 
poorer the student, the larger the grant component and the smaller the loan 
component. Horizontal equity improved significantly, as before the reform, each HEI 
managed its own budget to allocate loans. The most important change, however, was 
that student aid evolved from being strictly residual to a scheme of guaranteed support 
according to household income. 
 
Equity improved as student support systems were extended to private, independent 
HEIs. In practice, in the non-university segment, which claims most of low SES 
student population, the opportunities for access have been improving since the 
introduction of a grant favouring vocational courses at IPs and CFTs in 2001, before 
CAE. 
 
2.5.Unintended Consequences 
 
Earnings of HE graduates are still significantly higher than those of secondary school 
graduates, even though entry salaries may have decreased in the last decade. In Chile, 
a university graduate earns, on average, 3.8 times more than a secondary school 
graduate; the figure for vocational ISCED level 5B is 1.8. Although OLS marginal 
returns estimates for HE are high, the main problem is now the debt burden on CAE 
students. For income-contingent loans, the situation is different:  after 12 to 15 years 
of repayment – according to the amount owed at the time of starting repayment – 
any outstanding balance is written off. On the other hand, interest rates also differ: 
for income-contingent loans, the rate is 2 per cent real; for CAE, it is 5.5 to 6 per cent. 
This represents a major disadvantage for those with CAE loans; however, the 
government has introduced an income-sensitivity component and started subsidising 
interest rates (more details in chapters 4 and 5). 
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Both mechanisms show design failures. For income-contingent loans, repayment rates 
are about 50 per cent, forcing the state to provide funding for the system to keep 
operating. Criticism focuses on the low level of income contingency (5 per cent of gross 
annual income), short repayment period, subsidised interest rates, and increasing 
tuition fees. On the other hand, a study commissioned to the World Bank (2011) by 
the government raised concerns on high default and high debt-to-income ratios in 
CAE, which endangers the system’s financial sustainability. 
 
Despite that most students are better off with these policies, students and the general 
public are not satisfied. Chileans cite indebtedness of CAE borrowers affecting 
especially the low and lower-middle classes, rising tuition fees, perceptions of unfair 
access due to three quarters of the school population attending low-performing 
secondary schools, increasing enrolment in low quality HEI, and the perceived 
reluctance of the government to more closely supervise and regulate as critical issues 
that, to their minds, are not being addressed properly. 
  
As I noted earlier, an important part of the problem is due to the especially low public 
expenditure in Chilean HE. Even public universities rely on private funding for about 
80 per cent of their operational budgets, which is anomalous. Furthermore, in relation 
to GDP per capita, Chilean tuition fees are amongst the highest in the world, 
representing 27.9 per cent of GDP per capita in public institutions and 32.0 per cent 
in the private ones (OECD and The World Bank 2009). Chilean HEIs charge tuition 
fees similar to many developed countries but have a third of their GDP per capita. 
This explains why students taking up loans end up with a high financial burden 
relative to their expected earnings. Moreover, tuition fees have increased quickly, as 
shown in graph 2.1., representing a major issue for student support policies. It also 
deters poor students from borrowing money to take long courses, as their debt may 
become as massive as the value of a house. 
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Graph 2.1. Evolution of fees by type of HEI (current CLP) 
 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CNED databases (2012) 
 
This problem affects mainly the lower-middle and middle classes, who, because of a 
low-quality school education and a highly segregated school system, are hardly able 
to enter selective institutions. Nonetheless, no relevant research has been carried out 
on graduates’ labour market segmentation, which requires breaking down figures by 
HEI attended. Some government data suggests that, for the same courses, earnings 
may differ significantly according to which HEI graduates come from1. Labour market 
segmentation is a common trend in many countries. For instance, UK evidence shows 
an important variation in earnings by university attended as well as subject studied, 
where Russell Group HEIs lead in many fields (Ramsey 2008). A similar situation is 
evident in the US, where Ivy League Universities, again the most socially and 
academically selective ones, lead earnings in most fields (Gopal 2008). 
 
Although paradoxical it is not uncommon for the least well-off to face the harshest 
conditions. To solve this paradox, in 2011, Chile’s Congress approved a bill that drops 
the interest rates of CAE to 2 per cent and introduces income sensitivity for 
                                         
1 These data are not entirely transparent because the government publishes just earning’s ranges for 
many courses according to HEI attended, but it is not possible to know anything about earning 
distributions as earning categories do not fit with real earning distributions. Although there are available 
data, the Government does not publish more precise information due to technical issues (lack of a relevant 
number of observations), and institutional and political pressures.   
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repayments, fixing a maximum repayment of 10 per cent of earnings and subsidising 
amounts remaining. This is, of course, an improvement, but other issues well beyond 
HE policy remain, as I shall show in the next section. 
 
2.6.The Big Issue: The Chilean School System  
 
Until 1981, the Chilean school system was comprised of public schools, private 
subsidised schools, and private independent schools. The system was strongly 
centralised, coordinated by the Ministry of Education, and teachers were public 
servants. The reforms transferred school’s supervision to provincial bodies, public 
schools’ administration to local governments (municipalities), and set a plain voucher 
system to public and non-fee paying private schools on the basis of pupils’ attendance. 
Additionally, in 1982, the Government set a national standardised test to measure 
school performance (SIMCE). This quasi-market setting was supposed to increase 
coverage, foster competition among schools, introduce choice, and increase the quality 
of education. Unfortunately, the main assumptions required for a quasi-market to 
work do not hold in this system (Mizala 2007). 
 
In the 1990s, centre-left governments roughly maintained the system structure but 
made strong investments in infrastructure and increased funding, which the 
dictatorship had left at historical minimums. Massive programmes to improve quality 
and equity of the school system, a re-engineering of the teaching career, as well as 
targeted interventions for the poorest and lowest-performing schools were the 
distinctive characteristics of that period.  
 
The Chilean school system has become increasingly privatised since the 1981 reform. 
In 1981, 15 per cent of students attended subsidised private schools. In the 1981 to 
1986 period, more than 1,000 new schools entered the market, and by 1990, 31 per 
cent of school children attended subsidised private schools. Private participation 
increased during the 2000s, reaching 47 per cent of total enrolment in 2008. Most of 
this growth has been at the expense of public school enrolment (Elacqua, 2009), which 
represent a modest 37 per cent of school enrolment nowadays. 
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A high-impact policy was implemented in 1994. The government allowed private 
subsidised schools to charge fees without losing voucher financing. Many private 
schools began charging fees at the maximum allowed in order to keep vouchers to 
maximise funding. This policy is perhaps the most controversial in the Chilean 
education system introduced in the last 25 years, and is deemed as highly segregating.  
 
The core issue concerning school education in Chile is that it is one of the most socially 
segregated in the world. According to Elacqua (2009), more vulnerable students attend 
public schools that are more socially integrated than private voucher ones. As private 
schools select students by academic performance or other characteristics, public 
schools end up receiving most of the academically disadvantaged students.  
 
On the other hand, PISA results show an almost perfect stratification according to 
SES. Only a 3 per cent of examinees from low SES score in level 4 or above compared 
to 30 per cent for the upper group. The graph below is unsurprising, but convincing, 
as the correlation between SES and performance is very high.  
 
Graph 2.2. PISA score levels in reading by SES (%)   
 
 
Source: MINEDUC (2010) 
 
A very similar situation can be seen when breaking down PISA scores by school type. 
Differences in average scores are significant, with public school (Municipal) students 
being the most disadvantaged and private independent school (Particular Pagado) 
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students scoring as high as those in high-performance educational systems (see Graph 
2.3).  
 
Graph 2.3 PISA reading score average by type of school 
 
Source: (MINEDUC 2011) 
 
Regarding access to HE, both low SES students and those who have attended public 
schools perform lower in PSU, as shown in Table 2.3. Only 9.4 per cent of public 
school students score 600 or more points in PSU, compared with 14.9 per cent from 
private voucher schools and 53.9 per cent from private independent schools. This 
means that the majority of students coming from subsidised schools do not score 
enough to be admitted to a selective HEI, which is feasible only with scores of 600 
points or above (see Table 2.3 below). 
 
Table 2.3. PSU scores statistics by type of school (*) 
Score Public Private Subsidised Private Independent 
Less than 200 23 15 8 
200-449.5 38,749 40,869 2,131 
450-599.5 39,431 75,380 10,102 
600-850 8,157 20,521 14,284 
Total 86,360 136,785 26,525 
Mean 469.3 501.7 598.5 
StDev 93.2 92.4 95.5 
(*) PSU Scores have an average of 500 points and a 100 points SD.  
Source: DEMRE, 2015. 
 
The consequence of low performance in PSU is that poorer students end up attending 
low-quality institutions. This has an impact on student persistence, studies 
completion, and income expectations, which ends up reproducing inequalities coming 
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from schools. The correlation between either PSU or SIMCE score and social 
background is high.  
 
A relevant relationship between SES and student performance is unsurprising from an 
international perspective. In fact, according to OECD (2010), in Chile, a near 20 per 
cent of variation in PISA reading scores is explained by socio-economic background, 
close to that of countries such as Germany and the US; far from OECD’s average, 
which is 14 per cent, and even farther from countries like Finland (8 per cent), Japan 
(9 per cent), and Canada (9 per cent). 
 
The high level of inequity in the school system leaves HE policy no room to manoeuvre 
beyond remediation. Though HE participation of low SES students has improved 
significantly in Chile, the distribution of educational opportunities remains unfair. The 
implications of these levels of inequity drive attention to the performance and 
development of the school system, as policies aiming at levelling the field need to be 
implemented at that level. 
 
In the next section, I shall carry out a study testing whether and how inequality of 
school achievement affects HE participation. 
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3. HOW DOES INEQUALITY OF SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT AFFECT 
HIGHER EDUCATION PARTICIPATION?  A CROSS-COUNTRY 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
In section 1, I pointed out that some studies have shown that students’ socioeconomic 
background has lost predictive power when it comes to HE participation, with ability 
and achievement becoming more important. Nevertheless, the extent to which school 
achievement is socioeconomically determined affects low-income students’ access to 
HE. Even assuming that there are no financial barriers to HE access, that school 
achievement remains highly determined by social background may constitute a barrier 
for increasing HE participation. This is the main hypothesis I deal with in this chapter.  
3.1.Introduction 
 
According to economic theory, a more skilled labour force translates into gains in 
innovation and productivity, leading to increasing economic growth and 
competitiveness, higher wages, and a series of non-monetary benefits that determine 
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prosperity and well-being. Consequently, developing and boosting human capital are 
seen as crucial tasks for governments and countries. By widening access to education 
to as many citizens as possible, countries improve and expand the skills of their 
citizens; barriers to access actually play against countries’ interests by impeding the 
optimal provision of education. 
 
Over the last three decades, HE has been the main driving force of educational 
expansion. Nevertheless, SES still exerts an enormous influence with regards to access.  
Despite the global massification of HE, the proportion of low SES students remains 
small. Student support is inadequate and, in many countries,  public money goes 
mostly to subsidise better-off students (Barr 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, a body of research highlights the importance of prior achievement in 
ensuring access to HE, thus involving school education policy. Consequently, the 
socioeconomic distribution of prior achievement becomes crucial because it delimits 
HE’s potential expansion. A positive relationship between SES and school 
achievement is an obstacle for HE expansion, as poor students are the main source of 
new HE students. The relationship between inequality and access to HE has been 
studied in individual or handfuls of countries but there is no research pursuing the 
identification of a general relationship in a cross-country setting. For instance, there 
is no research testing whether a negative relationship between inequality of school 
achievement and participation holds cross-country. This turns relevant in a context 
where education policy has turned into a global issue and one additional reason for 
competition amongst countries.  
 
International and development agencies have contributed to the global debate on HE 
by promoting a wide range of education policies. More important, however, is the fact 
that these policies have been applied in several countries to bring more resources to 
the education sector, this way protecting education from fiscal constraints, increasing 
HE participation, relieving public finances, and meeting an increasing demand for 
more education and qualifications. I maintain that there is a global policy recipe in 
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HE but, paradoxically, empirical research has not focused enough on studying 
variables and relationships likely to be regarded as ‘cross-country effects’.  
 
Is there an average effect of inequality of school results on HE access that holds true 
across countries?  
 
I argue that the interest of the result itself is amplified by its implications for 
policymaking. In these terms, the most sensitive issue for policymaking is that the 
extent to which HE participation relies on school achievement and its distribution 
indicates the extent to which HE policy by itself actually influences HE access for low 
SES students.  
 
In this chapter, I shall analyse a dataset containing country-level indicators on HE, 
school systems performance, and countries’ socioeconomic characteristics, measured 
over time. The main objective of the chapter is to find a general relationship between 
the socioeconomic distribution of school achievement and HE access: Is there a cross-
country effect of inequality of school achievement on HE participation or is it a 
country-specific issue? Does inequality of school achievement limit the expansion of 
HE systems and, if so, how? Does the result hold once controlling for a number of 
country characteristics, institutional settings, and socioeconomic features?  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2., I describe the policy and research 
contexts and discuss the main literature on access to higher education. First, I show 
the reasons why education and its reforms are relevant in the field of economic theory, 
as well as the main motivations behind government policies. Next, I discuss the main 
research on barriers to access to HE, with a special focus on SES persistence. Finally, 
I review the core literature linking school achievement to HE participation.  
 
In section 3.3., I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using a cross-country 
dataset. Then I discuss and describe the main issues of the dataset, specify the analytic 
model, and discuss the reasons why each variable is included in the model. In section 
3.4, I estimate the association between inequality of school achievement and HE 
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participation and introduce control variables in several steps. I also try different 
specifications dealing with variables measuring school achievement (PISA scores) and 
investment in education (expenditure in secondary and HE as a proportion of GDP). 
In the last section (3.5), I draw some conclusions and identify further issues and future 
research in the field.  
 
Given data constraints and the nature of the chapter, estimates cannot be considered 
as causal effects but just as associations between variables. Notwithstanding I use 
several control variables and different empirical approaches to deal with both 
observable and unobservable confounders, I suggest that this chapter should be 
regarded as halfway between descriptive and explanatory. 
3.2.Policy and Research Context 
 
The fact that governments seek to increase and accumulate human capital as a means 
of boosting productivity and economic output is now common sense. In this context, 
confronting barriers to HE access turns into a key issue, as they involve efficiency and 
equity concerns. Competitive and market mechanisms have been devised in order to 
optimise and diversify funding and to increasingly target taxpayer’s money to school 
education. Barriers to access are relevant in both economic and social terms, as they 
threaten the optimal allocation of investment and impede a full and fair use of skills 
present in societies. Financial barriers not only matter, but represent a major social 
reproduction mechanism that keeps low SES students outside of HE. 
 
3.2.1. Education, growth and the shifting focus of educational investment 
 
The benefits of education for individuals and economies have been at the centre of the 
debate for more than 50 years. One of the most prevalent theories giving an account 
of the benefits of education is that of human capital. The seminal works of Mincer 
(1958) and Becker (1993) stressed the relationship between education and training, 
the individual income distribution, and the effects on productivity and growth. In the 
nineties, endogenous growth theories contested the neoclassical foundations of 
decreasing returns, giving instead a crucial role to innovation and knowledge as the 
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driving forces for sustained economic growth. The accumulation of advanced human 
capital in this context is seen as the driver. Thus, it became common sense that a 
good education system is a means for a country to assure economic growth and 
competitiveness. 
 
The interest in studying the relationship between education and earnings resurged in 
the nineties due to its importance for economic growth and the rapid massification of 
post-secondary education. A main  concern focused on the cost and benefits for those 
who were new to HE (Card 1999, 2000). Hundreds of studies have been done to 
measure the value of education using Mincer’s equation, and a web of research has 
been carried out to enquire whether the model still fits given the increasing availability 
and quality of data along with a number of statistical refinements to the classical 
model  (Heckman 1976; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2003). 
 
But formal education is not determinative when measuring the value of education. 
Cognitive and non-cognitive skills are formed throughout the life cycle, especially in 
early years’ education. Many education gaps are determined in childhood, and those 
gaps do not seem to narrow in the long term. Early intervention has a much higher 
return than traditional education and training policies (Carneiro and Heckman 2003) 
and  “reduce[s] the inequality associated with the accident of birth and at the same 
time raises the productivity of society at large” (Heckman and Masterov 2007:2). 
 
Some empirical literature also stresses the relationship between the wider social and 
economic context and education. Indeed, many investigations relate economic growth 
with educational attainment (Barro 2001; Hanushek and Kimko 2000; OECD 2012a; 
Psacharopoulos 1988). The reasoning has been the following: the more resources 
allocated to education, the more educational attainment of the workforce, and 
consequently the more productivity, which translates into higher wages, better jobs 
and household income, and economic growth.  
 
Although many agree that investing in education has unquestionable benefits for 
countries and citizens, policies promoted by international agencies have been seen by 
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some researchers as an ‘interested complement’ to structural adjustment policies 
carried out or supported by themselves in the eighties (Espinoza 2008). In the 
developing world, the World Bank (WB) has promoted the introduction of market 
mechanisms in school and HE as a standard response to structural adjustment policies 
(World Bank 2000).  Whether or not this assumption and the critique are correct, 
governments in developing countries have made efforts to devote more and sometimes 
too scarce resources to education. In addition to that, a chief motivation for 
bureaucrats and politicians is that citizens trust education as a means of improving 
opportunities for those of the following generation and, accordingly, voters favour 
governmental programmes promising educational improvement. This way, the 
educational debate becomes politically sensitive. 
 
3.2.2. Higher education finance and barriers to access 
 
In developing countries, the scarcity of resources to be devoted to education has been 
dealt with by focusing public investment on school education, as promoted by 
international agencies. In fact, since the early eighties, international organisations such 
as the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Bank for Development (IABD) have 
promoted the use of private funding for HE so that countries can target taxpayer’s 
money to school education. Changes in this direction have been implemented with 
international support in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, some African countries, and 
former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Johnstone and 
Marcucci 2010; World Bank n.d.). This has meant that subsidies for HEIs have been 
either frozen, cut back, or allocated via competitive schemes, giving priority to 
demand-side funding mechanisms (Sanyal and Johnstone 2011). In this scenario, the 
cost of HE has been shared/transferred with/to students and households (Johnstone 
2004), and governments have devised student funding mechanisms for poor students 
to overcome financial barriers.  
 
In relation to the last point, research has been carried out since the late eighties, on 
the effects of student aid policies on access and persistence. Some evaluation exercises 
have measured the impact of specific instruments – controlling or not for social 
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background and other relevant variables – such as guaranteed loans, income 
contingent/sensitive loans, and scholarships and bursaries (Canton and Blom 2004; 
Chapman and Ryan 2005; Dynarski 2003; St John and Noell 1989). These 
investigations have normally found positive effects of aid on access, featuring the 
‘optimistic’ side of research in the field.  
 
Research has also been conducted in order to establish which variables, apart from 
those informing the wider socio-economic context, relate to higher access to HE. For 
instance, the impact of socioeconomic background of students on HE access has been 
studied, amongst other countries, in Chile (Espinoza et al. 2009; Torche 2005), the 
United States (Alon 2009), Canada (Finnie 2012), and Spain (Mora 1997). Other work 
in a comparative context has also investigated social stratification in HE (Shavit et 
al. 2007). Most investigations highlight the persistent but diminishing effect of 
background on access to HE, then making the point for either reproductionist theories 
(Bourdieu 1979; Bourdieu and Passeron 1986; Bowles and Gintis 1976) or the 
Weberian social stratification tradition (Goldthorpe 2010).  
 
3.2.3. Reproduction, prior achievement, and HE access 
 
Reproductionists conceive education as a social process aiming at perpetuating and 
legitimating domination structures and the division of labour in capitalist societies. 
Bowles and Gintis (1976, 2002) stressed the role of education as reproducing the 
stratified structure of labour markets, and Bourdieu argues that selection and 
elimination mechanisms are more powerful than the pretended meritocracy: even the 
highest performers amongst the poor are disadvantaged in comparison to their 
wealthier counterparts. Stratification takes place even within HE through disciplines 
as low SES students are confined to less recognised disciplines, while better-off 
students undertake prestigious courses leading to the most socially recognised 
professions, which offer the best jobs and the highest wages upon graduation (Bourdieu 
1979). 
I contend that these arguments are not necessarily inconsistent with the fact that HE 
access for low SES students has increased worldwide and that returns from HE have 
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remained high. From the reproduction theory, I argue that the important issue to 
address is the intensity with which school systems reproduce and legitimate 
domination structures. In any case, the “progressive” and reproductionist approaches 
to educational phenomena should not be seen as completely contradictive perspectives.  
 
Although the level of determination exerted by socio-economic background on access 
to HE is consistent and persistent, the most important requirements for HE admission 
are secondary education completion and good school achievement. Countries (and 
regions and states in the US, for instance) measure school achievement using a variety 
of tests and exams. Some standardised tests check the fulfilment of curricular goals at 
different levels whilst some are properly exit tests leading to a certification or diploma 
(for instance, A-levels in the UK and Baccalaureat in France). For these reasons, 
researchers have used international tests–PISA, TIMMS or PIRLS–to carry out 
comparative research. 
 
A number of investigations use standardised tests such as PISA as a dependent 
variable, the predictors being socioeconomic level, school practises, geographical and 
demographic characteristics, immigration status, teacher salaries, and family practices 
at home that feature children’s learning environment and assets (Duru-Bellat and 
Suchaut 2005; Fischbach et al. 2013; Fuchs and Woessmann 2006). On the other hand, 
cross-country research has related scores in international tests–as they measure skills 
quality–to economic growth. The evidence suggests a positive relationship (Hanushek 
and Woessmann 2007; Jamison, Jamison, and Hanushek 2007).  
 
There also exists research relating school performance to access to HE. Studies in the 
UK show the importance of prior achievement in narrowing the HE participation gap 
in socioeconomic terms. Indeed, amongst the highest quintile of school performance, 
the socioeconomic participation gap is narrower than raw gaps (Chowdry et al. 2013). 
Additionally, Jerrim (2012) cites evidence suggesting that the socioeconomic gap in 
school achievement has narrowed in the bottom part of the achievement distribution, 
due, in part, to an important governmental investment. In Latin American countries, 
higher levels of inequality of school outcomes are found in comparison to OECD 
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countries. In fact, Gamboa and Waltemberg (2012), using data from PISA 2006 and 
2009, found high levels of inequality of opportunity when considering parental 
education, gender, and type of school attended. When using parental education, Chile, 
Mexico, and Uruguay – the highest performers in Latin America – showed the widest 
achievement gaps. Nonetheless, according to UIS-UNESCO indicators, some Latin 
American countries show quick improvements in GERs since the late nineties.  
 
The effect of school achievement, as measured by PISA scores, on access to HE has 
been studied by linking achievement with further educational trajectories. For 
instance, in Canada (Murdoch, Kamanzi, and Doray 2011), by using longitudinal 
surveys and following up students, researchers established that PISA literacy scores, 
schooling, and social factors appear to have an impact on access to HE and persistence, 
though the greater impact was found on access rather than persistence. In the same 
country, Finnie (2012) found that cultural variables are of the highest importance and 
argued that access policies should get away from the ‘old’ financial barriers issue. In 
comparative research,  Jerrim, Vignoles and Finnie (2012) have studied access for 
disadvantaged children controlling for educational achievement in four English-
speaking countries. They found that socioeconomic differences in HE access are more 
pronounced in England and Canada than in the US and Australia, and suggested that 
policies boosting school achievement would be more pertinent than traditional policies 
focused on aid. 
 
The above findings confirm that school achievement gaps, when taking SES into 
account, may vary importantly among countries. The rationale here is evident: the 
wider the socioeconomic achievement gap, the higher the inequality of educational 
opportunity. Country-level evidence also underlines the importance of prior 
achievement in the chances of low SES for attending HE. Comparative research shows 
different patterns for countries dealing with inequality of HE access. There is, however, 
an operational issue to address. Country level or comparative research using 
microdata, such as administrative records or longitudinal surveys tailored to 
examinees populations (as in studies using PISA), are mainly restricted to developed 
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countries, whereas this sort of dataset is seldom available in developing or middle-
income countries.  
 
Nevertheless, international agencies’ indicators are widely available for almost any 
country and data collection has been undertaken for decades and periodically, 
suggesting one should favour using country-level information instead of microdata as 
in the studies cited above. Looking at the country level may have some advantages, 
as including developing and middle-income countries, while controlling for a number 
of social and economic indicators not considered at the micro level, would allow 
investigating what happens with the relationship between inequality of school 
achievement and HE participation and whether it holds once country-level controls 
are introduced. For instance, a cross-country data set would allow addressing questions 
such as whether the inequality of school achievement affects HE participation once 
controlling for macro-level measures such as GDP and labour force qualifications.  
 
The above measures show how different social and economic contexts, institutional 
settings, and policymaking are, which is not likely to be addressed by using microdata. 
On the other hand, including developing and middle-income countries, which show 
higher inequality, lower achievement, and a more modest investment in education, 
adds by itself an important source of variability. Moreover, in developing countries 
and transitional economies, massive market-oriented reforms and privatisation in HE 
have taken place.  
 
Nonetheless, there are many caveats in cross-country research, the most important 
being data-measurement error. Jerrim and Micklewright (2013) studied measurement 
error in international tests with regards to SES, as it is reported by children. They 
concluded that parental occupation and education seem robust, but the number of 
books at home is problematic. This should be kept in mind, as I use this kind of SES 
score in my estimates later. 
 
On the other hand, using country means for indicators implies that generalisations on 
the basis of aggregated data may not hold at lower levels of aggregation and lead to 
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misleading conclusions, which is known as the “ecological fallacy”. A number of other 
operational issues regarding cross-country data are explained in section 3. 
 
From a policy point of view, measuring the effect of inequality of school achievement 
on HE access, having controlled for key variables, is of high interest. More important, 
though, is that having an empirical account of this would allow researchers to test the 
relevance of HE policy. If it were found, for example, that the most relevant predictors 
of access are outside of HE policy, it would contest many traditional HE policy devices 
that are used to equalise access: for example, student aid as some research suggest 
(Finnie 2012; Jerrim et al. 2012), and more crucially, cost sharing politics: that of cost 
transfer and privatisation being the solution for the poor to enter HE. Of course in 
such a situation, addressing the access issue should rely on school education policy 
rather than HE policy.  
 
Next sections address the lack of cross-country research intending to explain 
educational outcomes. Specifically, this chapter will ask: Does HE access decrease as 
the socioeconomic gap in school achievement widens? Does it hold independently from 
a number of country characteristics, institutional settings, and socioeconomic features?  
 
The above questions assume implicitly that HE access is a demand-side issue. Whether 
due to a political decision to keep HE enrolment within certain numbers or the lack 
of enough critical mass to support HE expansion -personnel, infrastructure, funding, 
etc.-, there might be constraints to the provision of more places in HE. Indeed, public 
provided/funded HE systems, as they rely upon public expenditure, may find it 
difficult to grow due to fiscal constraints or a political decision -sometimes with deep 
institutional and historical roots- in order to keep the numbers within certain 
manageable range. In some African countries, despite The World Bank has promoted 
student loans and private participation in HE, the scarcity of resources imposes 
restrictions to HE expansion. 
 
However, there are HE systems able to respond to the increasing demand quickly, as 
for instance Chile, Colombia, and the US with for-profit colleges, where lax regulations 
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to establish new HEIs make adaptation to an increasing demand easier and the private 
sector has led the expansion. As in the case of Chile I shall study in chapters 4 and 5, 
important increases in HE participation, alongside improved access conditions to low 
SES due to student aid (as it is also the case of American for-profit colleges), without 
policies addressing HE personnel development and the absence of enough quality 
controls on the new provision, the benefits (or the value) of the new 
provision/providers is questionable thus the efforts may not pay off. Although 
important, investigating the value of the new provision/providers is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. 
 
Countries included in the sample are mostly developed and middle income. Unless 
politically defined, supply side constrains should not be as severe as to represent a 
major impediment for HE to grow. It would not be risky to assume that in most 
countries HEIs would cope with an increasing demand. HE systems have responded 
from the supply side in one or more ways as for instance by ‘upgrading’ vocational 
institutions to HEIs (e.g., UK’s post 1992 universities) and allowing the private sector 
to participate (South Korea, Colombia, and Chile, for instance). 
 
Although I recognise that many more variables are important, I will focus on data 
provided by PISA, namely scores and the proportion of scores variability explained 
by SES, and control for variables operating in the wider economic context, school 
education, and investment in education. For instance, when countries are the unit of 
analysis it is possible to determine whether school achievement as measured by PISA 
scores still has a significant effect on HE participation once social inclusiveness 
indicators such as the proportion of scores variance explained by within-school 
characteristics as well as variables informing the wider socioeconomic context are 
included in models. The same rationale applies when including more controls. 
 
Hence, the main contribution of this chapter is to explain the relationship between 
inequality of school achievement and HE participation rates by using cross-country 
data.  
 
53 
 
3.3.Data and Methods 
 
3.3.1. The case for a macro analysis 
 
The use of microdata and the linkage of several administrative sources offer appealing 
opportunities for research. I recognise that the mechanisms linking school achievement 
and access to HE might be regarded as country specific to an important extent. 
Admission systems in HE, the presence of one or several school tiers and a series of 
cultural characteristics such as attitudes towards education are specific to countries. 
In effect, most investigations in the field, such as those reported in the above section, 
have focused on studying individual countries or a handful of them by using existing 
administrative sources and microdata and have compared, for instance, the effect of 
school achievement on HE entry as well as the persistence of SES on HE access. A 
key issue is that the availability of microdata and administrative records is mainly 
restricted to a small group of developed countries and this does not allow to draw 
conclusions beyond the countries analysed and their own contexts. More critically, 
developing countries, which hardly rely on quality microdata, have experienced the 
most explosive increase in education participation at all levels in the last decades, this 
being especially true for HE.  
 
Notwithstanding, it is not uncommon to find relevant research relying on macro data 
in the field of economics, as for instance international comparisons on returns to 
education (Psacharopoulos 1988; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004) and the 
relationship between education and income inequality (De Gregorio and Lee 2002). In 
fact, one of the more recognised works linking education to economic output is that of 
Barro (1991), which relies on country-level data for 98 countries in order to assess the 
neoclassical framework on growth on an empirical basis. However, there is not such a 
widespread use of cross-country data to predict educational outcomes in as seen with 
economic research in predicting output and growth. Despite the limitations of 
international data in relation to measurement, harmonising indicator definitions, and 
crucial statistical shortcomings like reverse causation and endogeneity, a macro 
approach provides answers to the research questions considered within this chapter.  
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Therefore, from a methodological point of view, the key issue in relation to the value 
added of this chapter should be whether obtaining an average coefficient measuring 
the relationship between school inequality of achievement and HE participation offsets 
the disadvantages of losing individual and school-level variation. From a strictly 
technical point of view, the answer is not clear as statistical shortcomings impose 
limitations to methods, thus the research may end up introducing more complexity 
instead of certainty. However, macro analysis may still make important contributions 
since it is easy to streamline its results with policymakers’ thinking.  In fact, knowing 
that there is positive cross-country average association between achievement and HE 
participation, for instance, may contribute to shifting the focus from traditional access 
policies such as student aid to improving school performance, allowing student aid to 
become a complementary policy rather than the focus. If the result was that inequality 
of school achievement is associated negatively with HE participation, policies 
attempting to tackle these inequalities would also remain within the school education 
field. 
 
Although a series of country-specific analyses may lead to similar conclusions with a 
deeper understanding of individual and school factors, the advantage of the macro 
approach I use in this chapter is that it may find that, in general, and keeping many 
country characteristics constant, there is an average relationship between inequality 
of school achievement and HE participation that is independent from individual 
countries’ peculiarities. 
 
In the last two decades, international agencies like the OECD have exerted an 
increasing influence on national education policies (Baird et al. 2011). Every three 
years, governments look forward to announcing good news to the public and 
highlighting how effective their own policies have been and, moreover, blaming former 
governments when good news is not forthcoming. PISA test scores are seen by many 
governments as the most authoritative measure of results, thus becoming a sort of 
assessment of governmental policies. 
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Despite international league tables and benchmarking exercises that are not 
questionable by themselves, this sort of information is taken so seriously by some 
educational authorities that they end up assessing, revising, dismantling, or imitating 
foreign policies on the basis of very simple associations. Nonetheless, I argue that 
educational research needs a mixture of strategies in order to gain more presence in 
the always problematic relationship between evidence and policy, and that cross-
country research can help uncover relevant relationships that may eventually translate 
into policy measures. Regarding this research, the conclusion is evident: finding a 
general relationship between school achievement, its distribution, and HE 
participation would contribute to making HE more socially accessible by making 
critical decisions at the school education level. The main consequence in policy terms 
would be that there is strong enough evidence to shift the focus of the debate from 
HE funding and cost transfer to school education, as some studies suggest (Chowdry 
et al. 2013; Finnie 2012). 
 
3.3.2. The dataset 
 
As I noted earlier, I collected data including variables from the wider economic 
context, school education characteristics, and investment in education in order to build 
a model to predict enrolment rates in HE. Those variables have to be widely available 
for as many countries as possible. Comparative datasets face a number of issues in 
regards to accuracy, national data sources’ quality, and availability across time. 
Changes in periodicity and the focus of data collection may end up leaving many gaps. 
In education, national systems differ from each other in many respects, for instance, 
in starting ages, compulsory years of education, and the very definition of post-
secondary, higher tertiary, or higher non-tertiary post-secondary level. Indicators such 
as coverage or enrolment rates harmonise definitions to allow between country 
comparisons. Moreover, the most precise and more sophisticated indicators do not 
always allow for better estimates because some countries are unable to collect them. 
In addition, policy priorities of international organisations may affect data collection; 
for example, giving more importance to certain factors in a period only to prioritize 
others a decade later may generate discontinued series, which may have otherwise 
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been of the highest value for research. Consequently, the operational criteria I used to 
gather indicators are (i) availability, (ii) continuity, (iii) simplicity, and (iv) 
comparability. In respect to comparability, I note the fact that comparability might 
well be fulfilled due to (i) and (iii) and the fact that a single organisation collects the 
data, like OECD PISA database. 
 
A dataset has been built taking into account the reflections above. I have used several 
sources to consolidate the dataset (OECD n.d.; UNESCO n.d.; World Bank n.d.). I 
took data from 63 countries, namely countries participating in PISA 2009 test, using 
World Development Indicators (World Bank) and UIS-UNESCO indicators. I 
considered the 2000 to 2009 period for the predictors and the 2003 to 2012 period for 
the outcome, thus allowing independent variables to be lagged by three or six years 
in relation to the outcome, depending on the specification. 
 
PISA has included more developing countries every round so it currently offers a more 
balanced country profile than 10 years ago. This improves representativeness but also 
introduce an issue with missing data I shall discuss later. 
 
3.3.3. The outcome 
 
The outcome variable I use in this chapter is the GER, which is defined as the ratio 
between the number of students attending HEIs and the 20-24 year-old population. I 
do not use the net enrolment rate, which only considers 20-24 year-olds currently 
enrolled in HE so giving a more precise measure, due to the lack of continuity in 
datasets and the fact that many countries do not report the net rate. The source from 
which the outcome variable was taken is World Development Indicators (WDI). There 
was also the option of using education attainment; namely the proportion of the 25-
29 year-old population with higher education, taken from Barro & Lee (2013) 
database.  
 
I chose GERs as the outcome variable for the following reasons. HE attainment is 
reported in quinquennial periods, while HE GERs are collected, in general, on an 
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annual basis. Using Barro and Lee’s database implies just using a half of the 
information from predictors, whereas HE GER allows using the full dataset. Apart 
from these rather practical reasons, there are substantive ones: (i) as PISA children 
were 15 years old when tested, the requirement is to count on attainment data 10 to 
15 years later, which means that for PISA 2000 examinees, in order to make sure 
models test the ‘same’ cohort, attainment levels for 2010 to 2015 are needed; and (ii) 
changes in predictor variables may take a long time to crystallise as a relevant change 
in attainment ratios, while variations in the predictors are more likely to have had an 
impact on enrolment within a short period of three or six years. For instance, a sharp 
increase of expenditure in HE through more grants and loans to poor students may 
have an immediate impact on enrolment rates, as GER are measured for the 20-24 
year-old population2; whereas an improvement of educational attainment due to this 
policy may take a decade to become noticeable. In other words, though educational 
attainment may give a clearer picture of how a country has ‘progressed’ in educational 
terms, a more immediate effect of explanatory variables is found in GER.   
   
Other plausible outcomes I did not consider because of operational reasons are entry 
rates (ER) and graduation rates (GR). Either a policy shock or a sharp improvement 
in school achievement would affect ERs quicker than GERs. On the other hand, GRs 
make more sense from the equity of outcome point of view. Indeed, high GERs may 
not necessarily imply that a country is successful in providing opportunities for low 
SES students as dropout rates tend to be higher for poor background and minority 
students (Bean 1980; Herzog 2005; Tinto 1975)). Therefore, improvements in GER 
may well mean the problem has been postponed. In fact, high GER and low graduation 
rates are common in Latin American countries. For instance, in Chile, which doubled 
HE enrolment in the last 10 years, just 50 per cent of students graduate (MINEDUC, 
2013). In Argentina and Mexico, rates are even lower, with individual universities 
reporting as many as 600,000 students at Universidad de Buenos Aires, UBA. Thus, 
graduation rates are cleaner if one thinks about how ‘robust’ are the provision of 
educational opportunities. Unfortunately, ERs and GRs are not as widely available as 
                                         
2 As GERs is the ratio between HE enrolment and the 20-24 year-old population, values may be higher 
than 100%.  
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GERs and attainment measures in international databases, and the number of 
countries in the sample (already small) would have dropped dramatically had I used 
ERs or GRs.   
An important data issue to deal with is that predictors and outcome should not be 
measured at the same time. Therefore, I have also compiled data on outcomes for the 
last available figure in the 2010 to 2012 period. Estimates were drawn by lagging the 
predictors by three years, or three and six years, depending on the specification. 
Lagging PISA scores by three years should reflect an impact on GERs since 15 year-
old students by t-3 are the new HE entry cohort in year t.  Something similar happens 
with lagging only PISA predictors by six years and the other ones by three years.  
 
3.3.4. Predictors and control variables 
 
The most important predictor in this research is inequality of education achievement, 
which is measured as the proportion of reading scores variance explained by 
socioeconomic background, namely the OECD Economic, Social and Cultural Status 
index (ESCS). The variable has been transformed so that it follows a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. In the rest of the 
chapter, I refer to it as inequality of school achievement. The reason why I use this 
variable instead of more traditional measures is as follows. 
 
In order to deal with a measure of inequality, Gini coefficient is the most traditional 
measure. Income Gini coefficients are widely available for most countries but 
databases are not continuous and many countries report Gini every five to ten years.  
Instead, I use an uncommon indicator such as the proportion of scores variance 
explained by ESCS. This variable shows how determinant the student’s socioeconomic 
background is for achievement, i.e. how ‘predictable’ school achievement is, given 
ESCS in a country.  
 
The measure shows an important variability between countries and this may reflect a 
broader conception of educational systems. Indeed, the extreme values for the model 
just containing ESCS as a predictor of PISA reading scores fluctuate between 1.8 and 
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27 per cent of the explained variance in PISA 2009 (1.8 to 22 percent are the values 
for PISA 2006). In fact, the variable accounts for the persistence of ESCS on scores 
but not necessarily just as a school education characteristic, but also as for how the 
country deals with providing equity of opportunities for school students. The more 
‘predictable’ the country, the stronger the social reproduction that takes place. 
Therefore, I can also use this indicator as a proxy of how strong social reproduction 
mechanisms through education are for countries.  
 
Alternatively, I may have considered other measures of inequality also coming from 
PISA. For instance, I could have calculated the ratio between the scores of the top 
quartile (or any other percentile) of ESCS and the bottom one, this way obtaining a 
relative measure of inequality of achievement. Other alternative measure might be to 
build a GINI-like index based on the distribution of achievement.  
 
Nevertheless, such a measure would not necessarily reflect the persistence of SES on 
achievement and would only be sensitive to variations in country specific 
socioeconomic distributions of school achievement rather than the persistence of 
socioeconomic status. Despite the issues that may emerge when considering a rather 
untraditional indicator, and the fact that coefficients might be difficult to interpret, I 
maintain that having a measure of inequality and social reproduction through 
education in a cross-country setting would not be possible by other means.  
 
I also include PISA reading scores as a predictor. The reasons why I selected PISA 
reading proficiency scores are as follows. PISA measures three proficiency domains: 
reading, maths and sciences. Every three years, the main subject is properly tested, 
whereas the remaining subjects are estimates coming from a small set of items as well 
as other estimation methods. In this case, I took data on reading performance because 
the reading subject has been the main one twice (2000 and 2009), the others being 
main subjects just once. For the remaining years (2003 and 2006) PISA scores are 
estimates of reading performance as the main subjects were, respectively, maths and 
sciences. There was no other option in order to count on as many test scores as 
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possible. This way I add a longitudinal component with the advantages it represents 
as it allows me to control for unobservables. 
 
I include inequality of school achievement and the ESCS for the years 2000, 2003, 
2006, and 2009 for all the models in this chapter. ESCS is an indicator including 
parental education and occupation, cultural assets, and educational resources in the 
household and it is used as an indicator of socioeconomic status. The base model, thus, 
considers inequality of school achievement and ESCS. The reason supporting this 
desicion I also introduce control variables related to PISA (OECD 2005, 2010). From 
there, I use the following variables: (i) and (ii) the percentage of score variance 
explained by within-school factors, which is sometimes called school inclusiveness 
index. Both variables consider crucial characteristics of school systems. 
 
ESCS index is a unidimensional measure of SES that OECD has estimated by using 
the first factor from principal components factor analysis on the basis of the following 
indicators: (i) the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI); 
(ii) the highest parental education level in years of schooling; (iii) the PISA index of 
family wealth; (iv) the PISA index of home educational resources; and (v) the PISA 
index of possessions related to ‘classical’ culture in the family home (OECD 2012b). 
The index has a mean of zero -which is the OECD mean, and a standard deviation of 
1. A negative value means that the country’s ESCS is lower than OECD average and 
positive values show the opposite. The index is not calculated as a country specific 
one but as a general index; this being the reason why some countries show means 
below or above zero (see OECD 2010, 2012b for more details).  
 
In relation to variance composition, within-school variance as a proportion of the total 
variance has also been included. High within-variance proportion might mean that 
different schools achieve similar test scores in general, and may be more inclusive in 
the sense that schools are more likely to serve students with different performance 
levels. Low within-variance proportion, on the other hand, means that schools differ 
but are internally more homogeneous, this meaning that school education is segmented 
as there are low-performance schools that differ too much from high-performance 
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schools. Finding bad-school, poor-student, low-performance (or the opposite) at the 
same time would indicate a segregated school system. This indicator intends to 
measure the first and the third elements of the triad. Following this example, 
socioeconomic inequality of school achievement as understood in this thesis would 
account for the second and third elements of the triad. 
 
As a robustness check, I shall also use maths scores and the variance composition 
indicators related to PISA maths. Maths scores in standardised tests have long been 
recognised as a better measure of school performance and as having a higher predictive 
value of future educational outcomes (e.g., university entry, college performance, 
labour market outcomes, etc.). Nevertheless, including PISA maths scores imposes 
important shortcomings I shall describe in detail in the results section.  
 
An issue to address is why PISA and why these indicators have been used.  Countries 
(regions and states in the US, for instance) measure school achievement by using a 
variety of tests and exams. Some tests check the fulfilment of curricular goals at 
different levels while some are properly exit tests leading to school leaving 
certifications or diplomas (A-levels in the UK, Baccalaureat in France, for instance). 
Most are used by HEIs to select students, so they are of critical importance for the 
student’s chances of being offered a place and continuing education. Countries like 
the US use standardised tests for HE admissions and school results. Since tests are 
used for different purposes, different aspects are measured. On the other hand, 
curricula differ amongst countries, thus a measure unaffected by curricula becomes 
necessary. Although I am aware of the fact that some research takes issue with this, 
threats to validity and technical critiques to PISA are well beyond this research.  
 
More controls are also included in the models: GDP per capita (PPP), educational 
attainment of the labour force – as measured by the percentage of the labour force 
with HE –, the participation in unemployment of people having HE, and GER for 
secondary education, defined as the ratio enrolment to people in the target population 
(13 to 17 year-olds in most countries). I have also used variables to measure the 
investment in secondary and HE as a fraction of GDP per capita. Those indicators 
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give an account of the wider socio-economic context. Educational attainment of the 
labour force is important both in terms of productivity and returns to education. 
Secondary attainment sets the bottom line, as it is the main formal prerequisite to 
HE. A country with no universal enrolment rate at the secondary level could hardly 
increase HE GER within a 10-year period. Finally, investment, measured as 
expenditure in education as a percentage of the GDP per capita is one of the main 
indicators when focusing on policy. It may reflect countries’ priorities as well as the 
relative cost of specific educational levels when compared to a higher or lower one. In 
relation to that, it would have been useful to gather data on public-private expenditure 
as it shows the main features of educational policy: the role of the private sector and 
cost transfer. Regrettably, that information is only available for a few countries and 
there is not a systematic pattern in terms of periodicity.  
 
3.3.5. Data issues 
 
There are many gaps in the dataset, especially in data from WDI and UIS- UNESCO 
where the data are collected every year. I dealt with this by using the last available 
value for the periods 1998-2000, 2001-2003, 2004-2006, and 2007-2009 to match PISA 
variables for 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009, respectively. In other words, I have a collapsed 
dataset informing four three-year periods.  
 
The final dataset contains the following variables: PISA reading scores, percentage of 
scores variance found within schools, ESCS, R-squared from ESCS, GDP PPP, 
percentage of the labour force with HE, participation of HE attainers in total 
unemployment, GER secondary education, expenditure in secondary education as a 
percentage of GDP per capita, and expenditure in HE as a percentage of GDP per 
capita. Every variable is reported (when possible) for the last year of the periods 
mentioned above. There are data for 63 countries, which corresponds to countries 
participating in PISA 2009.  
 
Nonetheless, one of the main concerns, especially when working with comparative 
data, is incomplete information for some variables. I considered imputing predictor 
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values by using two criteria. Firstly, I replaced missing values with fitted values for 
each country given by: 
 
ሾ3.1ሿ				ܺ′௜ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܺ ൅ ߚଶܲ݁ݎ ൅ ࡰ࡯࢚࢘࢟ ൅ 	ߝ 
 
Where ܺ′ is the predicted value of an independent variable ܺ, given by a linear 
combination of the valid Xs, the period ܲ݁ݎ and a vector of country dummies ࡰ࡯࢚࢘࢟. 
This is equivalent to fit a fixed effects model and replace the missing values for their 
fitted values obtained from [3.1].  
 
The second criteria consisted in computing a within-country mean for each country. 
For each country i and time t, missing values have been replaced by the following 
expression: 
 
ሾ3.2ሿ				ܺᇱ௜௧ ൌ 	 തܺ௜ 
 
Where തܺ௜ is the observed mean value of independent variables throughout the whole 
period of study.  
 
With either strategy, imputations were made only if at least two observed values were 
present for the variable. If, for a country, an independent variable had presented only 
one observation, no imputations would have been made for the independent 
variable/country.  
 
There are, of course, more imputation alternatives (e.g., more complex regression-
based techniques such as chained equations). It is difficult to find variables with no 
or few missing values in the dataset that may be used as predictors as, with the 
exception of identification variables, they face the same missingness issues as the 
variables to impute, then there are low chances of building a good imputation model. 
Even though the data allows multiple imputation, estimates would not differ 
substantially from those imputing using [3.1] due to the lack of auxiliary variables. 
This is not an appropriate setting to try multiple imputation techniques as the missing 
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at random assumption (MAR) may not hold as missingness is not related to non-
response patterns but to countries’ strengths and weaknesses affecting data collection 
carried out by international agencies, as well as countries’ policies regarding the 
generation, production, and dissemination of indicators3. For instance, the first round 
of PISA included OECD countries and a few middle-income and developing countries; 
whereas students from 63 countries were measured in 2009. This means that 
participating in PISA is not a random mechanism but conditional to countries’ income 
and development. In addition to that, some countries participating in PISA 2000 did 
not participate in the following version on purpose, this way allowing policies to 
crystallise or political reasons. Anyway, multiple imputation estimates, using chained 
equations, are also shown when assessing robustness and in more detail in Appendix 
A. However, I prevent that, due to the reasons given, these imputation models might 
not be particularly robust. 
 
All the models reported in the chapter include missing dummies. In section 3.4, I 
report estimates for models using [3.1] and [3.2] techniques, lagged predictors as well 
as models only considering full case data. I am aware of the fact that imputation using 
averages may reduce the variance critically but chances are limited 
 
3.3.6. Model specification 
 
The model will measure the effect of the socioeconomic distribution of school 
achievement on access to HE. I start by establishing the access to HE as a dependent 
variable being a function ݂ of a series of variables as shown below.  
 
ሾ3.3ሿ	ܩܧܴ௜ ൌ ݂ሺܵܧ݀ܥ݄ݏ,ܹܧܥ, ܫ݊ݒሻ 
 
In [3.3] ܩܧܴ௜  is the outcome variable, namely HE GER; ܵ ܧ݀ܥ݄ݏ is a series of variables 
informing school education characteristics such as equity of school achievement, 
performance, and social inclusiveness/segmentation; WEC are variables giving account 
                                         
3 For instance, the outcome variable may have many gaps as in some countries enrolment rates are not 
necessarily calculated by using administrative records but household surveys applied with very different 
periodicity. 
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of the wider socio-economic context such as GDP, school attainment of the adult 
population, and educational profile of the labour force; ܫ݊ݒ are variables accounting 
for investment in education at secondary and higher levels as a fraction of the GDP.  
 
Firstly, I use an OLS estimation. Let Char be a series of m country-level variables 
other than inequality of school achievement as in [3.4]. Formally, the OLS model is: 
 
ሾ3.4ሿ				ܩܧܴ௜ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܫ݊݁ݍ௜ ൅෍ߚଶ௝ܥ݄ܽݎ௝௜
௠
௝ୀଵ
൅	ߝ௜ 
 
For the i-th country: ܩܧܴ௜ is the HE GER, ߙ is the intercept, ܥ݄ܽݎ௝௜ are m variables 
to be used as controls, and ߝ௜ is the residual. The main coefficient of interest is ߚଵ, 
though some of ߚଶ௝ might be of interest too, especially those regarding PISA-related 
variables. 
 
Given the constraints and the nature of the data, I do not intend to establish causal 
relationships, but associations between variables. Moreover, there are issues like 
reverse causation and endogeneity that might bias the results. The main question here 
is whether ߚଵ is actually measuring the returns to inequality of school achievement or 
the returns to other unobserved confounders.  
 
Next, I use all available data in order to deal with observed confounders but I take a 
different approach to deal, in part, with omitted variable bias. One way of specifying 
the model is to add as many dummy variables ܦ௜ as countrites ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ௜ to [3.4] above.  
As the time dimension is included, the dependent variables, predictors, and residuals 
are added to the subscript t, this meaning that now estimates are for the i-th country 
in time t. 
 
ሾ3.5ሿ		ܩܧܴ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܫ݊݁ݍ௜௧ ൅෍ߚଶ௝ܥ݄ܽݎ௝௜௧
௠
௝ୀଵ
൅෍ܦ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ௜ ൅	ߝ௜௧ 
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In [3.5] all the effects of unobserved time-invariant characteristics are absorbed by the 
dummies. Another specification is the use of the ‘within estimator’, which measures 
the deviations from the mean within each entity – in this case, countries – so deviations 
of time-invariant unobserved characteristics equals to 0. I specify the model including 
dummies instead of the demeaned formulation as it is straightforward that controlling 
for dummies captures countries fixed effects. 
 
The fixed-effects model still has its own caveats. Firstly, omitted variable bias still 
remains as the fixed effect model can only control for unobservable confounders that 
are constant across time. Secondly, since the between-subject variance is taken out, 
variability is reduced, this meaning a loss of ‘signal’ at the same time that more ‘noise’ 
is likely. With a short panel, as the one I used, low variability might be a critical issue 
because in the fixed effect model all the variation comes from within-subject. 
Moreover, given this low variability scenario, problems associated with measurement 
error may distort the analysis and the estimates. This is especially sensitive to some 
variables in the dataset; for example, those reporting SES based on ESCS. However, 
the measurement error in this dataset is unlikely to be systematic. Finally, there are 
many imputed values so it is also necessary to check the robustness by comparing 
estimates obtained with different imputation techniques as well as complete case 
analysis (see relevant tables in Appendix A for more detail on missingness). 
 
I shall start specifying the estimation models by establishing a base model containing 
inequality of school achievement, PISA reading scores and ESCS. Additional controls 
will be added to the base specification in further steps, starting from within/between 
school variance composition, then I introduce indicators measuring the wider 
socioeconomic context, and finally I add variables on educational expenditure. The 
reason behind this sequence is that I mostly deal with the ‘interaction’ between ESCS 
and reading scores so any variables directly involved in the measure of socioeconomic 
inequality of school achievement are shown from the outset. I expect the inequality 
measure to attenuate as control variables are introduced. 
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3.3.7. Power and sample size 
 
The small sample size in this study (228 observations for 61 countries) is also 
problematic as the power of the estimates is affected. In this context, ‘power’ means 
the probability of obtaining a true non-null effect, and depends on sample size, effect 
size, or both. In other words, a small sample size, as it reduces power, undermines the 
chances of a statistically significant result being a true effect. It may also overestimate 
the magnitude of effects unless effect sizes are truly large. Button et al. (2013) 
illustrate the consequences of low power on the validity of the estimates; namely, low 
power means low replicability. They highlight the importance of a sound discussion 
on sample size and statistical power as an essential scientific practice. 
 
This is a threat to the validity of the estimates, so I shall also discuss power estimates 
in the results section. Power is formally defined as the probability of not making a 
Type II error, often referred to as ߚ. It is commonly expressed as 1 െ ߚ. I use a formula 
that corresponds to the inverse of that used by Dupont and Plummer (1998:599) to 
assess the power of the estimates: 
ሾ3.6ሿ				ݐ௣௢௪௘௥	ௗ௙	 ൌ 	 ߜ ܵܧሺߜሻൗ െ ݐఈଶௗ௙ 
 
Where ݐ௣௢௪௘௥	ௗ௙	corresponds to the value of t (two sided) in the t distribution, the first 
term is to the ratio between ߜ, which is the absolute value of the regression coefficient, 
and ܵܧሺߜሻ, which stands for the standard error of the coefficient. The standard error 
contains the sample size as it is the ratio between the standard deviation and √݊, 
where ݊ stands for the sample size. The expression ݐഀ
మௗ௙
 denotes the value of t at a 
given value of ߙ/2, with ݂݀ degrees of freedom.  This way, it is straightforward that 
 
ሾ3.7ሿ									ߜ ܵܧሺߜሻൗ ൌ 	 ݐఋ	ௗ௙	,  so replacing the terms, I obtain: 
 
	ሾ3.8ሿ					ݐ௣௢௪௘௥	ௗ௙	 ൌ ݐఋ	ௗ௙	 െ ݐఈଶௗ௙ 
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It is clear from [3.7] that increasing the sample size leads to smaller standard errors 
so ݐఋ	ௗ௙	 is bigger. 
 
With over 100 observations, normal and t distributions are similar, so one could argue 
that  ݐ௣௢௪௘௥	ௗ௙	 ≅ 	 ݖ௣௢௪௘௥.  At ߙ ൌ .05, the z value (two sided) is 1.96, then substituting 
in the equation: 
 
ሾ3.9ሿ					ܼ௣௢௪௘௥	 ൌ ߜ ܵܧሺߜሻൗ െ 1.96 
 
If the confidence level were to increase, statistical power drops.  
 
To obtain the probability of finding a true effect, I use the normal cumulative 
distribution Φ, thus: 
 
ሾ3.10ሿ		ܲ݋ݓ݁ݎ	 ൌ 	Φ൫ܼ௣௢௪௘௥	൯, 
 
where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. 
 
A different perspective is that proposed by Cohen (1988) -the one implemented in 
GPower software- to study the relationship between power and size effect. In a context 
of multiple regression, Cohen suggests using ݂ଶ, which is the ratio between the 
variance explained by the model and the residual, as a measure effect size: 
 
[3.11] ݂ଶ ൌ ோమଵି	ோమ   
 
The effect size of a given coefficient can be measured as a change in ܴଶ comparing to 
the model including the variable with another not including it. In bivariate regression, 
ܴଶ	is simply the square of the standardised regression coefficient r, which is the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, whereas in multiple regression the contribution of a 
specific variable to the model is measured through partial correlations, then the 
variable contribution is a partial-ܴଶ, which is defined as: 
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[3.12] ܴଶ௒௑,௑ᇱ ൌ ݐଶ ሺݐଶ ൅ ܰ െ ሺ݇ ൅ 1ሻሻൗ  , 
 
where Y stands for the dependent variable, X is the relevant predictor, and X’ is a set 
of predictors other than X,  ݐଶ	stands for the t-statistic corresponding to the 
coefficient.  ܴଶ௒௑,௑ᇱ already controls for the effect of any X’ variables. Hence, by 
substituting in [3.11], the calculation of ݂ଶ becomes: 
 
[3.13] ݂ଶ ൌ
௧మ ௧మାேିሺ௞ାଵሻൗ 	
ଵି௧మ ௧మାேିሺ௞ାଵሻൗ 	
 , 
 
Amplifying both the numerator and the denominator by  ሺݐଶ ൅ ܰ െ ሺ݇ ൅ 1ሻሻ, the 
expression becomes: 
 
[3.14] ݂ଶ ൌ ௧మ௧మାேିሺ௞ାଵሻି௧మ	 ൌ
௧మ
ேିሺ௞ାଵሻ	  
 
which is the measure of the effect size I use. The parameter ݂ଶ follows the F 
distribution so, for a particular F-value, given the sample size and the number of 
parameters the model estimates, the statistical power will be the area under the F 
curve up to the F-value corresponding to the effect size and the relevant degrees of 
freedom (for a further explanation, see Nakagawa and Cuthill 2007:598) . 
 
Another common problem with small samples is that the complexity of the model may 
exceed what the data are able to deliver. For instance, for a small sample with too 
many parameters, it is likely that the model is overfit. In other words, an overfit model 
is likely to be tailored to a particular sample so results are hardly replicated in out-
of-sample estimations. This is also termed as the model parameters being 
‘idiosyncratic’ to a specific sample. There exist several approaches to test model 
overfit, but I prefer parsimony as a general methodological principle. 
 
In consequence, I shall report Akaike’s and Schwartz’s Bayesian information criteria 
(AIC and BIC, respectively) on the estimates tables as an indirect way of assessing 
overfit. The advantage of using either information criteria, although there is no test, 
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is that they penalise the inclusion of additional parameters while at the same time 
assessing goodness of fit. Beyond their limitations, the use of information criteria is 
intuitive and researchers use them as conventions to select models (Kass and Raftery 
1995). 
3.4.Data Analysis and Results 
 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The most recent values of the outcome, 3-year lagged predictors and control variables, 
are reported in Table 3.1, where an important amount of variability can be found. 
Table 3.2 shows that GERs in HE have steadily increased on average from 49 to 63 
per cent from 2003 to 2012, this representing a growth of 28.6 per cent. Lower HE 
participation countries (those at P25) show a more rapid increase of 54 per cent, from 
33.9 to 52.4 per cent, whereas countries with the highest enrolment rates rose from 
64.9 to 74.4 per cent, this representing a 14.6 percent increase in HE participation. 
 
Statistics in Table 3.1 also reflect a diversity of countries characteristics. For instance, 
the interquartile range for GDP per capita is about US$ 11,000, 80 points for PISA 
reading scores, 7 percentage points for the proportion of variation in scores explained 
by ESCS, 12 percentage points for the expenditure in secondary education as a 
proportion of GDP per capita, and 17 percentage points for HE expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP per capita.  
 
Relevant to this analysis is the fact that, when predictors are lagged by three years, 
as inequality of school achievement decreases, GER increases. This negative 
association is reversed in the last period, as both mean and median ESCS R2 increase 
in 2009 (see Graph 3.1 and Table 3.2).  
 
No major changes to ESCS methodology were made in PISA 2009, but the inclusion 
of nine additional countries might have modified the relationship. It may have also 
been possible that, in 2006, the indicator of inequality had been affected by the scores’ 
estimation procedures although it is not documented anywhere. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics. 2009 or last available value (2012 for gross enrolment rate, higher education) 
 
 
Statistic 
 
Gross 
enrolment 
rate (%), 
higher 
education 
Variance in 
reading 
explained 
by ESCS 
(%) 
PISA 
Reading 
score 
ESCS 
(1) 
Variance in 
reading 
within 
schools (%)
GDP per 
capita PPP 
($05) 
% of 
Labour 
force with 
HE  
Unemployed 
with HE as % of 
total 
unemployment 
Gross 
Enrolment 
rate 
secondary 
education 
Expenditure 
in secondary 
education as 
% of GDP 
percápita 
Expenditure 
in higher 
education as 
% of GDP 
percápita 
p10 35.20 7.80 390.00 -1.16 39.77 8267.57 15.45 6.70 84.08 14.79 14.15 
p25 52.38 9.00 421.00 -0.62 48.69 11649.73 20.10 11.85 89.69 16.94 19.55 
p50 62.70 13.30 478.00 -0.13 58.36 23191.64 26.40 17.20 96.69 23.81 26.02 
mean 62.76 13.10 462.37 -0.25 59.68 23667.02 28.32 18.10 96.84 23.22 28.39 
p75 74.39 16.00 500.00 0.15 71.26 32469.17 35.00 21.75 101.94 29.20 37.68 
p90 86.02 19.00 520.00 0.34 78.90 41187.66 40.30 33.20 114.93 32.92 46.14 
sd 20.12 4.80 50.90 0.53 14.83 14568.25 11.01 9.80 12.17 7.38 12.02 
N 57 63 63 63 62 62 50 56 60 51 49 
(1) ESCS refers to the PISA index for economic, social, and cultural status. 
(2) Cross-country average is 493 for OECD countries. Mean reported here is lower as many countries performing below OECD have been incorporated in the last 
measurements. There is also an effect from the fact that these statistics are average values of country means instead of the average scores of PISA testees. 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for the main predictor and the outcome  
 2000 --> 2003 2003 --> 2006 2006 --> 2009 2009 --> 2012 
Statistic 
%Reading 
ESCS GER HE 
%Reading 
ESCS GER HE 
%Reading 
ESCS GER HE 
%Reading 
ESCS GER HE 
p25 10.18 33.91 9.92 37.75 8.48 46.06 9.00 52.38
p50 14.34 52.29 14.22 55.41 11.99 60.81 13.30 62.70
Mean 14.65 49.09 13.83 53.47 11.90 58.29 13.10 62.76
p75 18.88 64.87 17.89 68.00 14.53 71.01 16.00 74.39
Sd 5.12 20.83 5.36 21.46 4.19 19.60 4.80 20.12
N 31 57 39 58 54 56 63 57
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Graph 3.1. Gross enrolment rate (2003-2012) and inequality of school achievement (2000-
2009) 
 
 
A positive association between inequality of school achievement and GER is detected 
for the last period (the predictor in 2009, the outcome in 2012). A slightly positive 
slope is shown in the scatterplots (Graph 3.2), while the slope has been negative for 
previous years. Although this result might be surprising, I would like to hypothesise 
the reasons.  
 
A plausible explanation might be to assume this as a consequence of the 2008 crisis. 
A positive association between inequality and enrolment rate might be due to better-
off students postponing their entry to the labour market, this way relying on education 
as the crisis passed. Another hypothesis is that student aid policies may have been cut 
back by some governments, this way affecting low SES students’ opportunities, or 
credit agencies may have faced severe difficulties, as it happened with Fannie Mae 
bankruptcy in the US. Nevertheless, the scatterplots below should be taken with 
caution as they only show simple correlations between variables and might be subject 
to observable or unobservable omitted variable bias. 
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Graph 3.2. Scatterplots for predictor and outcome, by period 
 
 
 
Through different specifications, I shall analyse the relationship between GER and 
inequality of school achievement. I start by specifying a multiple linear regression 
model. Then I introduce the controls specified above.  
 
3.4.2. Basic OLS model 
 
I start the analysis by specifying OLS multiple regressions. The predictor and control 
variables have been lagged by three years. At a first stage, I use the base specification 
containing inequality of school achievement, ESCS and PISA reading scores. Then 
control variables are introduced in blocks to capture effects otherwise in the error 
term, as in the third model, which includes PISA variance composition. 
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Table 3.3. OLS regressions on HE gross enrolment rates (robust SE) (+) 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
compositio
n 
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -0.567 0.827 -2.368** -2.850** -2.253* -2.535**
 -1.099 (1.233) (1.200) (1.257) (1.151) (1.170)
ESCS 8.318*** 7.650*** 10.204*** 7.305** 9.034*** 5.110*
 -2.718 (2.597) (2.849) (2.820) (2.667) (2.612)
PISA Reading (z 
scores) 8.379*** 8.736*** 10.509*** 9.754*** 9.876*** 9.376***
 -1.556 (1.541) (1.564) (1.618) (1.564) (1.597)
% within variance  0.145* -0.094 -0.116 -0.092 -0.109
  (0.075) (0.080) (0.079) (0.076) (0.072)
ln (GDP per capita 
PPP)   -11.706*** -11.695*** -8.902*** -8.216***
   (2.557) (2.389) (2.475) (2.199)
% Lab force with HE   0.255* 0.240* 0.174 0.125
   (0.132) (0.130) (0.134) (0.132)
HE Unemp (% total 
unemployment)   0.465*** 0.488*** 0.405** 0.438**
   (0.170) (0.171) (0.172) (0.171)
GER Secondary   0.224** 0.233*** 0.219*** 0.232***
   (0.088) (0.082) (0.079) (0.071)
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.546***  0.644***
    (0.151)  (0.151)
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     -0.217*** -0.266***
     (0.051) (0.058)
Constant 
61.006**
* 52.624***
148.193**
*
136.134**
*
130.924**
* 
110.816**
*
  -1.487 (5.111) (24.205) (22.526) (23.249) (20.927)
N Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
R2 Adjusted 0.396 0.441 0.592 0.606 0.624 0.646
AIC 1927.9 1911.9 1848.0 1841.7 1830.9 1819.1
BIC 1951.9 1942.8 1906.3 1906.9 1896.0 1891.1
* p<.10, **p<.05, *** p<.01  
(+) All models include missing dummies 
 
In these models, inequality of school achievement is not statistically different from 
zero. By adding variables accounting for the wider economic context, estimates start 
changing and becoming statistically significant. This remains upon introducing 
controls accounting for expenditure. Indeed, inequality of school achievement becomes 
negative and statistically significant. Depending on the specification, a one standard 
deviation increase in inequality is associated with a decrease of 2.4-2.9 percentage 
points in GER, as shown in estimates between the third and sixth column in Table 
3.3. By adding controls, I still find a significant association, suggesting that the effect 
is robust to the introduction of more control variables. With regards to the magnitude, 
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the effects seem mild. However, if the context is considered, a value of 2.4-2.9 points 
is definitely relevant as the mean increase in GER in the 2003 to 2012 period has been 
around 4 percentage points every three years (see Table 3.2). Nevertheless, given the 
sample size, the power of estimates (i.e. the probability of finding a true effect), is 
rather modest, in the range of 0.50 and 0.62 (a threshold of 0.80 is commonly 
considered as a rule of thumb). 
  
Estimates of PISA reading scores are consistent across models and the effect size seems 
relevant. An increase of one standard deviation in PISA reading scores would lead to 
an expansion of 8.4-10.5 percentage points in GER. The coefficient decreases with the 
introduction of expenditure controls but remains massive. What this result indicates 
is that the absolute value of school achievement does matter for HE participation and 
that, given the effect size, countries with high HE participation are those with high 
PISA reading scores. 
 
Models in Table 3.3 were estimated using interpolation to replace missing values in 
the independent variables. As a robustness check, I ran the regression using only full 
case (i.e., cases with complete information for each model). Differences in estimates 
are not relevant but coefficients with full case show slightly higher estimates (see Table 
A.3 and Table A.4 in Appendix A). Indeed, an increase of one standard deviation in 
inequality of school achievement is associated with an increase in GER ranging from 
2 to 5 percentage points, against 2.9 points as the highest estimate in Table 3.3. 
 
Results so far tell that inequality of school achievement and PISA test scores matter. 
Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation is associated with about 10 
percentage points in HE enrolment rate – a half of a standard deviation in GER in 
other words. Could this suggest countries improve PISA results, thus school 
performance, as the most effective means of increasing participation in HE? Does this 
tell countries that even though inequality of school achievement affects GER 
negatively, increasing PISA scores would be more effective in increasing HE access?  
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There are also some counterintuitive results such as the negative and significant 
coefficients associated to tertiary education expenditure. Does tertiary expenditure 
affect negatively HE participation? The underlying reason might be either the lack of 
better control variables or that OLS is not the appropriate technique. In fact, there 
are many variables I need to control for that are not measured in the models as, for 
example, those related to the general institutional characteristics of education systems 
(for instance, whether early selection takes place), cultural attitudes towards 
education, or historical factors which may indicate that OLS is not the best approach. 
In turn, fixed effect estimates may in part address the omitted variable bias issue that 
is seemingly affecting OLS estimates.   
 
3.4.3. Fixed-effects estimates 
 
Estimates reported above might have been affected by a number of issues concerning 
OLS, the main being omitted variable bias. A sensitive issue is the lack of information 
on the main institutional settings in secondary and HE as well as cultural attitudes 
towards education, which are likely to remain constant across time.  
 
As the dataset contains information for four periods, I take advantage of the data 
structure. Variables dealing with the wider institutional settings of educational 
systems and structural characteristics at a societal level are not likely to change over 
a 10-year period, although educational policies might well change in short time periods. 
Omitted variable bias could, in part, be addressed by using country fixed effects. A 
fixed effects approach will show how robust OLS results remain when dealing with 
omitted variable bias coming from time-invariant unobserved variables.  
 
Variables have been introduced in blocks as in OLS models. Results are presented in 
Table 3.4. The basic specification only includes inequality of school achievement and 
the coefficient is statistically significant. An increase of one standard deviation in 
inequality  
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Table 3.4. Fixed effects regressions for higher education’s GER (+) 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition
Add 
Socio 
economic 
variables
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -3.645** -3.767** -2.142 -2.482* -2.451* -2.738**
 (1.403) (1.445) (1.400) (1.257) (1.314) (1.290)
ESCS 4.441 5.033 5.597 2.961 6.534 3.374
 (7.231) (7.040) (6.331) (6.878) (5.927) (6.527)
PISA Reading (z 
scores) 4.824 4.951 1.797 1.750 1.907 1.478
 (3.579) (3.592) (3.180) (3.215) (3.194) (3.161)
% within variance  -0.012 -0.024 -0.085 -0.007 -0.062
  (0.083) (0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068)
ln (GDP per 
capita PPP)   15.102** 11.490* 18.986*** 14.863***
   (6.650) (6.485) (6.011) (5.482)
% Lab force with 
HE   0.347*** 0.260** 0.330*** 0.256**
   (0.126) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118)
HE Unemp (% 
total 
unemployment)   0.234 0.157 0.254* 0.164
   (0.155) (0.168) (0.142) (0.159)
GER Secondary   0.141 0.245*** 0.143* 0.235***
   (0.087) (0.082) (0.086) (0.084)
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.718***  0.651***
    (0.198)  (0.200)
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     0.192 0.116
     (0.149) (0.126)
Constant 
59.884*** 60.693***
-
112.313* -95.779 -156.673** -131.067**
  (1.918) (5.506) (66.142) (65.024) (60.219) (55.684)
N Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
N Groups 61 61 61 61 61 61
R2 within 0.236 0.239 0.408 0.447 0.427 0.459
Rho 0.827 0.827 0.881 0.869 0.912 0.897
AIC 1501.8 1505.1 1461.6 1450.0 1458.3 1449.2
BIC 1522.4 1532.5 1513.0 1508.3 1516.6 1514.4
 
(+) All models control for missing dummies 
 
When controlling for PISA variance composition, the coefficient rises to 3.8. By adding 
more control variables, the coefficient for inequality of school achievement drops to 
2.1-2.8 and still remains significant, but at a lower significance level (p=0.10), except 
for the specification including both secondary and HE expenditure, which remains 
significant at p=0.05. In comparison to OLS estimates, which remained unchanged as 
control variables were introduced, fixed effects estimates for inequality of school 
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achievement become smaller. Common to both approaches, nonetheless, is the fact 
that it seems that inequality of school achievement does affect HE participation. 
 
Fixed effects and OLS models also differ in effect sizes of some control variables. In 
fixed effects models, coefficients for PISA reading scores are no longer significant. This 
means that PISA scores’ OLS estimates were affected by omitted variable bias as 
most of the effect has been taken by time-invariant cultural, historical, and 
institutional characteristics for instance. Equally important is that PISA coefficients 
effect size is massively reduced. Estimates for tertiary education expenditure are no 
longer negative nor statistically significant, as in OLS estimates. 
 
Power estimates are high enough for the first two fixed-effects models, in the range 
0.8-0.85, whereas I find power estimates in the range of 0.49-0.60 in the more complex 
models as in the last three columns of Table 3.4. This may crucially affect the 
reliability of the results because there is a high probability of the last estimates not 
being a true effect. Thus, results have to be taken with the necessary caution. 
 
With regards to models’ appropriateness, unlike OLS models, the introduction of more 
variables in fixed-effects estimates does not improve goodness of fit – as assessed by 
BIC – but the opposite, so there is ground, if not to consider overfit to some extent, 
to contend more complex models.   
 
However, in more substantive terms, I could still underline that there is no significant 
relationship between a cross-country absolute value of school achievement, as 
measured in PISA, and GER in HE. Indeed, there are, in fact, countries with 
comparatively poor performance in PISA reading with high GER as well as high PISA 
performing countries with lower GER in HE. This is what fixed-effect estimates show 
when comparing to OLS’s. Thus, for a country, the absolute value of PISA is not 
relevant for HE participation, although the relative school performance within that 
country seems to be relevant in order to access HE. Therefore, the relationship 
between prior achievement and access to HE should be regarded as idiosyncratic or 
country specific.   
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Nevertheless, the distribution of school achievement seemingly matters at a cross-
country level and affects HE participation negatively. The more the persistence of SES 
on school achievement, the fewer chances of increasing participation in HE. Although 
this indicator has not been used by researchers and may be hard to interpret, my 
estimates show that weakening the association between SES and school achievement 
might be of key importance for countries to increase participation in HE. Moreover, a 
finding like this highlights the importance of counting on variables measuring social 
selection mechanisms in education systems, as their influence might be crucial in order 
to study social reproduction mechanisms through education. More importantly, 
however, is that this sort of finding may alert countries designing interventions aimed 
at achieving equity of HE access to look outside HE policy. 
 
I have checked my results’ robustness by running the models with different imputation 
methods and several alternatives of lagged periods as well as including complete case 
analysis. These estimates are shown in Table 3.5. Column 1 shows the same coefficients 
for inequality of school achievement shown in Table 3.4.  
 
Estimates do not vary dramatically, but coefficients are bigger in columns 2 and 4 
(PISA variables lagged by 6 years and full case, respectively). Full case estimates are 
similar to those reported in Table 3.4 (column 1), so are estimates using within-country 
means as imputation technique (column 3). 
Table 3.5. Fixed effects coefficients for inequality of school achievement  
 1 2 3 4 5
  b b b b b 
Base  -3.645*** -4.394*** -3.386** -3.061* -3.206** 
Add PISA variance components -3.767** -4.323*** -3.553** -2.689* -3.210** 
Add Socio economic variables -2.142 -3.888*** -2.280 -1.431 -2.174 
Add Secondary expenditure -2.482* -3.545** -2.362 -2.688** -2.809** 
Add HE expenditure -2.451* -3.644*** -2.474* -3.299** -2.468* 
Add Sec & Tert expenditure -2.738** -3.301** -2.699* -2.673** -2.968**  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01      
1: Variable of interest and all controls lagged by 3 years from outcome; missing values interpolated 
2: Variable of interest and PISA variables lagged by 6 years, all the remaining variables lagged by 3 
years from outcome; missing values interpolated  
3: Variable of interest and all controls lagged by 3 years from outcome; missing values imputed by 
using within-country means  
4: Variable of interest and all controls lagged by 3 years from outcome; full case 
5: Variable of interest and all controls lagged by 3 years from outcome; multiple imputation estimates 
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Coefficients in column 2 are estimated from a smaller sample as lagging PISA variables 
by 6 years means missing one observation point so the total variance is reduced. 
Nevertheless, the effect size is bigger and statistical power stays in the 0.80 area. 
Detailed tables reporting estimates for imputed data and full case are presented in 
Appendix A, as well as the full outputs for the estimates shown in Table 3.5. 
 
In summary, results suggest that an increase of one standard deviation in inequality 
of school achievement is associated with a decrease of 2.5 to 4 percentage points in 
HE GER. The coefficient value is relevant because, as noted above, this range of values 
represents between a half and three-quarters of the average GER increase in the last 
three years. 
 
However, I introduce an additional robustness check by re-running the models using 
inequality of school achievement but using PISA maths instead. Although the 
proportion of PISA maths variance explained by ESCS is not available for PISA 2009, 
I used 2000, 2003, and 2006 tests to re-run the estimates in Table 3.4.  In Table 3.6., 
I compare the estimates for the same specifications in Table 3.4, but this time using 
the predictor values for 2000, 2003, and 2006 and the outcome value for 2003, 2006, 
and 2009. 
 
Table 3.6. Estimates of inequality of school achievement using reading and maths PISA 
scores 
 Reading Maths 
  b b 
Base (Only R-sq ESCS and ESCS) -3.465*** 0.971 
Add PISA variables -3.414*** 0.715 
Add Socio economic variables -2.152 -0.202 
Add Secondary expenditure -2.791* -1.219 
Add HE expenditure -2.188 -0.368 
Add Sec & HE expenditure -2.692* -1.046 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
I find quite different estimates conditional to which subject score is used. There are 
good reasons either supporting the use of maths or reading when it comes to measuring 
school achievement. Firstly, maths skills might be regarded as not being culturally 
specific, as mathematical concepts might be universal so measures of different 
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countries should be more transparent, easier, and more comparable than reading. In 
other words, there are substantive and methodological reasons supporting math scores. 
Secondly, one may also conjecture that the distribution of maths skills might also be 
less socially determined than reading. Thus, obtaining coefficients not significantly 
different from zero for the variable measuring inequality of school achievement is 
unsurprising.  
 
Nevertheless, there are also good reasons favouring reading scores. First, during the 
period covered in this study, reading has been the principal subject in 2000 and 2009 
whereas maths was the principal subject only in 2003. Scores of non-principal subjects 
are estimated on the basis of a reduced set of items, so they may be less accurate. 
Second, the comparison shown in Table 3.5 is made from data having less variance, 
which may induce unstable coefficients. Third, there are some pieces of research in the 
UK showing a higher relative importance of reading skills when it comes to access to 
university (Aucejo and James 2015). In the US some research on academic under 
preparedness of freshmen suggests that a lack of literacy skills is harder to address 
with remediation courses than a lack of maths skills (Adelman 2004). Although this 
work might reflect the fact that a higher proportion of university courses require 
reading over maths skills, it may also reflect the fact that literacy skills are more likely 
to be determined by social class than maths skills. This is well in line with classical 
developments of socio-linguistics because, as Bernstein (2003) noted, working-class 
children, unlike their middle and upper-class counterparts, were socialised within a 
more restricted linguistic code. 
3.5.Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The above results suggest that inequality of school performance is negatively 
associated to HE GER. Coefficients are consistent and significant for a relevant 
number of specifications regardless of methods (OLS or fixed effects), imputation 
technique, or timing between predictor and outcome variables. Besides the criticisms 
to PISA-driven education policies, my results show that at a cross-country level, 
keeping a number of variables constant, inequality of school achievement is negatively 
associated to HE growth. 
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The main caveat is the lack of statistical power of the models, including the full set of 
control variables. This is certainly an issue when the effects are mild as the ones 
reported in this chapter since small sample sizes make it harder to pick small effects. 
Moreover, it is also possible that the most complex models are overfit so long as BIC 
does not improve. I just have 10 observations per parameter in the most complex 
model (228/21, as missing dummies are included), which means the size/parameters 
ratio is in the lower bound of the conventionally recommended. 
 
In countries where tests results are more ‘predictable’, conditional to ESCS, HE GERs 
drop. In other words, higher inequality of learning outcomes, conditional to social 
background, does affect HE systems. The main policy implication is that governments 
should not only focus on improving achievement, but on policies seeking to break 
socioeconomic gaps in learning outcomes. This might suggest that policies looking to 
increase HE participation should focus on school education instead of relying on HE 
student aid.  
 
My results support the claim that the main mechanisms determining access to HE are 
likely to be country specific as there is no statistically significant cross-country average 
effect between test results and GERs, otherwise, HE GERs would be streamlined with 
PISA scores. This is consistent with the fact that, in some countries, HE has been 
accessible to students sometimes lacking the necessary skills to succeed in HE through 
the development of second-tier HEIs. Examples of this are for-profit universities in the 
US and the rapid emergence of private, non-selective HE institution. Both are included 
in enrolment figures, but the real value of the credentials offered is highly contested. 
 
For more robust estimates, a larger sample – or at least feasible proxies – is required, 
especially on the composition of expenditure and HE policy mechanisms giving an 
account of cost sharing and the balance between supply-and-demand-side funding. 
Obtaining such data for the same number of countries for several time periods seems 
unfeasible. Fast growing HE systems are more likely to correspond to developing 
countries that have prioritised financing school education out of public funds; thus, it 
83 
 
does not seem to be other chances than fostering private participation and cost transfer 
in HE. 
 
The fixed-effects approach undertaken in this chapter is not able to deal with sensitive 
issues affecting HE policy, such as the creation of new student aid mechanisms, abrupt 
changes in cost sharing/transfer structures, and fees policies, as they cannot be 
assumed as time invariant. This is probably the key weakness of the approach 
undertaken in this chapter: a policy shock may influence enrolment rates immediately, 
as evident in Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia, and Brazil, to a lesser 
extent). Notwithstanding, I included several control variables and dealt with time-
invariant unobserved variables. It is necessary to find better controls that account for 
policy changes and the private/public balance in terms of funding and enrolment.  
 
As I shall show in the next chapter, according to the literature, cost sharing/transfer 
mechanisms are harmless to equity of access so long as student aid policies are 
supportive enough and also streamlined with the characteristics and the specific needs 
of the target population. I shall present a case where an aggressive reform to student 
aid contributed in a great deal to a sharp boost to low SES students’ participation in 
HE. 
 
It is also desirable to have data on the socioeconomic composition of enrolment; for 
instance, the HE enrolment rates for different levels of income. In fact, in order to 
study access to HE with more depth, enrolment rates broken down by household 
income levels would be a key outcome to investigate. This information is available for 
a few countries, but is neither systematically nor periodically collected by international 
organisations. A short-term research agenda should include the collection of more 
measures of outcome and including additional variables in order to have more accurate 
predictors, as well as using alternative methodological approaches.  
 
School performance and main social reproduction mechanisms play a key role as 
predictors of HE participation. Equity driven HE policies may have no effect if they 
do not recognise inequalities coming from school education. Governments have set a 
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series of policies to overcome barriers to access, but inequity of access still remains 
high.   
 
This leads to the next Chapter, where I analyse the case of Chile. The country has 
expanded HE quickly and has also made progress in school education outcomes as 
measured by PISA scores. Chile has also provided opportunities to poor students by 
devoting 40 per cent of its public expenditure in HE to student aid. Notwithstanding, 
Chile has one of the most segregated school systems globally as well as high inequality 
levels, the second in Latin America behind Brazil. Despite showing impressive 
economic results in the last 25 years, old, sensitive, and persistent issues remain, which 
feature Chile as a paradigmatic case of study: most educational issues I have 
mentioned in the introduction and this chapter are taking place there. 
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4. INCREASING PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
THROUGH STUDENT AID: AN IMPACT EVALUATION EXERCISE 
OF CHILE’S 2005 REFORM 
 
4.1.Introduction 
 
Student financial support mechanisms have long been seen as the most prominent set 
of policies to reach equity in HE. Governments, regardless how public/private HE 
systems are, have devoted an increasing share of their expenditure to student aid. 
Indeed, on average, 22 per cent of the total public expenditure in HE in OECD 
countries corresponds to student aid. Apart from aiming at overcoming financial 
barriers to access, student aid may also boost student persistence and shorten course 
completion. This chapter focuses on the effect of student aid on access to HE through 
an impact evaluation of a change in the student aid system in Chile. Data limitations 
and the complexity of the policy do not allow an impact evaluation of the whole policy 
but that of grants, as I shall explain. However, the importance of evaluating grants 
lies in the fact that the rules have normally reserved them to the poorest students. I 
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evaluate the impact of the grants policy on the probability of access to higher 
education for the poorest students. 
 
In 2005, the Chilean government introduced a major reform to student aid. The 
changes were critical because Chilean HE relies heavily on student financing. Indeed, 
in 2014, student aid represented a 38.2 per cent of the country’s total public 
expenditure in HE; well above the OECD average. Nevertheless, there were two major 
issues that the government have to address before the reform. Firstly, there was no 
support for students attending private independent HEIs4, which accounted for two-
thirds of the undergraduate enrolment in 2005. Private independent HEIs in Chile 
started in 1981 without any direct government support except for a few –and marginal- 
student grants since 2001 (for more detail of the 1980’s reform, see Chapter 2). 
However, as enrolment and participation of private independent HEIs became 
relevant, equity implications and the social pressure to support poor students 
compelled the government to take action. Secondly, multiple and often inconsistent 
aid programmes used to support only CRUCH universities students. Both of these 
issues affected HE equity as a large number of low-income students were excluded 
from government support and were, therefore, unable to afford HE. 
 
The reform addressed the lack of equity by introducing loans and grants for students 
attending private independent universities. The main purpose was to reach horizontal 
equity. In other words, the aim was to realise the ambition that two students with the 
same skills, preferences and socioeconomic need should receive the same support from 
the government, regardless of the HEI they attend. 
 
Although addressing the lack of support for students at independent private HEIs was 
the main focus, the government also sought to reorganise the pre-existent student aid 
system serving CRUCH universities students. Indeed, the reform also benefited 
                                         
4 In what follows I refer to ‘private independent’ as fee charging HEIs which do not receive institutional 
grants from the government. Public HEIs stand for state owned institutions, whereas ‘private subsidised’ 
or ‘private maintained’ HEIs stand for private HEIs which receive government grants. ‘Subsidised HEIs’, 
in consequence, refer to both public HEIs and private maintained HEIs. I have not strictly followed 
OECD (2004) definitions but adapted as much as possible to the Chilean context  
87 
 
CRUCH students by increasing the level of support, though the effect was milder than 
that on private independent HEIs.  
 
The reform also introduced a major change in administrative terms. By implementing 
a single window system - instead of one application for each programme as in the old 
system -, the application procedure becomes simpler. This way, the risk of students 
not applying for aid is minimised and, consequently, the risk of not getting support 
provided that the poorest students have a limited access to information on the array 
of benefits available to them. 
 
The government determination to guarantee aid packages according to socioeconomic 
need and academic merit was critical regarding equity of access. The aspiration was 
that every student, being aware of their economic situation and academic merit, knew 
in advance what kind of support was available to them before making any enrolment 
decision. Hence, the system became more transparent so that students could make 
enrolment decisions on the basis of straightforward information.  
 
The main policy change consisted in creating a new loan system, CAE, a private loan 
programme, with the state guarantee as collateral. CAE was designed to support 
students enrolled at private independent HEIs, on the basis of socioeconomic need, 
but also as a ‘top up’ aid for CRUCH universities students, which were in part 
supported5 by the existing mechanisms. On the other hand, grants, which were 
previously available to CRUCH students only, gradually reached the poorest students 
attending private independent HEIs. The policy also delivered a sharp increase of 
maintenance allowances - cash and food stamps - benefiting the poorest students, no 
matter HEI type attended. 
 
In this chapter, I carry out an impact evaluation exercise the reform to student 
financing in Chile, where a massive demand shock took place in 2005. As I mentioned 
in Chapter 2, Chile’s HE features a paradigmatic combination of: (i) a high tuition 
                                         
5 The then current aid mechanisms for CRUCH students were often not enough to cover university fees 
so the gap may well be covered with CAE. 
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fee/instruction costs ratio, (ii) consequently, a low proportion of public contributions 
to HE funding with public expenditure in HE representing less than a third of the 
total expenditure in the sector, (iii) high proportion of private enrolment, (iv) quick 
expansion of the total enrolment in the last two decades, and (v) a funding structure 
massively dominated by demand-side mechanisms. 
 
The research question I shall address is to what extent does widening access to financial 
aid enhance the chances of low-income students accessing HE? To provide an answer, 
I use a difference-in-difference (D-I-D) approach as the evaluation technique. I use D-
I-D which is appropriate for observational and repeated cross-section data. I found a 
positive and significant effect of the policy on the probability of access to HE for the 
lowest income students.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, I start in section 4.2. by discussing the 
global policy context of cost sharing and cost transfer in HE. Then, I show why Chile’s 
HE features a unique case. Secondly, in section 4.3, I discuss the literature on access 
to HE with a special focus on the empirical literature discussing student financing.  
Next, in section 4.4, I explain what the reform implications are for different 
socioeconomic groups. I also give an account of the main developments of the Chilean 
HE system, especially student aid policies between 1990 and the 2005 reform. In 
section 4.5, I discuss the data and outline the relevant evaluation techniques, with a 
special focus on selecting relevant treatment and control groups. Additionally, in 
section 4.6, I analyse the results and discuss their main implications. I specify D-I-D 
models in order to estimate the effect of the reform on the probability of access to HE 
for low SES students. The chapter finishes in section 4.7, where I outline the main 
conclusions, discuss further research gaps, and the policy agenda. 
 
4.2.Cost Sharing and Cost Transfer in HE: The Global Policy Context 
 
Diversification of provision, new funding arrangements, an increased focus on 
accountability, and a more heterogeneous student body in socio-economic, educational, 
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and demographic terms are some core issues HE policy has to deal with (OECD 
2008b).  These issues are closely interrelated to each other.  
 
As HE has become a mass system in the developed world - and increasingly in 
developing countries -, there emerged pressures that governments need to address. 
Rising costs of instruction, infrastructure, and equipment, along with a changing 
student body have contested the traditional public funding formula. Many countries 
have adopted cost-sharing as a means of relieving public finances and increasing the 
resources available to HE on efficiency and equity grounds. On the efficiency side, 
some authors disagree that HE should continue to be funded out of general taxation 
because fiscal constraints may translate into sub-optimal investment in HEIs (Barr 
2001; Johnstone 2003), whereas on the equity side publicly funded systems have long 
been deemed as biased towards the affluent students (as in the seminal paper by 
Glennerster, Merrett, and Wilson 1968). In developing countries, funding HE out of 
taxation is regarded as inefficient and inequitable, as public resources are often 
diverted from school education to HE, thereby favouring students that would be able 
to pay for HE (Psacharopoulos 1988; Psacharopoulos and Papakonstantinou 2005). 
Nevertheless, the same kind of reasons would also apply to developed countries 
according to mainstream economic theory. 
 
Since the 1980s, International development agencies such as the World Bank (WB) 
and the Inter-American Bank of Development (IABD) have exerted a decisive 
influence in shaping HE cost transfer policies in part of the developing world. They 
have championed the introduction of fees and student loans, the replacement of 
institutional block grants with competitive funding, and the private sector 
participation in HE provision, financing, and coordination. In summary, these policies 
have reinforced market mechanisms as a driving force in HE coordination. In Latin 
America, an important area of influence of development agencies, these sort of 
measures have been introduced in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico through 
student loans and the development of a dynamic sector of fee-charging private HEIs, 
but to a lesser extent than the 1980s’ Chilean market reforms. 
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Notwithstanding, similar trends have also taken place in developed countries, such as 
Australia with the introduction of fees in 1989, or the UK with the successive lifts of 
fee caps. Even in countries with no tuition fees, living expenses represent important 
costs for students and families. Thus student aid is not limited to help students pay 
fees but also supports students to afford increasing living expenses. The Nordic 
countries, for instance, commonly seen as a paradigm of public and free HE, have also 
developed extensive and generous loan programmes, either publicly or privately 
originated, to help students afford living costs (OECD 2008b, 2014). 
 
Henceforth, with the term cost sharing, I shall refer to the fact that there is always a 
specific proportion of the total costs of HE that are borne by students and their 
families, on the one hand, and the state, on the other. In contrast, the term cost 
transfer refers to the process by which students and their families assume costs no 
longer borne by the state. The magnitude and the direction of cost transfer may 
operate from the state to individual/families, as with fee introduction, or the opposite, 
from individuals/families to the state, as with the abolition of fees in Germany, or the 
state paying HEIs uition fees, as SAAS in Scotland.  
 
Besides the above counterexamples, transferring costs from governments to students 
and families has been the most common trend in HE funding in the last decades as 
well as the main means of increasing HE investment. Cost transfer has operated in 
many countries by either: (i) transferring costs in taxpayer funded systems with low 
or no students/families contribution towards the cost of HE by introducing tuition 
fees or any kind of direct contribution, (ii) increasing the individual/families 
contribution in HE systems already relying on relevant non-governmental funding 
sources, as for instance policies dealing with lifting or releasing fee caps.  
 
Cost transfer may also make tuition fees the main metric in HE funding, even more 
so when tuition levels are closer to HE provision costs. The structure of HE funding 
is also affected. In fact, traditional block grants from governments to HEIs, based on 
historical quotas or funding formulas, are no longer the most relevant mechanism but 
demand-side funding.  
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In this context of cost transfer from the state and taxpayers to students and their 
families, low SES students who cannot afford tuition fees is a matter of concern so the 
key question that research has tried to address is to what extent policies, namely 
student aid systems, contribute to a more egalitarian distribution of HE access 
opportunities. HE policy is supposed to implement a number of funding mechanisms 
which should be effective enough to guarantee a fair access without deterring low SES 
students (Barr 2003).  
 
From an economic point of view, it has been argued that credit markets have 
imperfections that justify state intervention and credit provision (Barr 2004), with 
income contingent loans as a popular means of minimising negative impacts on equity,  
provided that they are the most able to address risk aversion and minimise the impact 
of debts over the life cycle (Chapman 2006).  
 
The evidence in a number of countries shows that cost transfer has not negatively 
affected the participation of disadvantaged students as long as student aid mechanisms 
are supportive enough and are well advertised amongst the target population. I discuss 
this in further detail in the following section. 
 
Notwithstanding, reporting positive effects of aid may overlook the context in which 
policies have been introduced. Indeed, establishing student loans - or allowing HEIs 
to charge fees- differs from expanding and diversifying student funding in order to 
boost access of low SES students in a system with well-established fee-charging HEIs. 
In the first case, aid is intended as a means of offsetting the consequences of cost 
transfer, whereas the other seeks a more socially inclusive HE system. There might 
also be the case that policies seek to transfer costs to students and households and at 
the same time expand and enhance student aid due to social inclusion considerations. 
 
Nevertheless, from a policy-making perspective, the effects of cost transfer on access 
to HE just show one side of the issue, that of how to deal with the increasing demand 
for HE in an efficient way without affecting the chances of low SES students entering 
HE. Nevertheless, to arrive at an explanation of the effects of student aid, it is also 
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necessary to know what other factors affect the chances of access to HE at individual, 
family, and institutional levels, as well as within the broader social and economic 
context.  
 
Chile has been regarded as a forerunner in the radical introduction of market 
coordination mechanisms and the prominent role that the private sector has played 
(Levy 1986). Nevertheless, there are other characteristics which may make Chile and 
2005 reforms a worth studying case. Firstly, it is a country which, before the reform 
took place, had already relied on demand-side funding. Secondly, as I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, since 1980 when the military dictatorship diversified funding sources, rolled 
back (or froze) the enrolment of public universities, and delegated much of the HE 
development to the private sector, and all Chilean HEIs, either public or private, 
charge fees representing a high proportion of instruction costs. Thirdly, the reform 
consisted of three major measures: (i) a re-engineering of the previously existent 
student aid whose main focus were public and public subsidised HEIs, (ii) an 
important increase of grants, (iii) the introduction of a state-guaranteed loan scheme 
aimed at increasing the support for low SES students attending private independent 
HEIs. 
 
Before the reform, there was virtually no support for students attending private 
independent HEIs. After the reform, students attending private independent HEIs had 
the chance of getting CAE and grants. This would require an important degree of 
responsiveness from HEIs in order to meet the demand for extra places. Accordingly, 
I make the same assumption as in Chapter 3: HEIs qualifying to participate in 
government sponsored student aid have no constraints when it comes to fulfil the 
demand for extra places resulting from student aid increases.  
4.3.State of Art. The Role of Student Aid on Access to HE 
 
A more equitable access to HE implies weakening the relationship between socio-
economic background and someone’s present or prospective situation, as I have 
already pointed out (see Chapter 1). In that sense, the extent to which access to HE 
depends on the socioeconomic background is a good measure of effectiveness of equity 
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policies. More generally, equity policy is a set of measures aiming at weakening the 
relationship between socioeconomic background and a given educational outcome - 
access, persistence, employability, etc.  Definitions of equity and the influence of 
inequalities in the school system on access to HE have already been presented earlier. 
Student aid, as I have also pointed out, is one amongst many factors affecting access 
to HE. In fact, the effect of aid is likely to be confounded with those of external factors 
such as the characteristics of school systems, variations in schools’ quality and 
performance, the responsiveness of HE providers to demand, and the policy 
environment.  
 
Evidence from a number of countries shows that cost sharing strategies have not 
reduced the participation of disadvantaged students so long as student aid mechanisms 
are well designed and supportive enough. In other words, to be effective, they should 
guarantee an appropriate level of financial support. On the other hand, information 
on benefits should be made widely available, this way making it easier for the target 
population. 
 
Studies tend to aggregate student aid without making distinctions in relation to aid 
composition so the effect of aid design and packaging may be neglected (Chen and 
Zerquera 2011). Nevertheless, studies addressing aid composition, packaging and 
targeting are more focused on outcomes such as persistence, dropout and completion 
than access. I shall give an account of this in Chapter 5, which deals with the effect 
of aid on completion and dropout. 
 
Although aid is often treated as an aggregate variable, a high proportion of the 
literature is devoted to the effect of several grants and scholarships programmes. In 
contrast, the effect of loans has not been as extensively studied (Page and Scott-
Clayton 2016). Since student aid is normally made up of several instruments (loans, 
grants, allowances, tuition fee rebates, etc.), measuring the true causal effect of a 
particular programme would require good quality and wide coverage of data.  
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In general, empirical research has concluded that aid affects positively the chances of 
low SES students entering HE. In Australia, after introducing income contingent loans 
to meet newly introduced tuition fees instead of a no fees approach, the socio-economic 
distribution of HE became more equitable (Chapman and Ryan 2005). In the US, a 
country with a long tradition of paid HE, student aid has contributed to increasing 
college entry for low SES and ethnic minority students (Dynarski 2003; St John and 
Noell 1989). Canton & Blom (2004, 2010) found similar evidence when evaluating a 
student loan programme targeted to low SES students attending private –and 
expensive- universities in Mexico. In Colombia, positive effects of loans on low-income 
students participation have also been found (Melguizo, Sanchez, and Velasco 2016). 
In Chile, as I shall show below, the expansion of student aid has also been associated 
with an increase in HE participation for low SES students. 
 
Although aid has contributed to expanding access, it has also helped the development 
of a second tier HE, as in the case of the for-profit sector in the US, which targets 
students eligible for aid. This contests the value for money of the education received 
(Cellini 2010), as well as the pertinence of a sector growing mostly at the expense of 
aid (Darolia 2013). Student funding has also had a differential impact on enrolment 
decisions across socioeconomic groups, aid being more effective to trigger enrolment 
decisions of less well-off students (Braunstein, Mcgrath, and Pescatrice 1999).   
 
Although the evidence suggests that transferring the costs to students should not deter 
the poor from entering HE, risk aversion of poor students might deter them from 
taking up loans if aid is not well designed (Barr 2003). Cultural factors such as the 
configuration of a pro-HE environment within families through, for instance, having a 
relative or close friend in HE, may also model the decision of entering HE (Finnie 
2012). The same rationale applies to aid packages design: to tackle risk aversion or 
any other issues affecting equity of access, a combination of loans, grants and 
maintenance allowances should be tailored to different social groups (DesJardins and 
McCall 2010; Stampen and Cabrera 1988). However, positive effects of aid packaging 
go beyond enrolment decisions but are also important for increasing persistence and 
reducing time to degree (DesJardins and McCall 2010). 
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Risk aversion may lead poor students to make bad decisions. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, risk aversion has led to low rates of loan take up. Low-income students 
prefer working part time -or accepting unqualified jobs- to taking up student loans. 
The most pervasive consequences of this have been longer courses, as students are 
distracted from their studies; an underused aid system; and a less than optimal 
enrolment (Oosterbeek and van den Broek 2009). These issues have consequences on 
equity and efficiency. So does completing HE studies become harder for low-income 
students as the risk of dropping out increases: if students’ circumstances change, there 
will be no guarantee of having the resources to afford HE. On the other hand, an 
underused aid system is inefficient because resources that do not suit the needs of low-
income students may have had other uses instead. 
 
Information also plays a central role in loans take up. As affluent students have more 
information, equity implications are evident. Nevertheless, this common assumption 
has  been contested in some empirical research, for example, Booij, Leuven and 
Oosterbeek (2012) conducted a randomised trial and found no causal effect of 
information in take-up rates in the Netherlands. An additional problem relates the aid 
system complexity. More complex aid systems have countered the impact of aid on 
college enrolment and persistence since a they are less transparent so not everyone 
have a clear idea of the true availability of support, this affecting low-income students 
more critically (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2013). 
 
Research on student aid in Chile is scarce. However, the sharp increase of resources 
to aid, the 2005 reform, the development of high-quality administrative information 
systems on aid recipients, and the fact that the government started collecting 
individual records of HE attendants in 2008, has contributed to configuring a research 
body assessing the impact of aid on HE outcomes. Solís (2013), using a regression 
discontinuity design found that the participation of students with loans was around 
20 per cent higher for students just above cut-off point (PSU score) in comparison to 
those just below the threshold. Urzúa and Rau (2012) found a higher effect of CAE 
on persistence in comparison to other aid, as did Horn, Santelices and Catalán  (2014) 
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and Santelices, Catalán, Krueger and Horn (2015). The results are consistent with 
other studies: a positive and significant effect of student aid on low-income students’ 
access probabilities.  
 
The above studies have taken full advantage of newly available good data and used 
quasi-experimental evaluation techniques. Further developments should be expected 
as data on mature cohorts become available and different administrative sources are 
linked. Nonetheless, there are no investigations on the effects of the 2005 reform. 
 
Regretfully, it is not possible to use microdata to evaluate the impact of the 2005 
reform as linking aid recipients and enrolment administrative records is only possible 
from 2008 onwards. Consequently, as I shall explain in section 4.4, I use a series of 
household surveys to estimate the impact of the 2005 reform on the probability of 
access to HE for low-income students. 
4.4.Chilean HE Policy 
 
4.4.1. Historical development 
 
Until 1980, Chile’s HE was made up of eight publicly funded and non-tuition charging 
universities, two of them were state owned and operated at a national scale, whereas 
the other were private owned but relied on public funding. The system was funded 
out of general taxation and resources were mostly allocated through funding formulas 
based on enrolment and historical criteria.  Since 1980, when the military dictatorship 
carried out its reform, Chilean HE has experienced dramatic changes.  The government 
introduced tuition fees and allowed the private sector to set up new universities and 
non-university HEIs. Other relevant institutional transformations have already been 
outlined in section 2.2 (Chapter 2).  
 
The regime also changed HE funding structure by diversifying financial sources, 
passing from purely institutional block grant funding, according to historical 
considerations, institutional size and complexity, to a combination of block grants, 
student loans, private funding (through tuition payments) and a series of competitive 
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mechanisms to finance research activities. The government promised to transit from 
block grant funding to an even combination of block grants, student loans and 
competitive mechanisms. The 1980s crisis battered the Chilean economy and, 
consequently, the projected funding was not fulfilled.  
 
The most relevant feature of HE policy in the 1990s was the expansion and 
consolidation of the system. Many new private universities were established between 
1989 and 1991, because of a fear that the new democratic government (Concertación 
centre-left coalition) would undertake a major reform against the private sector 
involvement in HE (Uribe 2004). The first Concertación governments gave the 
greatest resources to CRUCH universities by increasing funding as well as creating 
new funding mechanisms to foster investment in infrastructure. Concerning student 
aid system, in 1994 the government set an income contingent loan system, instead of 
the mortgage-type operating since the early 1980s, and grants for poor background 
students6.   
 
Since the 1990s, an increasing share of governmental expenditure in HE has been 
funding student aid, reaching almost 40 per cent in 2014 of government contributions 
to HE (OECD 2014). A major milestone in student funding took place 2001, when aid 
started reaching students from private independent HEIs for the first time. In political 
terms, it made the case for extending student loans to private HEIs, especially 
considering that the reform would not have been endorsed by a left of centre 
government unless the evidence had been convincing. The reform’s leitmotif was that 
it would make aid available based on students socioeconomic need instead of the HEI 
they attend: two siblings must receive the same support regardless HEIs they attend. 
 
Enrolment steadily grew from 245,000 students in 1990 to 650.000 in 2006 and reached 
near 1.2 million students in 2015. Relevant causes for this quick expansion are the 
                                         
6 The first scholarship programme was created in 1991. Until then, the state did not use to provide any 
type of grants to HE students. 
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universalisation of secondary education7 which resulted in low-income students 
completing secondary education; and a massive increase in student aid from 2000 
onwards. Accordingly, and as expected, participation rates in HE of the poorest 
students have consistently increased in the last 15 years. In fact, participation rates 
of the poorest household income quintile rose from 4.5 per cent in 1990 to 17 per cent 
in 2006 and 27 per cent in 2013. In other words, for the very poorest young people the 
chances of being enrolled in HE in 2006 were twice those of 1990. Compared to 1990, 
a Chilean student from the poorest income quintile was five times more likely to attend 
HE. These figures on participation, however, differ throughout the system, as student 
aid eligibility used to be completely restricted to CRUCH universities, then the private 
sector served comparatively more affluent students as no government support was 
available. 
 
Inequality of opportunities will diminish so long as student support systems are 
extended to private institutions. In practice, in the non-university segment, which 
concentrates an important proportion of low SES students, the opportunities of access 
have improved since the introduction of a grant favouring vocational courses in 
Technical Training Centres (Centros de Formación Técnica, CFTs) and Professional 
Institutes (Institutos Profesionales, IP) in 2001, and the reform in 2005. 
 
4.4.2. The reform in 2005 
 
In late 2005 the government undertook an ambitious reform of HE student funding. 
There were three major changes. The first was the introduction of a new student loan 
scheme originating in private financial institutions but with the state guarantee, CAE, 
which was conceived as a means of extending the support to all students attending 
accredited HEIs, this including CRUCH and private independent HEIs’ students. 
Second, the government undertook a re-engineering of the then current student aid 
system for CRUCH universities. Third, the government set student aid packages 
consisting of a mixture of loan and grants, including a maintenance component for the 
                                         
7 For example, in 1990 a 26 per cent of 20-24 years old in the poorest income quintile had completed 
secondary education. In 2003, the proportion was 62 per cent. Something similar happened with next 
quintile (MIDEPLAN 2007). 
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poorest students. The poorer the student, the larger the grant component, and the 
smaller the loan component. 
 
Nonetheless, the reform still considered two parallel aid systems: one for CRUCH 
universities and another for private independent HEIs. For CRUCH universities the 
government set a policy based on meeting funding goals rather than a strictly residual 
policy targeting the very poor students. In fact, the government would finance a 100 
per cent of tuition fees to students coming from the lowest three household income 
quintiles through a combination of the pre-existing income contingent loan (FSCU) 
and grants. For the fourth and fifth, the percentage of aid decreased as income 
increased but CRUCH students were also able to use CAE to top up until 100 per 
cent of fees. This scheme was criticised because in practice students with the same 
socio-economic difficulties are treated differently according to the type of HEI 
attended, this meaning a lack of horizontal equity.  
 
Private independent HEIs students, which were in practice marginalised from student 
aid before the reform, could use CAE to cover fees as well as scholarships for the very 
poor. However, aid is not as generous as CRUCH’s, as CAE funded students are 
charged market interest rates, at fixed instalments instead of subsidised interest and 
income contingent repayment as in FSCU. CAE was able to cover the three poorest 
income quintiles and an increasing proportion of the fourth quintile. By 2011, CAE 
even reached some students from the richest quintile, whereas in 2014 was able to 
offer support to students from any socioeconomic background. Nonetheless, for the 
aims of this chapter, I shall consider the period 2005-2009 as the evaluation period, 
although in the discussion I shall also refer to further developments. 
 
Despite the reform, there still exists a lack of horizontal equity, but the fact that the 
government started guaranteeing a determined level of support according to income 
actually represented a qualitative change in comparison to the residual pre-reform 
scenario. The main changes to Chilean HE aid rules are shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Aid packages before and after the reform by household income quintiles 
  Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
  Loans Grants Loan Grants 
Quintiles 1 
and 2 
 
CRUCH 
Universities 
YES, FSCU if 
PSU 
score>=475 
YES, if PSU 
score>=600 
YES, FSCU if 
PSU score 
>=475 
CAE 
(although 
marginal8) 
YES, if PSU 
score >=550 
Maintenance 
Grant (food 
and cash) 
Private 
independent 
HEIs 
NO YES, some 
partial grants 
for vocational 
courses at non-
universities 
HEIs 
YES, CAE if 
PSU>=475 
YES, a few but 
increasing 
subject to 
PSU>=550 
Maintenance 
grant (food 
and cash). 
Grants for 
students 
taking 
technical-
vocational 
courses  
Quintile 3 CRUCH 
Universities 
YES, FSCU if 
PSU 
score>=475 
NO YES, FSCU if 
PSU score 
>=475 
CAE 
(although 
marginal) 
NO 
Private 
independent 
HEIs 
NO NO YES, CAE if 
PSU 
score>=475 
NO 
Quintile 4 CRUCH 
Universities 
FSCU (partial 
and 
decreasing) 
NO Partial FSCU 
+ 
CAE for some 
to top up fees 
NO 
Private 
independent 
HEIs 
NO NO CAE NO 
Quintile 5 CRUCH 
Universities 
FSCU but 
negligible 
NO NO NO 
Private 
independent 
HEIs 
NO NO NO NO 
 
It is noticeable that CRUCH students are still better off in terms of support but Table 
4.1 gives a very clear account of how the situation improved for anyone meeting the 
standard requirements. There is no doubt that the reform contributed to improving 
horizontal equity, as I shall show below, but HEIs were also able to respond to a 
                                         
8 Students from quintiles 1 and 2 at CRUCH universities should not have received CAE but a few were 
offered the loan because did not applied for other student aid. On the other hand, students in their second 
year or higher were able to apply for CAE. Although unlikely, there might have been unsupported 
students who applied for CAE and were offered the loan. The same applies for quintile 3.  
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demand shock by providing the extra places needed. This responsiveness, nevertheless, 
would not have taken place without the government setting CAE and sharply 
increasing the number of grant for students attending technical-vocational courses. 
 
In fact, HE enrolment increased from 595,000 undergraduate students in 2005 to about 
850,000 in 2009 (see the period between the solid and dotted vertical line in Graph 
4.1). Within the period, private independent HEIs increased their enrolment by 47 per 
cent, whereas public and public subsidised HEIs increased their enrolment by only a 
19 per cent, a rate well in line with which the government had agreed with public 
HEIs: an annual enrolment growth of up to 6 per cent. Non-university HEIs were the 
most affected sector: a steep increase of 67 per cent in enrolment took place (see Graph 
4.2).  
Graph 4.1.Undergraduate enrolment type of HEI Graph 4.2.Enrolment growth(2005=100) 
 
 
 
The reform led to an increase in participation of low SES students but most new poor 
students were absorbed by the private sector, specifically the non-university sector, 
since the modest expansion of public and private subsidised HEIs and the fact that 
aid was already available for them. In terms of the government sponsored benefits 
allocated to students, the figures are clear enough in order to understand what the 
government intended with the policy (see Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2. Number of grants awarded and loans taken up 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Grants 43,061  50,532  62,992  86,998  123,144 
CAE  21,263  54,447  90,722  148,416 
FSCU 122,779  119,084  133,000 119,928 111,467 
Source: Mineduc (2015) 
 
The bulk of the reform consisted in implementing CAE and increasing the number of 
students awarded with grants. CRUCH universities income contingent loan did not 
benefit more students as students’ numbers were frozen and even cut back by the end 
of the period. Nevertheless, the ratio FSCU/Tuition fees did improve as the 
government guaranteed full tuition coverage for students from the three poorest 
household income quintile. Between 2005 and 2009, the number of grants triplicated 
and, after just 4 years, CAE became the most important type of aid in terms of the 
number of students served.  
 
The reform Chile undertook in 2005 is a rather unusual one. As the global trend has 
been to transfer the costs of HE from the state to individuals, Chilean HE, since the 
early 2000’s and definitely with the reform, has gone in the opposite way as HE policy 
on access has heavily relied on public expenditure. Indeed, Chilean public expenditure 
in HE as a proportion of the total expenditure rose from 16 per cent 2005 to 35 per 
cent in 2012 (OECD 2008a, 2015b). The scale of the change, in a short period of seven 
years, is striking. Nevertheless, there are internal developments that may explain the 
uniqueness of this reform. As Chile used to have the lowest participation of public 
resources in HE funding in the world, despite the scope of the transformation, the 
post-reform proportion of public expenditure became similar to that of countries with 
highly privatised HE, such as South Korea and Japan. In addition to that, besides the 
government made a massive financial effort, the way loans are recorded in the national 
accounts system turns highly relevant. Whereas, in general, loans do not count as 
expenditure, in the case of the Chilean system, due to the design of the state 
guaranteed loan (CAE), at least a part of the resources count as expenditure. As the 
law prohibits the government to allocate loans in the credit system, the way it 
intervenes is through repurchasing the portfolio that commercial banks are not willing 
to finance, which are in turn financed by the government through banks by paying a 
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surcharge. Although portfolio repurchasing should not count as expenditure but assets, 
official statistics do consider repurchasing as expenditure, this way introducing a 
distortion. Nevertheless, the noticeable increase of grants and the fact that the 
government does devote public money to CAE reflect a major financial effort. 
 
The peculiarity of the Chilean case lies in the radical reform undertaken by the 
military dictatorship, when major changes in HE structure, funding, and institutions 
were made at a very quick pace, which did not improve the situation for low income 
students due to the lack of resources but more critically to the high dropout and low 
completion rates in secondary education for low income students. The military left 
education -at all levels- underfunded by historical minimums without doing relevant 
investments. In 1990, most universities operated in the same conditions as 1973, and 
even with a lower expenditure per student in real terms. 
 
In some way, the public effort in HE might be seen as compensating the depreciated 
situation of HE (and education in general) in the early nineties rather than reversing 
the global trend towards more involvement of the private sector in funding and 
provision. Hence the reform might be seen as part of a structural process of putting 
things in place but without threatening the basis of Chilean HE: highly privatised, 
loosely regulated, with increasing public investment which comes to consolidate, with 
more state control, mixed provision model not very different from the one imposed by 
the military. Indeed, though important efforts have been made in institutional funding, 
the bulk of public investment has increasingly gone to demand-side funding. 
 
The socioeconomic distribution of the Chilean student body, as expected, saw relevant 
changes during the evaluation period. Indeed, the net enrolment rate for quintile 1 
increased from 0.10 to 0.16 between 2003 and 2009. This also happened with quintile 
2 (from 0.15 to 0.21) and to a lesser extent with quintile 3 (from 0.23 to 0.26).  
 
In Graph 4.3, a steep increase of enrolment rates for the poorest quintiles is noticeable 
in the shaded area, which corresponds to post-reform. I would like to highlight the 
extent to which access to HE has increased for low income students in a relatively 
104 
 
short period. From 2011 onwards, the rise of low-income students’ participation was 
even sharper, due to policies implemented that year which are out of the scope of this 
chapter (as I shall explain in the next section).   
 
Graph 4.3. Net enrolment rates by household income quintile 1998-2013 
 
 
Source: CASEN survey 
4.5.Data and Methods 
 
4.5.1. Sources and data requirements 
 
When the reform took place, there were neither exhaustive nor centralised 
administrative records of student aid but HEIs used to carry out specific processes. 
The reform also implied a major change in the way student aid was managed by both 
the government and HEIs. A proper system allowing linking enrolment and aid records 
was just developed in 2008 and is not useful in order to evaluate the impact of the 
2005 reform since there is no pre-reform data. The Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) 
generates socioeconomic statistics based on administrative data as a by-product of 
processes of application to student aid, but not everyone does apply to financial 
support. Furthermore, administrative records of applicants do not contain exhaustive 
information on background characteristics, with the exception of income, which 
determines eligibility to support, as well as parental education. 
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To address this chapter’s research question, I use a series of socioeconomic surveys, 
namely CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional, National 
Socioeconomic Characterisation Survey), which is the main socioeconomic survey 
applied in Chile. It is a cross-sectional survey applied every two or three years 
depending on the period but it is currently biannual. The series started in 1987 and 
the last version is that of 2015 which has not yet made public. I shall use the surveys 
from 2003, 2006 and 2009. I use 2003 as a pre-reform survey whereas I evaluate the 
policy impact in 2006 and 2009. I could have used surveys beyond 2009 but this raises 
some methodological concerns I shall explain in more depth later. 
 
The surveys allow a precise identification of HE students and former students as well 
as a series of socioeconomic variables at the individual level as well as household and 
its member’s information. As CASEN does not ask retrospective questions, a key issue 
is to record household variables vis-à-vis student variables. Surveys are consistent over 
time, there are no major issues when dealing with varying coding structures and 
questions because the core nuclei of questions has remained across time.  
 
In order to assess the impact of the policy change in the probability of low SES student 
accessing HE, I need information on similar people at different points across time. 
This is guaranteed by the fact that the survey corresponds to a random sample of the 
Chilean population in every version so, in fact, I am using repeated cross-sections. 
Along with making sure that I have repeated measures of a similar population, it 
would also be necessary to establish both treatment and control groups and include 
enough control variables so that I can treat the data as coming from a natural 
experiment. I can also introduce control variables in order to test robustness as well 
as deal with the non-random assignment to treatment and control groups to a limited 
extent. 
4.5.2. Data structure 
 
CASEN is applied to a random, stratified and multistage households sample 
(geographical sample units have changed over time). Every present adult is 
interviewed face to face whereas the head of household responds on behalf of absent 
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adults and children. Sample sizes were of about 50 000 households in 1998 and 70 000 
in 2013, this meaning a number of individuals in the sample have fluctuated between 
210 000 to 250 000. The sample design is complex and has been subject to several 
changes with regards to improving the efficiency and allowing reliable estimates for 
smaller geographical areas but not in terms of target population. Therefore, it should 
not represent a threat to representativeness, since each cross-section is a sample of the 
same population. As I do not observe the same subjects over time, it is convenient to 
rule out a major change in CASEN sampling procedures so the samples in different 
cross-sections are likely to be ‘identical’ with each other.   
 
Sampling design has changed over time so it is not possible to replicate the sample 
structure when data from several years are merged into a unique dataset because 
primary sampling units and strata are different so the use of estimates accounting for 
complex sample design (as the svy: prefix in STATA) cannot be used. Nevertheless, 
it is still possible to use sample weights but as if it were just a proportional sample. 
 
The survey has always included modules on residents, income, employment, housing, 
health and education, while modules on assets, ICT penetration, energy usage and 
disability have also been introduced in subsequent surveys. CASEN also allows 
identifying each member of the household and their relationship with the head of 
household and, consequently, most of the relationships between each member of the 
household. Nevertheless, I made a series of decisions in order to get the most 
appropriate data and choose the correct individuals which are as follows. 
 
The first measure I took concerning data was to consider 18-24 year-old individuals as 
my target population. This is consistent with the fact that in Chile students typically 
enter HE at the age of 18 and that the average duration of courses is 5 or 6 years. 
The age criterion also allows including both current students and former students (18-
24 year-old graduates and dropouts) and is sensitive to the fact that student aid 
supports students on their first degrees so students over 24 years old, although a 
relevant proportion of the student body, are unlikely to be affected by the reform. As 
I am interested in measuring the impact of the student aid reform on access to HE, 
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the outcome variable is the probability of having ever entered HE. Therefore, I need 
to identify anyone that could have been supported with student aid so dropouts and 
graduates must also be included. I use this variable instead of enrolment because it is 
more inclusive. If I had used enrolment, people who finished HE –for example two or 
four-year programmes in IPs or CFTs- would have been excluded and treated as if 
they have never attended HE, even though they had studied their whole courses within 
the evaluation period. The same could have happened with students who defer or 
leave their courses.  
 
The survey does contain a variable dealing with student aid and even the amount and 
coverage of tuition costs so it is possible to establish for an individual which kind of 
aid was awarded (FSCU, CAE or grants) and, at least in theory, what proportion of 
tuition fees student aid represents. Regretfully, the variable does not work well as 
there are major inconsistencies in the number of students being supported with grants, 
a crucial component of aid for the poorest students, in comparison to administrative 
data. In effect, FSCU is overestimated by 25 per cent in 2003, whereas grants are 
underestimated by 30.2 per cent in 2009. Although some degree of inconsistency 
between administrative sources and household surveys is not surprising, having 
overestimation is some years and underestimation in others seems problematic. 
Although CASEN has experienced several changes in sample design, when it comes to 
follow a specific population, sample variation is likely to affect aid recipient estimates 
rather than changes in sample design. For instance, CASEN used to overestimate HE 
enrolment by 15% in comparison to official statistics. However, from 2009, the 
estimated number of students has been much closer to the student population; for 
instance, in 2009 HE enrolment was 835,247, whereas CASEN estimated 826,345 
students, very different from 2003 when the official figure was 542,516 but CASEN 
estimated 685,264, 26 per cent of overestimation.  
 
The above is not due to pitfalls in CASEN but to changes in data collection and the 
generation of official statistics. In effect, until 2007, the government used to ask HEIs 
for enrolment statistics. In contrast, since 2008 the government asks for administrative 
data using a refined definition of enrolment, which also includes special part-time 
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programmes targeted to workers that did not use to capture in former data collection 
processes.  
Table 4.3. CASEN estimates and administrative data by type of aid 2003 and 2009  
  CASEN estimates Administrative data dif % 
Type of aid 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 
FSCU   146,583      95,063   117,019   111,467 25.3% -14.7% 
CAE             -     132,006             -     148,416  -11.1% 
Grants (+)     39,335      85,935     38,840   123,144  1.3% -30.2% 
+ Only considers grants supporting tuition fees payment 
Sources: CASEN and MINEDUC 
 
Anyway, one has to consider that the more disaggregated the population, as in 
disaggregated estimates of recipients, the less precise the estimates due to sample 
variation. Despite the above issues, which affect the estimates in terms of absolute 
numbers, there is still possible to get good estimates in terms of proportions by income 
quintiles, which is what I actually do in this chapter. Nevertheless, changes in the 
questionnaire might have been crucial as CASEN used to ask for state-supported loan 
and grants in general but currently the question inquires whether the student is the 
recipient of specific programmes. 
 
The next decision regarding data was that, in order to get the family background 
and/or household characteristics, I restricted the population to those still living with 
at least one of their parents/tutors. At least in the Chilean context, this decision seems 
sensible. As shown in Table 4.4., over a 70 per cent of 18-24 year-old population lived 
with at least one parent/step parent and this has been constant over time. A similar 
approach has been used in Canada (Corak, Lipps, and Zhao 2004) although not 
without criticism as living arrangements may influence HE participation (Finnie and 
Usher 2006). Nevertheless, there is no chance to track people retrospectively because 
the survey does not have a longitudinal element and, more importantly, there is no 
other way of having data containing family and background characteristics. 
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Table 4.4. Number of 18-24 year-old by relationship with the head of household 
Relationship with 
head of household 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011 2013
 Children or 
stepchildren  
        
1,231,851 
        
1,236,048 
        
1,341,478 
        
1,427,244 
        
1,561,340  
        
1,631,304  
        
1,541,258 
 Other  
           
537,079  
           
506,875  
           
554,598  
           
550,077  
           
575,882  
           
621,418  
           
610,424  
 Total 18-24 
        
1,768,930 
        
1,742,923 
        
1,896,076 
        
1,977,321 
        
2,137,222  
        
2,252,722  
        
2,151,682 
 Proportion of 
children/stepchildren  
              
0.696  
             
0.709  
             
0.708  
             
0.722  
             
0.731  
              
0.724  
             
0.716  
 
There are some socio-demographic differences between those living with their parents   
and those who do not. Those living on their own live in partnerships and are employed, 
head of household and women in a higher proportion than those living with parents. 
This group is also more concentrated in the lowest income quintiles, with 46 per cent 
against 38 per cent of those living in the parental house in quintiles I and II. Statistics 
are shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. Socio-demographic characteristics of 18-24 year-old with at least complete 
secondary education. 2009 
 Not living at parental home Living at parental home Total 
Marital status 
Married 0.10 0.01 0.03
In partnership 0.33 0.04 0.11
Other 0.58 0.95 0.85
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
N ('000s) 509.3 1,462.9 1,972.3
Employment 
Employed 0.45 0.34 0.36
Unemployed 0.11 0.12 0.12
Economically Inactive 0.44 0.55 0.52
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
N ('000s) 509.3 1,462.9 1,972.3
Income quintile 
1 0.20 0.17 0.18
2 0.26 0.21 0.23
3 0.22 0.22 0.22
4 0.18 0.21 0.20
5 0.15 0.18 0.17
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
N ('000s) 506.6 1,462.9 1,969.5
Gender 
Male 0.45 0.51 0.49
Female 0.55 0.49 0.51
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
N ('000s) 509.3 1,462.9 1,972.3
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I have also introduced an additional restriction considering individuals with at least 
complete secondary education. This way, I avoid an important distortion as 
completion rates at the secondary level are higher for better off students so my target 
population consists only of students which at least have the formal qualifications 
required in HE so I do not penalise low-income students due to their lower secondary 
attainment. 
 
The final dataset contains data considering 2003, 2006, and 2009 surveys, the total 
sample size reaching 27,600 records with 9,000 to 11,000 cases for each respective year. 
The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the subject has ever 
attended HE and 0 if not, which is henceforth referred to as access. There are many 
identification variables such as age, sex, marital status and whether or not in 
employment. Background characteristics include per capita household income 
quintiles, household size, the number of siblings, whether it is urban or rural, sex of 
the head of household, years of schooling of the head of household, mother’s education 
attainment, and the head of household occupation (ISCO 2008 but aggregated).  
 
4.5.3. Model identification 
 
I shall start with a logistic regression approach to compare the probability of access 
to HE before and after the reform. One way of doing it would have been to run specific 
regressions for each year and compare the effect sizes of the variable measuring income 
and test whether the differences between the effects are statistically significant. 
However, this approach is not robust because there are unobserved variables such as 
school performance and quality of prior education, affecting both predictors and the 
outcome. Whether or not unobserved variables are fixed over time, the problem arises 
when effect sizes are considered. Comparing effect sizes of regression models including 
the same variables measured at different time periods is not equivalent to measuring 
policy impact but might be an approximation to assess the main objective of student 
aid: weakening the effect of socioeconomic background on the probability of access to 
HE. I shall provide a comparison in the results section but the estimates must be 
taken cautiously. 
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A more experimentalist approach would be to build a counterfactual simulating what 
would have happened post-reform had the conditions of student aid, the influence of 
social background and other relevant variables remained the same as in the pre-reform 
period. This is equivalent to build a forecasting model which is as follows. 
 
To achieve this, I specify a logistic regression model given by the logistic function:  
 
ze
Y  1
1)1Pr(   [4.1], 
 
where Y is the outcome variable and z is a linear combination  
 
γX 0Z  [4.2], 
 
X  is a vector of predictor variables. An interesting feature of the logistic model is 
that the exponential of γ can be interpreted as odd ratios, the ratio by which the 
probability of access to HE increases/decreases when X  increases one unit or when 
the attribute takes the value of one, in the case of dummy variables. Values greater 
than 1 mean that probability increases, whereas the opposite happens with values 
lower than 1.  
 
The counterfactual is simulated by regressing the probability of access on X  in 2003. 
Next, these estimates are applied to 2006 and 2009 surveys and the probability of 
access is forecasted. The logic behind this is straightforward as the model forecasts a 
counterfactual: how the post-reform probabilities of access would have been had the 
effects of all variables in the model remained constant. After that, logistic regressions, 
containing the same variables, are run for each post-reform year (2006 and 2009) so 
the impact measure for each income quintile would be the difference between the 
average forecasted probability by income quintile and the actual mean predicted 
probabilities given by year-specific logistic models. I do not use sample probabilities 
for the comparison as the metric is different. The fitted probability is a continuous 
variable whereas the sample one is binary so standard errors are not useful to run 
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significance tests. The above technique is an approach to an experimental setting but 
lacks a control group so it may be subject to biases and inconsistencies affecting the 
estimates. The identification problem to solve is that the differences between 
forecasted and actual probabilities are not yet an approximation to the true causal 
effect of the policy. Comparing intra-quintiles probabilities would not establish the 
difference between affected and unaffected students which is the true causal effect of 
the policy to estimate.  Although the above approach does build a counterfactual, the 
policy evaluation toolbox has always been used to compare groups which are 
(un)affected by the policy. 
 
I specify a differences-in-differences (D-I-D) model in order to evaluate the impact of 
the student aid reform. The crucial step is to choose an adequate control group, 
unaffected by the policy and at the same time supports the common trend assumption, 
the key identification one in D-I-D models. Had not the reform taken place, the 
differences in access between control and treatment group would have been the same 
in pre and post reform period (the counterfactual). The most straightforward and 
intuitive control group, as it is easy to deduct from Table 4.1., would be to choose the 
highest quintile since it is not sensitive to the policy change (there is no aid for quintile 
5 in pre and post reform years). As I have control variables, I could deal with pre-
existent differences in household variables and personal characteristics.  
 
Although there is no direct way of testing the key identifying assumption, it is clear 
from Table 4.5. that the pre-reform trajectory of quintile 5 is one of stabilisation of 
enrolment rate instead of the increasing trend observed in the poorer income quintiles. 
On the other hand, participation rates, the type of previous schooling -with a much 
higher incidence of private schools-, and PSU entry scores features quintile 5 as hugely 
different. On the one hand, there is a group showing enrolment rates similar to the 
developed world, whereas on the other extreme enrolment rates rather correspond to 
those of the third world. 
  
113 
 
Table 4.6. Net Enrolment Rates by Household Income Quintile 
Year I II III IV V
1998 0.062 0.094 0.165 0.285 0.521
2000 0.070 0.116 0.222 0.310 0.520
2003 0.100 0.150 0.229 0.352 0.578
2006 0.136 0.172 0.238 0.353 0.531
2009 0.166 0.210 0.256 0.338 0.550
2011 0.221 0.275 0.263 0.392 0.590
2013 0.274 0.305 0.355 0.408 0.575
Source: CASEN survey 
On the basis above, I ruled out quintile 5 as a control group. The alternative is to 
choose groups that have been affected by the reform in a very different fashion. I have 
slightly modified Table 4.1 showing pre and post reform situations but instead of 
considering the two parallel aid systems, I compare the pre and post reform situation 
for the HE system as a whole. In Table 4.6, instead of explaining the rules and 
conditions for aid eligibility, I show how every income quintile is affected by the policy.  
 
From both tables 4.1 and 4.7, it is easy to note that the poorest two income quintiles 
were affected in the same way, from partial to full access to loans and an increasing 
coverage of grants either those aimed at paying fees or the maintenance ones. Access 
to loan was partial because there was no loan programme for students attending 
private independent HEIs and access to loans for CRUCH students in quintiles I and 
II, although having a high coverage, was not guaranteed and also subject to budgetary 
constraints and specific issues affecting HEIs management 
 
Table 4.7. Effect of the New Policy by Income Quintiles 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 Loans Grants Loan Grants 
Quintile 1 and 
2 
 
Partial coverage 
subject to 
PSU>=475 
Low coverage, 
pay fees 
Subject to 
PSU>=600 
Full coverage, 
subject to 
PSU>=475 
Increasing 
coverage, fees and 
maintenance 
expenditures  
PSU>=550 
Quintile 3 Partial coverage 
subject to 
PSU>=475 
n/a Full coverage 
subject to 
PSU>=475 
n/a 
Quintile 4 Partial coverage 
subject to 
PSU>=475 
n/a Partial coverage 
subject to 
PSU>=475 
n/a 
Quintile 5 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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The situation differs when comparing to quintile 3, which also became fully covered, 
subject to the same entry score requirements because quintile 3 students are not 
entitled to grants. Indeed, there was no CAE before the reform and the coverage for 
CRUCH students was partial and not guaranteed. Nevertheless, FSCU coverage for 
quintile 3 students was lower than that of quintiles 1 and 2 so this may represent a 
comparability issue when contrasting quintiles 1 and 2 vis-à-vis quintile 3 in the pre-
reform scenario. However, as the bulk of the post-reform new loans corresponds to 
CAE, changes in FSCU, in terms of changing the probability of access to HE for low 
and middle-income quintiles, should have had a modest impact.  
 
For quintile 4, there is partial CAE coverage because it is restricted by the budget 
allocated by the government to guarantee debts. After 2009, CAE has increased its 
coverage so has even been offered to any applicant of any socioeconomic condition. In 
the case of quintile 5, it has already been ruled out due to common trends assumption 
hardly holds.  
 
Using quintile 3 as a control group is approximately equivalent to measuring the joint 
impact of (i) the extension of the grants programme through lowering the score 
requirement from 600 to 550 points (equivalent to half a standard deviation), (ii) the 
government offer in order to guarantee grants to students from the two poorest 
household quintiles, with the consequent substitution of FSCU with grants. Hence, 
rather than assessing the impact of the whole reform, I am evaluating the effect of the 
new grants policy.  
 
The nature of the data features an opportunity for using quasi-experimental evaluation 
techniques. In fact regression discontinuity (RD) has been used to evaluate the impact 
of aid (van der Klaauw 2002; Melguizo et al. 2016; Solis 2013). Although it is not 
difficult to make a case for Regression Discontinuity (RD), the lack of data on PSU 
scores in CASEN survey does not allow taking advantages from changes in the 
assignment rule. Even though the reform introduced rules linking amounts of aid to 
income, not knowing PSU scores, a statutory requirement, would make the exercise 
misleading. 
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After choosing treatment and control groups, I then proceed to specify the evaluation 
technique which is the D-I-D model. Although D-I-D is a non-experimental technique 
whose main shortcoming is the lack of random assignment of treatment and control 
groups, it is one of the most common evaluation techniques when using observational 
data, as in this chapter. The technique has been widely used in a variety of topics in 
the social sciences and impact evaluation in the US (Dynarski 2003) and recently in 
the UK (Dearden, Fitzsimons, and Wyness 2014). 
 
Equation [4.3] shows the D-I-D model as an OLS model. 
 
ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅	ߚଶܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ ൅	ߚଷሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൈ ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎሻ  [4.3], 
 
where the dummy Access is the dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
person has ever attended HE, ߚଵ is the mean difference in probability for the treatment 
group, in this case quintiles 1 and 2,	ߚଶ	represents the mean difference in probability 
after the intervention, and ߚଷ is the effect of the interaction term, the D-I-D estimator, 
which captures the difference in access to HE over time for treatment group compared 
with the difference over time for the control group. 
 
It is also possible to extend the model by introducing more covariates as control 
variables, as in [4.4] 
 
ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅	ߚଶܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ ൅	ߚଷሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൈ ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎሻ ൅ 	ߛࢄ		[4.4] 
 
Where X is a vector of individual, household and social background characteristics.  
 
I do not use a non-linear model but the linear probability model due to simplicity and 
the fact that interaction effects in non-linear models such as probit and logit may not 
be meaningful and might even change sign or become statistically (non)significant 
according to the value of the other covariates in the model (Ai & Norton, 2003). 
Anyway, I provide D-I-D estimates using logit as a link function in Annex B. 
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A graphical representation of how D-I-D estimator works and what the coefficients 
measure is provided in Graph 4.4. Nevertheless, as I have more than one post-reform 
period, I use a slightly different specification to allow estimates for different post-
reform periods to capture the D-I-D estimator, as equation [4.5] shows. 
 
ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅	ߚଶܻ݁ܽݎ1 ൅ ߚଷܻ݁ܽݎ2	 ൅	ߚସሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൈ ܻ݁ܽݎ1ሻ ൅
	ߚହሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൈ ܻ݁ܽݎ2ሻ ൅ 	ߛࢄ	    [4.5] 
 
Where ߚଵ is the treatment dummy,  ߚଶ and ߚଷ are coefficients for each post-reform 
year, and ߚସ and ߚହ are the D-I-D estimators, which are the main parameters of 
interest in this chapter. 
 
Graph 4.4. Graphical representation of the differences-in-differences estimator 
 
 
The main advantages of D-I-D estimators are the following. Firstly, from a practical 
point of view D-I-D offers an experimental framework in the absence of randomisation 
so observational data, as either panel or repeated cross sections, is used within an 
experimental framework. Second, it controls for observables and unobservables time 
invariant variables in a similar fashion as fixed effects. Third, D-I-D deals with 
common time effects, such as the state of the economy and changes in the policy 
environment, across treatment and control groups. 
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Nevertheless, D-I-D is not robust to time-variant unobservables so even with good 
time-variant control variables there may still be confounders affecting the estimates. 
Moreover, there also needs to be data before and after the intervention, which is not 
always possible. Common trends, i.e. that differences between treatment and control 
group would have remained constant over time in the absence of the intervention, 
which is the D-I-D key identification assumption, is hard to hold because there is no 
direct way of testing that non-random assigned groups would be equally (un)affected 
by time effects. Nevertheless, I provide placebo estimates in the next section which, 
though indirectly, suggest that holding the common trend assumption would not be 
problematic. 
 
However, the most important critique to studies using D-I-D is the lack of accuracy 
when computing standard errors. An influential paper (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan 2004) found a surprisingly high proportion of papers whose estimates 
were likely to be false positives due to the underestimation of the standard errors, 
with serial correlation being the main cause. Serial correlation is likely to affect 
estimates drawn from data containing many points of time (Bertrand et al. 2004 report 
a mean of 16.5 time period in the papers they reviewed), whereas collapsing the data 
in before and after periods is likely to lead to consistent standard errors, which is the 
case that applies to this chapter. 
 
4.6.Results 
 
4.6.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, I present and explain the results obtained by using the evaluation 
techniques above described. Statistics on educational attainment are provided for the 
whole 18-24 year-old population and those living with at least one parent/guardian 
for the period 1998-2013 (Table 4.7). There is a noticeable increase in the proportion 
of students reporting either complete or incomplete HE, rising from 32 per cent in 
2003 to 37 per cent in 2009. For those living with their parents, the proportion 
attaining HE is slightly higher, with 34 per cent in 2003 and 40 per cent in 2009. As I 
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pointed out in section 3, living arrangements are likely to influence HE participation, 
especially for students from the lowest socio-economic background. 
 
Table 4.8. Proportion (%) of 18-24 year-old by educational attainment (living with at 
least one parent) 
 
Educational 
attainment 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011 2013
No formal 
education 
  
0.005  
 
0.009 
 
0.010 
 
0.011 
  
0.009  
 
0.010 
 (0.004)  (0.009) (0.01) (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.01) 
Incomplete 
Primary 
  
0.076  
 
0.046 
 
0.030 
 
0.024 
  
0.024  
 
0.018 
 (0.062)  (0.037) (0.024) (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.013) 
Complete 
Primary 
  
0.068  
 
0.056 
 
0.044 
 
0.042 
  
0.033  
 
0.038 
 (0.054)  (0.04) (0.033) (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.028) 
Incomplete 
Secondary 
(academic) 
  
0.142  
 
0.118 
 
0.113 
 
0.110 
  
0.163  
 
0.099 
 (0.127)  (0.105) (0.102) (0.096)  (0.159)  (0.086) 
Incomplete 
secondary 
(technical) 
  
0.043  
 
0.041 
 
0.031 
 
0.027 
  
0.045  
 
0.018 
 (0.043)   (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.047)   (0.017) 
Complete 
Secondary 
(academic) 
  
0.244  
 
0.248 
 
0.277 
 
0.284 
  
0.224  
 
0.247 
 (0.25)   (0.254)  (0.272)  (0.279)  (0.211)   (0.234) 
Complete 
secondary 
(technical) 
  
0.143  
 
0.164 
 
0.156 
 
0.134 
  
0.101  
 
0.116 
 (0.147)  (0.172) (0.156) (0.133)  (0.1)  (0.114) 
Incomplete 
HE 
  
0.241  
 
0.286 
 
0.304 
 
0.324 
  
0.358  
 
0.385 
 (0.275)  (0.316) (0.337) (0.36)  (0.384)  (0.425) 
Complete 
HE 
  
0.029  
 
0.030 
 
0.034 
 
0.045 
  
0.041  
 
0.065 
 (0.027)  (0.028) (0.033) (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.065) 
Not 
informed 
  
0.009  
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
-  
  
-  
 
0.003 
 (0.006)  (0) (0) (0)  (0)  (0.003) 
Total 
  
1  
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
  
1  
 
1 
 (1)  (1) (1) (1)  (1)  (1) 
N Total 
        
1,742,923  
        
1,896,076  
        
1,977,321  
        
2,137,222  
        
2,252,722  
        
2,151,682  
     
(1,236,048) 
      
(1,341,478) 
     
(1,428,244) 
     
(1,561,340) 
     
(1,631,304) 
      
(1,541,248) 
 
If only people with at least secondary education were considered, the differences would 
be smaller. This gap has slightly widened over time as shown in Graph 4.5 but at a 
much slower pace than the gap in attainment shown in Table 4.8. Indeed, in 2003, 
43.4 per cent of 18-24 years-old had ever attended HE whereas 44.7 of the subgroup 
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living with at least one parent did so. For 2006-2009 the gap is wider: 43.8 vs 46.6 in 
2006 and 46.9 vs 49.4 per cent in 2009 (the shaded area corresponds to the evaluation 
period).  
 
Graph 4.5. Access to HE for 18-24 year-old having at least completed secondary 
education 
 
 
Descriptive statistics and cross tabulations of the dependent variable are presented for 
the years 2003, 2006 and 2009 in Table 4.9. It is easy to appreciate the increasing 
pattern of access to HE for the lowest income quintiles, whereas the higher –quintiles 
4 and 5- remained constant. However, when the experimental and control groups are 
considered, both groups experienced an increase in access during the evaluation period. 
There were also changes in access when gender and area are considered. In effect, 
female access to HE increased by 7 percentage points whereas access for males 
remained constant; access improved in both urban and rural areas, where the increase 
was 9 percentage points. Children of unqualified workers and craftsmen and operators 
also increased their participation in HE at a faster rate than those from other 
occupational backgrounds. So did students whose mothers had only attained primary 
education. In summary, social groups traditionally seen as the most disadvantaged 
were the ones which made more gains in access to HE during the evaluation period.  
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Table 4.9. Access to HE by background variables. Weighted sample proportions 
 2003 2006 2009 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Household income quintile             
1 0.263 0.440 0.328 0.470 0.369 0.482
2 0.333 0.471 0.394 0.489 0.437 0.496
3 0.425 0.494 0.446 0.497 0.471 0.499
4 0.594 0.491 0.585 0.493 0.601 0.490
5 0.830 0.375 0.791 0.407 0.818 0.386
Total 0.509 0.500 0.527 0.499 0.550 0.498
Gender             
Male 0.519 0.500 0.511 0.500 0.527 0.499
Female 0.499 0.500 0.544 0.498 0.573 0.495
Total 0.509 0.500 0.527 0.499 0.550 0.498
Area             
Urban 0.528 0.499 0.549 0.498 0.570 0.495
Rural 0.277 0.447 0.301 0.459 0.361 0.480
Total 0.509 0.500 0.527 0.499 0.550 0.498
Occupation Head of Household             
Managers, professionals and 
technicians 0.807 0.395 0.798 0.402 0.818 0.386
Clerks and sales 0.559 0.497 0.576 0.494 0.605 0.489
Farming and agriculture 0.296 0.457 0.356 0.479 0.338 0.473
Craftmen and operators 0.412 0.492 0.463 0.499 0.501 0.500
Unqualified workers 0.262 0.440 0.324 0.468 0.371 0.483
Unknown 0.425 0.494 0.472 0.499 0.463 0.499
Total 0.509 0.500 0.527 0.499 0.550 0.498
Mother's education             
Primary 0.245 0.430 0.303 0.459 0.334 0.472
Secondary 0.520 0.500 0.561 0.496 0.555 0.497
Higher 0.888 0.316 0.828 0.378 0.857 0.350
Unknown 0.486 0.500 0.470 0.499 0.483 0.500
Total 0.509 0.500 0.527 0.499 0.550 0.498
Total N 11,931 14,260 15,102 
 
4.6.2. Logistic regression estimates 
 
I start with regression-based impact estimates, for which I provide regression 
coefficients in Table 4.10. I regress the access dummy on a series of predictor variables 
measuring individual, socioeconomic background, and household characteristics.  
Firstly, I estimate the model for 2003, then I use the same estimates to compute fitted 
probabilities by income quintile for years 2006 and 2009.  Next, I estimate the model 
but this time using years 2006 and 2009. I compute fitted probabilities for 2006 and 
2009 and compared them with those predicted by the 2003 model.  The logic behind 
this is that I build a counterfactual by using 2003 estimates and computing fitted 
probabilities for post-reform years so the differences between fitted values are in fact 
a measure of impact for each income quintiles.  
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Table 4.10. Logistic models to predict access to HE 
  2003 2006 2009 
  exp(b)/se exp(b)/se exp(b)/se 
Income quintile    
Quintile 2=1 1.503*** 1.527*** 1.588*** 
 (0.196) (0.172) (0.156) 
Quintile 3=1 2.642*** 2.124*** 1.755*** 
 (0.342) (0.233) (0.174) 
Quintile 4=1 3.447*** 2.771*** 2.490*** 
 (0.474) (0.323) (0.283) 
Quintile 5=1 6.108*** 4.219*** 4.333*** 
 (1.027) (0.596) (0.612) 
Age 6.099*** 26.573*** 22.107*** 
 (3.250) (12.854) (9.757) 
Age2 0.963*** 0.932*** 0.936*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Female=1 1.061 1.189** 1.221*** 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.080) 
Married=1 0.395*** 0.379*** 0.455*** 
 (0.099) (0.072) (0.077) 
Employed==1 0.172*** 0.194*** 0.245*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) 
Head of household woman=1 0.887 0.814** 0.795*** 
 (0.093) (0.076) (0.067) 
N Siblings 1.124* 1.209*** 1.162*** 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.060) 
Household size 0.790*** 0.743*** 0.812*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.031) 
Urban=1 1.251** 1.311*** 1.296** 
 (0.118) (0.100) (0.135) 
Mother's education    
Mother Secondary=1 1.538*** 1.513*** 1.350*** 
 (0.149) (0.135) (0.110) 
Mother HE=1 3.777*** 1.908*** 2.692*** 
 (0.676) (0.324) (0.392) 
Mother Unknown=1 0.591** 0.541*** 0.674** 
 (0.134) (0.128) (0.114) 
Head of household occupation    
Clerks and sales=1 0.819 0.739** 1.066 
 (0.118) (0.104) (0.143) 
Farming and Agriculture=1 0.671** 0.672** 0.711** 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.123) 
Craftmen and operators=1 0.630*** 0.675*** 0.744** 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.092) 
Unqualified worker=1 0.591*** 0.536*** 0.781* 
 (0.092) (0.075) (0.108) 
Unknown=1 0.899 0.969 0.976 
 (0.127) (0.137) (0.138) 
Head of household years of schooling 1.101*** 1.119*** 1.104*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 11894 14231 15102 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.27 0.24 
Log likelihood -426720 -506012 -599199 
Log likelihood null model -625851 -696238 -788303 
p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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The above models, in general, show that the goodness of fit worsens over time. This 
means that the association between the background variables reported in Table 4.10 
and the outcome, access to HE, have weakened over time, this meaning that the 
outcome becomes less dependent on socioeconomic variables over time. For instance, 
relative to quintile 1, quintile 5 students were 6.1 times more likely to attend HE in 
2003, whereas the odds ratio dropped to 4.3 in 2009.  
 
Accordingly, children of unqualified workers were 41 per cent less likely to attend HE 
in 2003 but only 22 per cent less likely in 2009. Furthermore, females were 22 per cent 
more likely to access to HE than males in 2009, up from 6 per cent in 2003. These 
reflections indicate that the 2005 reform seems to have weakened the link between 
socioeconomic background and access to HE but I do not provide impact estimations 
in this instance. 
 
By calculating fitted probabilities for each income quintiles I obtained Table 4.11, 
which compares access rates predicted with 2003 estimates and actual rates fitted for 
2006 and 2009. Standard errors were obtained by calculating the ratio between 
predicted probabilities’ standard deviations and the square root of cell frequencies.  
Table 4.11. Impact estimates for income quintiles 
 2006 2009 
  Predicted Actual Difference Predicted Actual Difference 
1 0.2606 0.3274 0.0668 0.2999 0.3688 0.0689
2 0.3155 0.3916 0.0761 0.3458 0.4369 0.0911
3 0.4009 0.4450 0.0441 0.4575 0.4706 0.0131
4 0.5495 0.5845 0.0351 0.5781 0.6007 0.0226
5 0.7920 0.7904 -0.0015 0.8131 0.8180 0.0049
Note: Differences in bold are statistically significant at p=.05 
 
According to these estimates, the 2005 reform increased the probability of access to 
HE by 7 per cent for quintile 1 students in the evaluation period, 9 per cent for quintile 
2 students, and also affected quintiles 3 and 4 but to a lesser extent. Those differences, 
although an approximation, are not measuring the true causal effect of the reform but 
at least confirm what the descriptive statistics showed. The above estimates try to 
mimic what would have happened in the absence of the reform, the counterfactual, 
but do not offer a comparison between affected and unaffected groups.  
123 
 
4.6.3. Differences-in-differences estimates 
 
To address the above issue, I use the D-I-D model to estimate the causal effect of the 
reform. As I highlighted in the last section, there are two crucial steps. Firstly, I need 
to define treatment and control groups so the control group is ideally unaffected – or 
slightly affected - by the policy change. As I argued in the last section, although 
quintile 3 has also been affected by the policy, the main difference in comparison to 
quintiles 1 and 2 is that quintile 3 students were not eligible for grants. Apart from 
other issues presented in the last section, quintile 3 makes a sensible control group. 
Secondly, I need to provide evidence in order to test, although indirectly, the common 
trends assumption. I provide placebo estimates to indirectly test common trend. 
 
I use the linear probability model (LPM) as a functional specification. In other words, 
I use an OLS model instead of link functions such as logit or probit. Besides its 
shortcomings, especially regarding the prediction of probabilities higher than 1 or lower 
than 0, LPM is not seen as too problematic when it comes to D-I-D models. There is 
no technical ground for treating the effects as linear but the alternative of using non-
linear models may introduce more serious issues. In fact, a logit model, for instance, 
would estimate odds ratios. This is even more problematic in non-linear models when 
interaction effects are concerned, provided that the estimates would vary according to 
the estimation point at which the function is evaluated. Notwithstanding far from 
optimal, using the LPM in a D-I-D context seems to be a sensible approximation to 
the measurement of the true causal effect even though estimates should be taken with 
the necessary caution. 
 
I provide summary statistics of the outcome and control variable in Table 4.12 for the 
treatment and the control group, broken down by year. The differences between both 
groups are straightforward with the control group presenting higher access, more 
employed people, proportionally less rural population, children of more educated 
mothers, and a higher proportion of heads of household with managerial and 
professional occupations.  I also present sample means for treatment and control group 
from 1998 to 2013 in table 4.13. 
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Table 4.12. Summary statistics. Control and treatment groups 
 Control group Treatment group 
  2003 2006 2009 2003 2006 2009 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Access 0.425 0.494 0.446 0.497 0.471 0.499 0.304 0.460 0.366 0.482 0.408 0.491 
Female=1 0.503 0.500 0.480 0.500 0.487 0.500 0.555 0.497 0.529 0.499 0.545 0.498 
Age 21.166 1.759 21.139 1.832 21.095 1.835 20.985 1.797 20.954 1.854 20.836 1.805 
Married=1 0.045 0.208 0.042 0.201 0.050 0.219 0.059 0.235 0.054 0.225 0.062 0.242 
Employed=1 0.523 0.499 0.561 0.496 0.461 0.498 0.332 0.471 0.365 0.481 0.278 0.448 
Female H.of HH=1 0.212 0.409 0.245 0.430 0.286 0.452 0.269 0.443 0.303 0.460 0.335 0.472 
N siblings 2.583 1.116 2.512 1.054 2.390 0.975 2.847 1.196 2.725 1.240 2.597 1.087 
HH size 4.990 1.667 4.812 1.450 4.661 1.450 5.383 1.759 5.189 1.803 4.982 1.658 
Rural=1 0.085 0.278 0.098 0.297 0.104 0.306 0.124 0.329 0.150 0.357 0.144 0.351 
Mother primary=1 0.330 0.470 0.369 0.483 0.315 0.465 0.460 0.498 0.455 0.498 0.415 0.493 
Mother secondary=1 0.559 0.496 0.518 0.500 0.558 0.497 0.471 0.499 0.466 0.499 0.497 0.500 
Mother HE=1 0.084 0.278 0.080 0.271 0.097 0.295 0.048 0.214 0.055 0.228 0.053 0.224 
Mother unknown ed. 0.026 0.160 0.032 0.177 0.031 0.172 0.021 0.142 0.024 0.152 0.035 0.183 
Managers, professionals and technicians=1 0.135 0.341 0.104 0.305 0.105 0.307 0.048 0.213 0.045 0.207 0.052 0.223 
Clerks and sales=1 0.165 0.372 0.157 0.364 0.191 0.393 0.102 0.302 0.121 0.326 0.136 0.342 
Farming and agriculture=1 0.051 0.219 0.050 0.218 0.040 0.196 0.064 0.245 0.057 0.232 0.048 0.214 
Craftmen and operators=1 0.342 0.474 0.333 0.471 0.324 0.468 0.291 0.454 0.268 0.443 0.226 0.418 
Unqualified workers=1 0.164 0.370 0.204 0.403 0.184 0.387 0.196 0.397 0.241 0.428 0.251 0.434 
Unknown=1 0.144 0.351 0.152 0.359 0.156 0.363 0.299 0.458 0.269 0.443 0.287 0.452 
Unweighted N              2,649               3,384                3,687              5,629              6,040              6,602  
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Table 4.13. Access rate for control and treatment groups. 1998-2013 
 Control Group Treatment Group 
1998 0.415 0.310 
2000 0.451 0.319 
2003 0.425 0.304 
2006 0.446 0.366 
2009 0.471 0.408 
2011 0.481 0.462 
2013 0.603 0.583 
 
D-I-D estimates are presented in Table 4.14. I start with the basic model just 
containing treatment, time dummies and their interactions - the D-I-D estimators. 
There is no significant effect for the year 2006. The second model controls for 
individual level characteristics. After that, I control for household characteristics and 
the socioeconomic background controls are introduced in the last models. Estimates 
do not show a significant effect of the policy reform by 2006. This is completely sensible 
as it was the first year of implementation and the impact estimator may not have 
captured the effect of the 11 000 new grants (in comparison to 2003), mostly 
concentrated in the lowest quintiles, which makes the difference in how the policy 
affected treatment and control groups. The coefficients fluctuate between 2.3 and 4.2 
percentage points and only one specification, that of household controls, showed a 
statistically significant effect but at just 0.10 level. 
 
There are significant effects for the interaction between treatment group and year 
2009. Coefficients are stable at around 6 percentage points. The magnitude of the 
impact estimator keeps upon introducing control variables, which means that D-I-D 
estimates were unlikely correlated with the error term, at least with the set of control 
variables I used. In summary, D-I-D estimates indicate that there is no significant 
effect of the reform of grants policy in 2006 but it did have a significant effect in 2009. 
Had I estimated the true causal effect, the changes in the grants policy would have 
increased the probability of access to HE for students from income quintiles 1 and 2 
in 6 percentage points. 
 
The size of the participation effect for the poorest students is massive and equivalent 
to an increase of 14 per cent for students from the poorest 40 per cent of households.  
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Table 4.14. Differences-in-differences estimates. OLS, LPM 
Variable 
Base model 
b/se 
Individual 
controls b/se 
Household 
controls b/se 
Background 
controls b/se 
Treatment=1 -0.121*** -0.171*** -0.154*** -0.105*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Year 2006=1  0.020 0.036* 0.032* 0.043** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Year  2009=1 0.046** 0.033* 0.028 0.023 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Treatment=1*Year 2006=1 0.042 0.038 0.042* 0.026 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) 
Treatment=1*Year 2009=1 0.059** 0.062** 0.060** 0.057** 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Age  0.416*** 0.414*** 0.408*** 
  (0.064) (0.062) (0.060) 
Age2  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female=1  0.010 0.020** 0.023** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Married=1  -0.251*** -0.153*** -0.151*** 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
Employed==1  -0.322*** -0.312*** -0.264*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Head of household woman=1   -0.024** -0.039*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) 
N Siblings   0.045*** 0.023*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
Household size   -0.055*** -0.043*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Urban=1   0.136*** 0.039*** 
   (0.008) (0.009) 
Mother’s education Secondary=1    0.095*** 
    (0.011) 
Mother’s education Higher=1    0.232*** 
    (0.024) 
Mother’s education Unknown=1    -0.058** 
    (0.029) 
H.of Household Clerks and sales=1    -0.060*** 
    (0.021) 
H.of Household Farm and Agriculture=1    -0.116*** 
    (0.023) 
H.of Household Craftsmen and operators=1    -0.108*** 
    (0.020) 
H. of Household Unqualified worker=1    -0.123*** 
    (0.020) 
H.of Household Unknown occupation=1    -0.072*** 
    (0.020) 
Head of household years of schooling    0.018*** 
    (0.002) 
Constant 0.425*** -4.169*** -4.145*** -4.198*** 
  (0.016) (0.663) (0.650) (0.623) 
N 27631 27628 27628 27590 
R2 0.012 0.134 0.156 0.219 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.134 0.156 0.218 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
  
 127 
 
Common trends checks 
 
I show an approximation to the common trends assumption in Graph 4.6 that displays 
the probability of access to HE for treatment and control groups, pre and post reform, 
using CASEN surveys from 1998 to 2013. The shaded area refers to the evaluation 
period where it is straightforward to appreciate a change in comparison to the pre-
reform trend, whereas the dotted line would represent the counterfactual if the 
common trend assumption held. 
 
Graph 4.6. Probability of access to HE. Treatment and control group (sample means) 
 
 
 
I report placebo estimates to indirectly assess the common trends assumption. To 
assess it, I run D-I-D for the pre reform period to establish whether the interaction 
terms are significant. This means testing whether the lines representing treatment and 
control group were in fact parallel before the intervention took place. Placebo 
estimates are reported in Table 4.15. I use the full model including individual, 
household and background controls. I found no significant interaction effects at p=.05 
although the interaction between treatment and year 1998 is slightly significant at 
p=.10  
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Table 4.15. Placebo estimates for D-I-D estimates 
Variables Full model 
 b/se 
Treatment -0.109*** 
 (0.017) 
Year=1998 -0.006 
 (0.020) 
Year=2000 0.002 
 (0.022) 
Treatment=1*Year=1998 0.044* 
 (0.026) 
Treatment=1*Year=2000 0.021 
 (0.028) 
Individual controls YES 
Household controls YES 
Background controls YES 
N 18787 
R2 0.236 
Adjusted R2 0.235 
* p<.10, **p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
4.6.4. Discussion 
 
I have aimed at measuring the true causal effect of the 2005 reform throughout the 
chapter. My estimates report that there is a significant effect of changes in the grants 
programme which were not yet reflected in 2006, the first year of implementation, but 
in 2009. The impact measure is about 6 percentage points. However, there are still 
issues with the data that may affect the estimates that I discuss now. 
 
One crucial issue is that unobserved variables affecting HE participation may have 
changed differently for control and treatment groups, such as school achievement. In 
effect, Chile had already experienced a performance improvement as measured by 
PISA reading test. In effect, whereas Chilean students scored on average 410 points 
in 2000, scores reached 449 points in 2009. In 2000, 42 per cent of 15 year-old students 
performed at PISA level 1 or lower (the most basic level), while in 2009 just 30 per 
cent scored at level 1. The proportion of students in the lowest performance level fell 
from 16 per cent to 9 per cent in the highest socioeconomic groups but also fell from 
73 per cent to 53 per cent in the lowest socioeconomic group (MINEDUC 2011). In 
absolute terms, what happened is that low-income students improved faster than 
higher income students so poor students might take advantage from an enhanced aid 
system.  
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Besides differential improvements in PISA, according to socioeconomic level, the 
violation of the common trends assumption does not seem plausible. In fact, 
socioeconomic gaps in entry test scores (PSU) have not narrowed. Neither have gaps 
in the national assessment test (SIMCE). The key identification assumption of D-I-D 
is unlikely to be under threat. 
 
Anyway, having controlling for observable variables and, to some extent, ruled out 
differential changes in achievement as a threat to common trends, it is not enough 
guarantee that the estimates are unbiased. There still remain other unobserved 
variables that can alter the results as for instance those dealing with the structure of 
incentives the reform put in place. Amongst these, higher motivation of low income 
students due to more support being available for them, an anticipation effect since 
CAE started being discussed in the Congress three years earlier, as well as the fact 
that the government sought, beyond supporting more students, to guarantee a relevant 
amount of money according to household income, may have influenced poor student 
in a very different fashion compared to better-off students. No research has been 
conducted in that area but the way incentives are designed -and the way students 
respond to them- might be crucial for my research. 
 
4.7.Final Remarks 
 
Besides the caveats, this evaluation exercise represents a step forward for the study of 
access to HE in Chile. At least for the short period this chapter has covered, 
background variables do seem to have become weaker predictors of access to HE. 
Despite the methodological shortcomings, the evidence gathered in this chapter does 
suggest that the lowest income group was noticeably benefitted with the grants policy 
change. The effect of the reform on access rates for low SES students and its 
effectiveness in closing SES gaps in participation is massive. 
An emerging trend of studies linking student aid to educational outcomes is taking 
place on Chilean HE research. The development of information systems and the 
accumulation of good quality and rich administrative records, alongside the continued 
commitment to improving and funding more generous student aid from the 
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government, will trigger new research. However, this chapter remains as the only 
research piece that has addressed the 2005 reform so far.  
 
The relevance of 2005 reform is unquestionable: apart from the sharp funding increase, 
the reform set a new basis for student aid. Firstly, income determines what level of 
aid would be available to students and the government is committed to guaranteeing 
a type of support and aid amount instead of the residual approach of the previous 
system. New developments in student aid policy in Chile have happened on the 2005 
reform basis. Expanding income thresholds for loans and grants, introducing an income 
sensitive repayment structure and a subsidised interest rate for CAE are policies that 
were introduced in 2011 as a ‘natural’ continuation of 2005 reform, as well as a 
response to massive student demonstrations. However, measures taken in 2011 had 
already been widely discussed since the 2005 reform took place. 
 
The estimates I provided throughout the chapter support the fact that the reform of 
student aid did favour the poorest students. D-I-D estimates showed that changing 
the grants policy had an impact of 6 percentage points on the probability of control 
group students entering HE, between 2003 and 2009. The magnitude of the effect of 
grants is to be regarded as an important achievement. Considering that the increase 
in participation for quintiles 1 and 2 was around 10 percentage points between 2003 
and 2009, an impact measure of 6 percentage points is certainly relevant. Despite 
concerns that I am not picking up a ‘pure’ causal effect of the policy intervention, the 
use of several approaches to evaluating policy impact proved fairly consistent. 
 
Supply-side changes, which have not been the focus of this chapter, are worth 
considering as they may confound the reform effect. For instance, one may argue that 
poor students willing to attend HE were not able to make it due to, for instance, some 
local HEIs offering limited places. If this were the case, the participation effect may 
be due to increased supply of places rather than the effect of more governmental 
support. This seems unlikely in the Chilean case given fee levels as a proportion of 
household income. In effect, considering that cheapest courses fees -mostly technical- 
were around US$ 1,800 in 2009, it was equivalent to a quarter of the annual household 
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income in quintile 2. This would be even more unlikely for someone willing to study 
an average five-year professional programme (Business, Law or Psychology at an 
average public university) that should have paid US$4,500 in 2009, which is equivalent 
to a 62.5 per cent of a quintile 2 annual household income. A high tuition fees/costs 
of instruction ratio makes very difficult for low income families to pay tuition fees 
without governmental support. Hence, it is fairly safe to maintain that the effects from 
my estimates are a sensible approximation to the true causal effect of the reform.  
 
Reaching equity in HE is a real challenge to policy makers, while this chapter has 
shown that devising appropriate student support mechanisms may improve the 
situation, there is a long way to meet the goal of ‘two people with the same ability 
and preferences should receive the same education’. Apart from household and family 
influences, there are a number of institutional and social factors affecting the chances 
of the poor to reach HE, such as admissions procedures, HEIs’ recruitment policies, 
school practices regarding HE access, as well as the influences of peer groups, teachers 
and even geographical barriers. The lesson here is that policy makers should address 
equity issues in HE beyond the scope of HE policy.  Importing the wider equity agenda 
to HE without addressing inequalities in the process earlier is a disproportionate and 
ineffective burden for HE policy. 
 
In order to reach equity, policies need also to look at improving persistence, completion 
and results in the labour market. Motivations, expectations, the student experience, 
and the institutional factors are all relevant processes which policy should address. In 
the next chapter, I shall also take advantages of the 2005 reform to address the issue 
of aid composition and its influence on persistence, completion and dropout. 
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5. HOW DO STUDENT LOAN CHARACTERISTICS AFFECT 
COMPLETION AND DROPOUT IN HIGHER EDUCATION? A 
MULTILEVEL MULTINOMIAL DISCRETE SURVIVAL APPROACH 
 
5.1.Aims and Research Questions 
 
Student loans are an increasingly popular device to help low SES students afford 
tuition fees and/or living expenses in HE. Financial aid has contributed to either 
improve access (Canton and Blom 2004; Chapman and Ryan 2005; Dynarski 2003; St 
John and Noell 1989) and persistence in HE (Chen and DesJardins 2008, 2010; Dowd 
and Coury 2006). On the other hand, research in persistence and dropout also shows 
that students who drop out have higher risks of defaulting students loans than those 
completing their courses (Dynarski 1994; Hillman 2014; Woo 2002).  
 
I shall argue that, as students progress with their studies, the debt burden increases 
so that they are compelled to persist and/or finish their courses on time, thus 
preventing either over-indebtedness or repaying a loan for an unfinished course. 
Nonetheless, the effectivity of these incentives may vary depending on loans 
characteristics. Students may borrow from several sources such as the government, as 
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in most income contingent/ deferred payment schemes; HEIs, as in some loan schemes 
in the US; and the private sector, by either contracting conventional bank loans with 
a private collateral or state guaranteed loans.  
 
The main hypothesis behind this chapter is that different credit schemes imply a 
variable levels of harshness, which may trigger a variety of behavioural responses. For 
instance, students who find out they lack academic skills or simply do not like the 
course they chose have to make a tough decision, especially if the course is financed 
by a loan: to persist until the studies are finished or drop out. By persisting, the 
student avoids being indebted for a ‘no-good’ as there are no half-engineers or three-
quarter doctors, while by dropping out they can stop the debt growing, but at the cost 
of wasting the investment. Moreover, when having to decide between persisting and 
dropping out, students weigh, amongst other factors, their academic fit, 
academic/professional preferences, income prospects, the value of the credentials, and 
critically, their ability to repay loans. Soft loans may make easier to drop out as the 
consequences of defaulting are perceived as not severe in the medium/long term. 
Indeed, not repaying a government provided loan may be seen as less problematic 
than not repaying a bank loan because the latter would usually imply bad credit 
records and may affect students’ future more severely. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how student loan characteristics affect study 
completion and dropout, having controlled for a number of household, institutional 
and individual characteristics.  Three questions will be addressed in this chapter: (i) 
How does the debt structure (amount and composition) affect the probabilities of 
dropping out/ course completion? (ii) Do bank or harsher loans increase the 
probability of completing studies (or deter students from dropping out) more effectively 
than other student aid mechanisms? (iii) Does loan structure have differential effects 
for certain type of students (income levels, prior achievement, or type of HEI)? 
To answer these questions, I carry out a survival analysis of Chilean university 
students participating in CAE, whose repayment process operates through commercial 
banks. I take advantage of a policy failure occurred during the first year of the 
programme implementation (2006). The failure consisted in offering a loan to rich 
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students instead of the poor due to a random software failure. The government was 
forced to increase the budget so that poor students were also offered loans. Take up 
ratios were similar for different income groups so the failure features a unique 
opportunity to study the entire socioeconomic distribution being supported with aid.  
 
The implication of the failure for this chapter is that it allows me to observe students 
from the whole socioeconomic distribution. Had the failure not occurred, I would have 
been able to get information for only the poorest students. The failure, in consequence, 
does not provide an experimental setting but allows observing students that would 
not have been supported with the loan had the assignment procedure been applied 
correctly.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. First, I discuss the main theoretical and 
disciplinary approaches in the literature on persistence and dropout (section 5.2). After 
that, in section 5.3, I describe the Chilean student aid system, with an emphasis on 
the crucial role it has played in providing opportunities to the less well-off students 
over the last two decades. Next, in section 5.4, I describe the dataset and its main 
variables, discuss the methods commonly used in empirical research, with a special 
emphasis on survival analysis and random effects (frailty) models methods, and data 
constraints. Then, I specify multinomial logistic models for university students 
entering five-year undergraduate courses in 2006 and supported by CAE loans. I 
analyse the results in two stages: (i) the effects of debt-related variables on the 
outcome (completion/dropout) for five-year course entrants and (ii) the effects of debt-
related variables for specific groups by interacting variables. I also introduce random 
effects as a means of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity (section 5.4). The chapter 
finishes with the main conclusions and issues for future research and policy agendas 
(section 5.5). 
5.2.State of Art 
 
The effect of student aid on access of low SES students, minorities, and non-traditional 
students to HE  has been widely studied (Bettinger 2004; Canton and Blom 2004; 
Chapman and Ryan 2005; Dynarski 2003; Finnie and Usher 2006; Johnstone 2004; St 
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John and Noell 1989). Most investigations have shown a positive effect of aid on access 
to HE and some of them have suggested specific policy mechanisms to improve equity 
of access beyond overcoming financial barriers (Finnie 2012). 
 
Interestingly, the study of dropout/persistence processes goes far beyond socio-
economic and background variables as psychological, economic, social, institutional, 
and academic variables are regarded as affecting the process. Following Cabrera, Nora 
and Castañeda (1992), two types of research on dropout/ persistence can be 
identified9. Firstly, the literature trying to understand the structural processes 
underlying dropout processes. This research seeks to discuss/review theoretical 
frameworks and conceptual approaches, along with testing empirically the adequacy 
of particular theories. On the other hand, there is a body of research focusing on 
measuring the effects of a series of variables, critically student aid, on dropout and 
persistence. 
 
Theoretical approaches to dropout from HE have been developed since the 1970s, 
especially in the US. The main conceptual developments are the integration model 
(Tinto 1975, 2010), the attrition model, developed by Bean (1980, 1985) and the 
‘choice’ model. These approaches to persistence and dropout arise from a variety of 
disciplines such as psychology, sociology and economics. 
 
The first theoretical framework, that of the integration, pays attention to social and 
academic integration levels and focuses on students adaptation to the academic 
environment and variables which boost it, such as SES, personal attributes, family 
context and prior academic performance. Tinto’s model features a variation of 
Durkheimian sociology which emphasises social integration and normative components 
(Spady 1970), where dropout behaviour is treated in a similar way as Durkheim dealt 
with suicide (Durkheim 2006). The integration model relates dropout to the mismatch 
between students and institutions, where factors explaining persistence such as 
motivation, students’ skills, and academic and social characteristics of HEIs model 
and, at the same time, provide feedback to the student commitment to their academic 
                                         
9 An illustrative synthesis of earlier theoretical developments may be found in Bean (1982). 
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goals and studies. The more important academic goals and commitment are, the higher 
the probability of persisting (Cabrera, Nora, and Castaneda 1993). The integration 
model has sometimes been regarded as the most influential and the one which more 
empirical research has produced (Cabrera et al. 1993; Donoso and Schiefelbein 2007). 
 
The second model -that of Bean (1980, 1981)-, introduces external factors such as job 
opportunities as well as considers the intention of persisting/dropping out as the main 
predictor. This model incorporates non-cognitive factors such as attitudes, motivation 
and interests as well as environmental and organisational factors. In fact, Bean and 
Vesper (1990) suggested that these factors along with family approval play a central 
role (see also Bean 1982:27). Nevertheless, Bean’s major progress in the field is the 
fact that he intended to model the intention to leave, which has a direct impact on 
institutional research.  
 
The third model establishes a connection between student’s academic choices and 
persistence. Dropout follows a three stages process: (i) socio-economic factors and 
academic skills model the predisposition of attending the university; (ii) students 
balances costs and benefits of attending a specific HEI; (iii) the academic experience 
models perceptions on economic and non-economic benefits of persisting. Here student 
aid is important because it affects costs that student should face. Stratton, O’ Toole 
and Wetzel (2008) state that dropout is a rational response to the changes of the 
probabilities of getting a degree and/or costs and benefits associated with it.    
 
Cabrera et al (1993) point out that an important part of empirical research is based 
on integration and attrition models. Results show that both theories complement each 
other and that factors external to students are more important in comparison to what 
the integration model may predict. By integrating theoretical views, Stratton et al 
(2008) suggest that a major weakness in the literature is the fact that there has not 
been a clear distinction between dropping out and leave HE temporarily (stopping 
out). I would agree with this view but also argue that studying stopout relies too much 
on the availability of quality data covering periods long enough to make sure that stop 
outs can be properly detected. More crucial, however, is the fact that stopout is 
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difficult to operationalise as there is not a precise definition of it so it is keen to 
definitions ad hoc to the available data- 
 
Chen and St. John (2011) concluded that integration is one of the most stable 
predictors of persistence. Students attending selective institutions show lower dropout 
rates, student aid coverage as a proportion of tuition fees has a significant impact and, 
in consequence, there should be a coordination between policies affecting the level of 
fees and student aid packages. Nevertheless, the authors concluded that non-need-
based aid had a smaller effect on persistence than need-based aid. This relates to the 
incentive structures behind the funding instruments and their related behavioural 
response. 
 
In relation to research on the effect of student aid on dropout rates, nevertheless, 
results are mixed rather than concluding. Some studies find significant effects on 
persistence, whereas other examine the importance of matching aid policies according 
to student characteristics and the temporal dimension of the educational process. 
However, there are also investigations finding no effects of student aid in 
dropout/persistence. 
 
For instance, Chen and Desjardins (2008) noted that research carried out on the basis 
of dominant theoretical frameworks has not done important contributions as it lacks 
a focus on the interaction of student aid and income levels when explaining dropout. 
For this reason, they used a longitudinal approach and estimated a coefficient 
measuring the interaction between student aid and income level. They found 
heterogeneous effects of aid on dropout according to income level, the most important 
effect being found for low and middle-income students. In another study, the same 
authors arrived at similar conclusions but this time by testing differential effects by 
racial and ethnic characteristics (Chen and DesJardins 2010). 
 
On the other hand, Stratton et al (2008) suggest that getting a job at the university 
and being granted a scholarship is associated with a lower probability of dropping out 
in comparison to those receiving loans.  
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Other research pieces have tested whether aid packages design leads to differential 
outcomes. Herzog (2005) points out that the return of student aid is much less 
important than the student academic experience, but at the same time, the relevance 
of the level of aid in relation to fees is well established: middle-income students with 
unmet economic needs are the keenest to drop out, while students with good academic 
skills show a higher probability of moving to other HEI. Aid structure has also been 
studied together with timing –temporal effects-, i.e. how aid affects departure decisions 
in different stages of the educational process (DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall 
2002b). They found that moving from loans to scholarships, as Princeton University 
did, had a positive effect on persistence. Other studies obtained important conclusions 
for policymaking as temporal effects may help package aid by both differentiating aids 
according to how long the student has been enrolled and targeting aid packages to 
those at higher risk of leaving before graduating (DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall 
2002a). 
 
Nonetheless, studies such as Dowd and Coury’s (2006), which focused on Community 
Colleges in the US, found no effect of student loans on persistence and warned that 
even though allocating resources through loans seems to be correct conceptually, the 
evidence they found contests this assumption.  
 
This disparity of results is due to the scope -institutional, state and national levels-, 
data limitations, and the lack of consistent theories. Interestingly, the main theory 
frameworks are contended by empirical research but the validity of attrition and 
integration models, the most comprehensive ones, have hardly been questioned. 
 
In the particular case of Chile, research on the subject is recent and underdeveloped. 
However, there is a comprehensive theoretical discussion (Díaz 2008; Donoso and 
Schiefelbein 2007; Himmel 2002). In turn, earlier empirical research has measured 
neither factors affecting dropout nor the impact of student aid but rather qualitative 
approaches (De los Ríos y Canales, 2007; Centro de Microdatos, 2008). There are also 
studies measuring dropout globally through small samples (Centro de Microdatos, 
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2008) or by developing proxies on the basis of official statistics  (González and Uribe 
2003; Uribe 2004).  
 
Only two pioneering studies have made use of administrative records to link 
persistence/ dropout with student aid. Urzúa and Rau (2012) used administrative 
records from CAE and HE enrolment database. They found 2006’s CAE students 
outperformed non-CAE students with lower dropout rates. That paper uses a multiple 
choice approach and only tracks students one year after the first enrolment and after 
5 years in order to link the data with unemployment insurance records to obtain data 
on wages (all formal employees contribute to unemployment insurance based on their 
earnings). Nevertheless, there are many flaws regarding some particular characteristics 
of the programme, the effects of the administrative mistake and the special conditions 
that HEIs established for their first CAE student cohort (I shall return to this in the 
data and methods section). The other study (Horn et al. 2014), investigated the 
differential effect between state-provided  and institutionally provided aid. 
Nevertheless, this study used data from the most selective Chilean university, the 
Catholic University of Chile (PUC), thus the variability of some parameters of 
interest, such as prior achievement, is highly restricted so that the estimates might be 
problematic. Additionally, this restriction threatens the generalisability of the results. 
Research discussed above focuses on measuring the effects of aid and/or aid packages 
targeted to specific populations. The results confirm the positive effect of aid on 
persistence as well as the effectiveness of aid packages in targeting specific groups, 
mostly low SES students. Nonetheless, there are not direct comparisons between 
financial instruments introducing different incentive structures that may trigger a 
variety of behavioural responses according to the level of harshness implied. 
 
5.3. The Chilean Student Aid System 
 
5.3.1. General features 
 
Currently, 1.2 million students attend HE in Chile at the undergraduate level, this 
representing four times the total enrolment in 1990. This is well in line with global 
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trends. In fact, in the last 20 years, HE enrolment has been growing by 5 per cent a 
globally (British Council 2012; OECD 2008b). 
 
Even though the tuition fees introduction in Chile dates back to 1981, it is a rather 
recent trend in advanced countries. Cost sharing policies have been accompanied by 
financial mechanisms allowing low SES students to access HE (Chapman 2006; 
Johnstone 2004; Teixeira et al. 2008). In the Chilean case, two major processes explain 
the steady increase in HE participation, which took place since the early 2000s: (i) the 
universalisation of the coverage of secondary education and (ii) an important 
governmental effort to enhance demand-side funding through student aid (Armanet 
and Uribe 2005; MDS 2012).  
 
Reaching universal coverage in secondary education had an obvious impact on the 
demand for HE. The secondary education attainment of the poorest decile’s 20-24 
year-old population rose from 39 per cent to 68 per cent between 2000 and 2011, while 
in the next decile the figures improved from 48 percent to 69 per cent in the same 
period, as shown in Graph 5.1. Poorest young people attaining secondary education 
became the most important source of demand for HE and most of its growth prospects 
relied on it. 
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Graph 5.1. Share of the 20-24-years old population with at least complete secondary 
education by household income decile. 
  
Source: MDS (2012) 
 
Reaching universal coverage in secondary education had an obvious impact on the 
demand for HE. The secondary education attainment of the poorest decile’s 20-24 
year-old population rose from 39 per cent to 68 per cent between 2000 and 2011, while 
in the next decile the figures improved from 48 percent to 69 per cent in the same 
period, as shown in Graph 5.1. Poorest young people attaining secondary education 
became the most important source of demand for HE and most of its growth prospects 
relied on it. 
 
5.3.2. The Chilean aid system. Policies and developments 
 
Chilean student aid system is made up of a variety of programmes, including loans, 
grants and maintenance allowances. Students apply to the whole student aid system 
before the university applications process takes place. Student aid is allocated to 
students upon PSU scores and university application outcomes are released. Aid is 
granted on the basis of academic performance, namely GPA, PSU scores, and SES. 
Once PSU and admission results are published, students are required to enrol in HEIs 
but currently they know in advance which kind of support is available to their choices. 
It is important to note that, by far, the main selection criteria used by HEIs is PSU 
score, this meaning that having good test results assures a place in the most selective 
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universities. For the twenty-five public and private dependent universities (CRUCH) 
selection relies entirely on PSU scores and secondary GPAs whilst an increasing 
number of private independent universities do use PSU as the main selection criteria. 
Non-selective universities, however, do not pay much attention to PSU scores with 
selection purposes. In practice, for CRUCH universities, the most selective HEIs, 
students are eligible to income contingent loans (FSCU) and a generous grant scheme, 
whereas, for independent private HEIs students, aid relies mainly on CAE. The next 
table (5.1) shows eligibility rules for student aid. 
Table 5.1. Student aid eligibility criteria in for new entrants (as at 2006) 
Type of HEI SES (household 
income quintile) 
Academic 
requirements 
Benefit package HEIs eligibility 
CRUCH 
universities 
(public and 
private 
dependent) 
I and II PSU>=550 Grant to cover 
100% of tuition 
fees.  
Food and 
maintenance 
allowance 
None 
550>PSU>=475 FSCU up to 100% 
of fees 
Food allowance 
None 
III PSU >= 475 FSCU up to 100% 
of fees 
None 
IV PSU >= 475 FSCU from 20% 
to 80% of fees. 
CAE subject to 
budget 
constraints 
None, except that 
HEIs ought to 
participate in 
CAE if applicable
Private 
Universities 
I and II PSU >= 475 CAE, grant, food 
and/or 
maintenance 
allowance also 
apply 
Accredited 
and/or CAE 
participant 
III and IV PSU >= 475 CAE CAE Participant 
Professional 
Institutes (IPs) 
 GPA>=5.3 CAE, Grant, 
allowances 
CAE Participant 
GPA>=5.0 Grant, allowances Determined by 
MINEDUC 
III and IV GPA>=5.3 CAE CAE Participant 
Technical 
Training Centres 
(CFTs) 
I and II GPA>=5.3 CAE, Grant, 
allowances 
CAE Participant 
GPA>=5.0 Grant, allowances Determined for 
MINEDUC 
III and IV GPA>=5.3 CAE CAE Participant 
 143 
 
Top performing students prefer selective CRUCH universities and a handful of private 
independent institutions on the basis of academic indicators, prestige, and the kind of 
aid available to them.  
 
As noted above, the Chilean student aid supports students on the basis of SES and 
academic merit. There are several packages, the most attractive ones favouring 
students entering CRUCH universities. Moreover, the government guarantees aid 
packages to anyone meeting the requirements as well as budgets enough resources to 
meet students’ needs on the basis of enrolment and tuition fees estimates. 
Nevertheless, it is important to prevent that CAE coverage has evolved according to 
the budget allocated by the government on annual basis. In fact, in the first years of 
CAE operation, loans were offered to students with per capita household income up 
to the third income quintile. Nevertheless, the government has increased resources to 
CAE and is currently (as at 2015) able to offer loans to anyone fulfilling academic 
requirements. 
 
5.3.3. The 2005 reform and the introduction of CAE 
 
In late 2005, a major reform of student aid took place. Three important changes were 
critical: (i) the creation CAE, which has leveraged resources from private banks and 
had benefited 600,000 students by 2014, (ii) a re-engineering of student aid affecting 
CRUCH universities, and (iii) an increase of the number and coverage of grants 
alongside the extension of maintenance allowances. The government established aid 
packages according to student academic and socioeconomic characteristics (see 
MINEDUC 2007; OECD and The World Bank 2009 for more details) including grants, 
loans, and maintenance support targeted to the poorest students (see Table 5.1 on 
last page). Student aid started being allocated exclusively on the basis of per capita 
household income. Moreover, subsequent aid expenditures started being budgeted by 
forecasting aid demand but this time explicit parameters such as enrolment growth 
and fee increases are considered.  
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The new loan scheme has concentrated the biggest share of the aid increase. In fact, 
21,000 students were supported by CAE in 2006 and roughly 600,000 have been 
favoured until March 2014. At the same time, the number of current students under 
the support of CAE increased from 21,263 in 2006 to 356,574 in 2014, this accounting 
for about one-third of the Chilean HE enrolment (INGRESA 2015).  
 
Participation levels by SES, although still unequal, increased for all socioeconomic 
groups with the exception of the richest income quintile, which had also reached an 
almost universal coverage.  
 
However, policymakers’ focus has shifted from access to the mechanisms contributing 
to increasing retention of poor students as well as securing the financial sustainability 
of aid policies. There is a wide interest in explaining which different settings of student 
aid are more effective according to socioeconomic characteristics along with a 
recognition of the heterogeneity of the impact of aid by SES. This turns relevant given 
that student population in Chile has experienced an important diversification (UNDP 
2005). The student body is no longer the homogeneous group with good school 
background entering HE straight away from the school, but a much diverse one.  
 
These concerns are a consequence of both the rapid transition from an elite to a mass 
HE, which relied on the inclusion of otherwise marginalised students and the increase 
in the number of HEIs from the mid-nineties onwards. The current student population 
also comprises low SES background young people, workers seeking a second 
qualification, mature students, etc. The risk of dropping out has become a major 
concern, as many new students lack academic skills and differ from the once normal 
well-prepared and academically oriented student seen before.  
 
The Chilean HE policy debate has also paid attention to a fundamental issue: 
students’ debt burden, which has questioned systemic foundations such as cost 
transfer and a comparatively low share of public funding in HE total expenditure. 
However, it is a matter of concern that relevant facts are neither investigated nor well 
documented: dropout rates of CAE supported students are much lower than the 
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average. For Chilean standards, a modest 12 per cent of CAE students have dropped 
out in the first three years of study, in sharp contrast with the four times higher 
system level dropout rate (González and Uribe 2003; Rolando, Salamanca, and Lara 
2010). The main question here is why CAE  dropout rates are lower, even though the 
prospects are high income to debt ratio (World Bank 2011), which is often associated 
with low retention and higher risks of default (Volkwein et al. 1998; Woo 2002) and 
harsher repayment conditions in comparison to FSCU supported students. 
 
CAE loans started in 2005 to finance students entering in 2006. Loans are generated 
by private financial institutions while the main mechanism to leverage funds is the 
state guarantee. Crucially, the government faces a major constraint: the law does not 
allow the government to originate CAE loans directly, which is what defines the CAE 
financial model where the government must repurchase the credits that banks are not 
willing to finance. Once students take up loans, the government splits the portfolio 
into equally sized and homogeneous loan packages which are subsequently tendered. 
Bank bids are selected based on the following parameters: (i) the highest proportion 
of students to be financed by the bank and (ii) the lowest surcharge to portfolio 
repurchase 
 
Another particular feature of CAE is that both the state and HEIs share the risk: 
HEIs guarantee a decreasing proportion of loans until the student graduates, which is 
completely transferred to the state upon graduation. HEIs participation in CAE, in 
consequence, is not mandatory and they are allowed to cap the number of CAE-
supported students according to their institutional practices. HEIs are also able to cap 
the number of CAE-supported students they accept and establish academic 
requirements on top of legal requirements (either scoring 475 in PSU or reaching a 
GPA of 5.310). The way HEIs responded to the incentives in the first year of CAE 
operation is rather mixed. Some HEIs were conservative in capping numbers and set 
demanding academic requirements to minimise dropouts so taking a very low risk, 
others did not cap the number of CAE-supported students but used CAE to substitute 
their own mechanisms of student support -institutional loans, grants, and bursaries-, 
                                         
10 Chilean marks normally range between 1.0 and 7.0, 4.0 being the pass threshold. 
 146 
 
while for other HEIs CAE represented an opportunity to expansion (CAE driven 
HEIs). Nonetheless, most HEIs ended up sticking to the legal requirements and 
relaxing caps in subsequent years.  
At least for this analysis, as only 2006 entry cohort -and the first- is considered, the 
incentives to HEIs in order to expand enrolment are rather limited, whereas there 
might be an incentive to have a special attention on CAE-supported students. Indeed, 
a number of HEIs devised institutional mechanisms aiming at preventing dropout. 
Nevertheless, CAE students having lower dropout rates, at least in the first cohort, 
does not seem to be due to special measures taken by HEIs but more demanding 
academic requirements set by HEIs. The impact this may have on the estimates of 
debt composition seems to be rather limited, provided that all students in the sample 
are CAE-supported and most students are totally CAE-supported.   
 
The policy failure 
 
A major policy failure took place in the first year of CAE operation. CAE regulations 
stated that loans must be offered on the basis of socioeconomic need, the poorest 
students having priority. After that, loans would be offered to the extent to which the 
budget allows so11. Due to a very rare software failure, loans were offered to the richest 
students instead of the poor. This meant a major shock for a new programme which 
was created to improve HE access and forced a quick and radical government 
intervention. Originally, the government had intended to offer 14,000 credits but as a 
consequence of the failure, the budget would be increased enough so that poor students 
could obtain a loan while keeping the loan offer to better-off students. Finally, 21,263 
students took up the loans from which 13,695 corresponded to new entrants. Middle-
income groups were the most affected with the failure, as shown in Table 5.2, which 
instead of the intended pyramidal distribution shows one looking as an hourglass. 
  
                                         
11 The government budget is not intended to originate loans directly but to portfolio repurchase –including 
banks’ mark-up and guarantees payment.   
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Table 5.2. CAE loans taken up in 2006 by household income quintile. New entrants 
Household income quintile N % 
1 2,924 21.35
2 2,208 16.12
3 2,130 15.55
4 3,277 23.93
5 3,156 23.04
Total 13,695 100
Source: Comisión INGRESA 
 
Had the assignment rule been correctly applied –giving priority to those coming from 
low SES households-, a relevant group of students would not have been offered a loan. 
That group of students had (upper)middle-class background and a variety of sources 
of government sponsored support were available to them, as shown in Table 5.1. Some 
of them, those attending to state subsidised universities, were supported by a mixture 
of CAE loan and income contingent loan, whereas the other group -those attending 
independent HEIs- was completely financed by CAE.   
 
This features a unique opportunity for research as those students financed by mistake, 
many being also supported by other aid mechanisms, would not have been present 
otherwise. It also helps build a proxy for debt composition, which consists in what 
proportion –as a percentage- of tuition fee payments corresponds to CAE loan and 
consequently compare the outcomes across debt composition levels. Indeed, without 
the mistake, CAE was not meant to cover students from quintile 4. Quintile 4 students 
at CRUCH universities are able to top up their fees -mostly covered with FSCU- with 
CAE in a variable degree (from 20 to 80 per cent of fees as shown in Table 5.1), but 
the mistake benefited them, this way allowing me to have a relevant number of cases 
to study debt composition. In summary, the effect of the policy failure on my research 
was twofold: it allowed me to count on observations from the whole socioeconomic 
spectrum and provided a relevant number of cases with different aid composition. This 
features the uniqueness of the data I use in this chapter as well as the way I take 
advantage from the mistake. 
  
I discuss the use of debt composition as a proxy of harshness and the assumptions 
implied in more depth in section 5.4. 
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The assignment rule has been applied correctly in the following years and the system 
has been able to, step by step, offer loans to everyone, thus covering the whole socio-
economic spectrum. However, the 2006 cohort features a unique case as it is the only 
one covering the whole socioeconomic spectrum and, at the same time, allow me to 
track students throughout the complete duration of their studies. On the other hand, 
loans take up ratios by income quintiles were very similar- about 75 per cent in the 
2006 to 2010 period (World Bank 2011). This makes a good point to support the use 
of the policy failure as a natural experiment (I shall discuss this further in the data 
section). 
 
It is important to discuss the consequence of the policy failure on the probability of 
getting aid. The fact that CAE distribution did not have a pyramidal shape may 
slightly affect the middle (third) income quintile but does not affect students beyond 
2006 process. In that sense, provided that quintile 3 was used as control group in 
Chapter 4, the D-I-D estimator presented for year 2006 might be slightly 
overestimated. Nonetheless, given the number of students involved in the reform and 
the fact that CAE was just starting so it did not represent a relevant share of student 
aid, the effects on the estimates are not important. Neither are 2009 estimates affected 
because four years later this very small effect would have vanished.  
 
5.4. Data and Methods 
 
The dataset comes from a merging of several administrative databases from Chilean 
HE student aid systems. My main predictors are a dummy variable ‘fully funded by 
CAE/partially funded by CAE’ and the standardised cumulated debt (z score). By 
using several methodological approaches, I use a series of individual, institutional, 
course, and household characteristics as control variables. My aim goes beyond merely 
understanding the effects of student aid on persistence and dropout but this chapter 
focus on studying the differential effect of both types of support.  
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5.4.1. Outcome variable 
 
The data used in this chapter come from the Administrative Commission for the 
Higher Education Loan System, INGRESA. INGRESA is a public institution in charge 
of managing the State Guaranteed Loan, which is responsible for setting the budget, 
application processes, loan allocation, and coordination with the banking system.  It 
is also responsible for collecting information from the HEIs to monitor and supervise 
the system. As loans are renewable every year, INGRESA checks student statuses 
which are relevant to keep the system working properly. Three main statuses are of 
interest: (i) continuing registration, (ii) dropout, and (iii) completed studies. 
 
The status ‘continuing registration’ is the most straightforward as INGRESA just 
checks with HEIs whether the student is still registered and meets the academic 
requirements -70 per cent of completed credits- and then proceeds to renew the loan 
for the following year if requirements are met and the student requests so. This is 
important to be taken into account as some students may not need financial support 
or may have been awarded other type of support in a particular year. When 
requirements are not met, the loan is not renewed for the following year but the 
student would be eligible for subsequent years if academic credit completion is met in 
the future. 
  
In contrast, ‘dropout’ status is not straightforward. Law # 20,127, which regulates 
the system operation, defines that a student has dropped out when there is no 
registration at any participant HEI during the whole last academic year. For instance, 
suppose a student started studying in year n. Then the student was not registered 
during year n+1 and consequently, INGRESA recorded the student as ‘presumably 
dropped out’; and finally, if the student did not register at any participant HEI in 
year n+2, INGRESA deems the student as ‘dropout’. The issue at this point is that 
the student might well have dropped out in year n or n+1, since the status variable 
refers to the beginning of the academic year. I assumed the student has ‘dropped out’ 
in year n and so was it recorded in the dataset. 
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The status ‘completed studies’ is slightly simpler. For example, a student has been 
recorded as ‘continuing registration’ from year n to year n+4. At the beginning of 
year n+5, HEIs inform INGRESA that the student has finished and then INGRESA 
records the student as ‘completed studies’. Besides it is recorded as ‘completed studies’ 
in year n+5, I assume the student actually finished in year n+4, as all HEIs report 
status at the beginning of each academic year so the student should have finished at 
the end of year n+4 at the latest. 
 
The outcome is a categorical variable made up of three categories: Continuing 
registration (0), dropout (1) and completed studies (2). I shall consider transfers, 
which account for 14.3 per cent of the sample, as continuing registration due to the 
following reasons. First, some students appear as transferred when they move to other 
HEI when in fact there might be a regulated pathway so it would not be a proper 
transfer. This is not straightforward to quantify as it would require me having every 
regulated pathway in the dataset, which is not the case. Second, the condition 
‘transferred’ does not exclude other outcomes happening thereafter, which is one of 
the key conditions for the model I develop in this chapter to hold.  Moreover, not 
always are transferred students easy to identify as the data do not allow to track every 
possible move into the HE system. Therefore, most transferred students are found 
within category ‘0’.  By doing so, I am indirectly assuming that the events as coded 
in the outcome variable are absorbing, i.e. no other event must occur after dropout or 
completion have taken place. In this setting the status ‘transferred’ would be a non-
event. 
 
In order to obtain a basic profile of transferred students, I present some basic statistics 
in Table 5.3 from which it is noticeable that the proportions of transferred students 
by income quintile are rather even; entry scores are significantly lower for transferred 
students, though depending on the income quintile; the proportion of students having 
completed their courses by year 6 is significantly lower for transferred students; and 
there is a higher proportion of dropouts among students who have stayed at their 
entry HEI compared to transfers, even though this depends on the income quintile 
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Table 5.3. Characterisation of students according to transfer condition 
 
 Household income quintile  
 Transfer condition 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Distribution 
Stayed at entry HEI 815 687 772 1,304 1,442 5,020 
% Stayed 86.3 86.1 84.1 83.9 87.7 85.7 
Transferred to another HEI 129 111 146 251 202 839 
% Transferred 13.7 13.9 15.9 16.1 12.3 14.3 
Total 944 798 918 1,555 1,644 5,859 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
PSU score means 
Stayed at entry HEI 539.8 542.5 547.7 572.5 601.1 567.5 
Transferred to another HEI 539.0 529.8 550.5 557.4 591.8 558.0 
Dif 0.8 12.8 -2.8 15.1 9.3 9.5 
Proportion completing course by year 6 
Stayed at entry HEI 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.6 0.64 0.599 
Tranferred to other HEI 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.254 
Diff 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.35 
Proportion dropped out by year 6 
Stayed at entry HEI 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.165 
Tranferred to other HEI 0.14 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.116 
Diff 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.05 
Note: Statistically significant differences at p=.05 reported in italics 
 
The above makes sense since transferred students do not leave HE but instead try a 
different university, whereas a lower proportion of transferred students complete their 
courses by year 6. In summary, transferred students are not different in socioeconomic 
terms from those staying at the entry HEI, perform lower in PSU but the difference 
is of less than 0.1 standard deviation, whereas the relevant difference concerns course 
completion rates.  
 
5.4.2. Covariates 
 
There are two kinds of covariates in the dataset: time invariant and time variant. 
Time invariant covariates are background variables as per capita household income at 
the entry point (measured as household income quintiles), GPA in secondary school 
and university admissions test scores (PSU scores). Other time-invariant variables are 
the HEI and type of HEI the student entered and the expected income –as at 2006- 
upon graduation. Time variant covariates are the cumulated debt (in z scores) and 
the proportion of CAE debt as a percentage of the fees. 
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Two debt related variables were built: (i) the proportion of total tuition fees being 
financed by CAE and (ii) the cumulated CAE debt. These are the main variables of 
interest, their study featuring the core motivation of this chapter. The proportion of 
CAE financed tuition fees has been dichotomised, the cut-off point being 80 percent. 
This takes into account the fact that partial CAE funding starts when FSCU finances 
20 per cent of tuition fees. It would have been possible to use debt composition as a 
continuous variable but the frequency distribution does not allow it as a large majority 
of observations concentrate at around 100 per cent of CAE funding (consider I use the 
CAE database). 
 
The cumulated debt variable only considers the total CAE accrued debt since the 
amount corresponding to other aid instruments is not recorded in the database. I have 
defined those students whose CAE debt proportion is lower than or equal to 80 per 
cent as ‘partially funded’, whereas ‘totally funded’ refers to students with a CAE 
proportion higher than 80 per cent. The assumption behind this is that non-CAE 
financed fees are funded by other aid mechanisms such as income-contingent loans, 
state and institutional grants, third sector aid, etc. 
 
The dataset consists of a merge of administrative data on CAE borrowers from 2006, 
the year of the administrative error. The total number of students is 21,163, from 
which 13,097 entered HEIs for the first time that year. Three databases were used to 
build the dataset. Firstly, student aid applications database (FUAS), which contains 
socioeconomic data such as per capita household income, household members’ activity, 
educational background, and income. Income is self-reported and checked by the 
Chilean tax service (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, SII), which returns household 
income quintile on the basis of members’ national ID numbers as provided by 
applicants. SII just reports per capita income quintiles due to legal constraints 
safeguarding data privacy, while quintiles cut-off values follow standards from CASEN 
household survey. Thus, there are two measures of income whose consistency is around 
70 per cent, the self-reported income being continuous and the corrected categorical. 
Although SII adjusts income and this measure should be more reliable, it is the 
applicant who fills in application forms regarding household members’ data. Therefore, 
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omitting the ‘wealthy’ household member or adding household members with no 
income drops the per capita income artificially so it may end up supporting students 
that should not be benefited. There is some evidence of manipulation of socioeconomic 
data so the government has devised a number of consistency checking routines. 
Nonetheless, application checks have turned irrelevant as the income cut-off point has 
been pushed upwards over the last years. Anyway, I use the household income quintile 
as adjusted by SII.  
 
National ID numbers (every Chilean is assigned one upon registering birth) make also 
possible to merge FUAS database with PSU scores, GPA, and the secondary school 
attended. Secondary schools’ identifiers allow merging data on school performance 
tests (SIMCE) at the school level, type of school (public, private subsidised or private 
independent), and a school vulnerability score based on the proportion of students 
entitled to free school meals. Individual standardised test scores are problematic as 
the measurement system intends assessing performance at the school level rather than 
individual achievement. Though some studies in Chile have used individual scores, 
there is not enough technical ground supporting the use of individual scores. I use 
PSU scores and school GPAs instead. 
 
Other course characteristics are also reported. For instance, the Chilean Ministry of 
Education (MINEDUC) tracks student employment and wages. The information is 
delivered by generic course/profession, as for instance medicine, engineering, 
architecture, etc. There are data on wages and the proportion getting a job in a specific 
year for 181 courses/professions of which 167 has been matched to CAE borrowers. 
Employment prospects, namely courses’ current average income is used as a proxy of 
how attractive a course is, thus allowing an extra control variable. Despite the 
variability in earnings for the same course at different universities may be high, 
average incomes are a good proxy for prestige and attractiveness. 
 
Finally, an index of university complexity was built as a proxy of quality, selectivity 
and how demanding courses might be. The index considers research output and 
academic staff qualifications and productivity for each university as at 2006. By using 
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factor analysis via principal components factor extraction, I obtained a unique index 
to be used as control variable, which corresponds to the one with the highest 
eigenvalue. 
 
5.4.3. Debt composition as a proxy of harshness 
 
A key issue for this chapter is to relate debt composition and harshness. I shall argue 
that CAE loan is the harshest kind of student aid due to the following reasons. Firstly, 
loans are originated by private financial institutions, the same applies to debt 
collection. Secondly, the repayment method is done by fixed instalments which are 
collected for 10, 15 or 20 years on the basis of the amount accrued. Although an 
income sensitive element was introduced in 2013 where the government subsidises the 
gap between the fixed instalment and 10 per cent of the gross monthly income, this 
does not affect the incentives structures at the time the borrowers were studying. 
Thirdly, there are not provisions for writing off unless a permanent disability is 
demonstrated or the borrower’s death. Neither do income thresholds apply to CAE. 
Fourthly, CAE interest rates are fixed by INGRESA on the basis of government 
borrowing rate plus a 2 per cent spread. For 2006 CAE borrowers, the annual interest 
rate was 5.5 per cent after accounting for inflation. Interest is also accrued during the 
study period. 
 
In contrast, FSCU, the income contingent loan used by most government supported 
HEIs, is written off after 15 years, is repaid at a fixed 5 per cent of the monthly income 
over an income threshold. The interest rate is 2 per cent real, well below the 
commercial banks’ interest and the government cost of borrowing. Debt collection is 
done by the universities through some contract specialised firms to support the 
process. Therefore, it is a much more student-friendly loan and there is much more at 
stake in the case of defaulting a bank loan. 
 
In consequence, it is safe to maintain that a higher proportion of tuition fees funded 
by CAE translates into a harsher debt. Nevertheless, due to the data nature and the 
high proportion of fully CAE funded students found in the dataset (the average is 90 
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per cent by the sixth year), it was not sensible to use a continuous debt composition 
variable but a dummy. Despite I could not maintain that 80 per cent of CAE funding 
does make much difference with 75 per cent, for instance, I do maintain that even a 
small amount of CAE does make the difference since a bank demanding payment is 
much more deterrent than the university doing so. 
 
5.4.4. Data structure and hierarchies 
 
HEIs report enrolment by course attended every year and a status variable over time: 
continuing student, graduated, dropped out, suspended, etc. Specific course descriptors 
are also reported as course duration and tuition fees for the current academic year. 
Amounts borrowed are recorded every year so it also allows tracking cumulated debts 
at any point in time. Additionally, the dataset responds to a hierarchical structure as 
all the students are identified by HEI and course, thus providing an opportunity to 
test whether observations are independent through introducing random effects (see 
section 5.4.5).  
 
Nested data might be crucial in order to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. The 
reason is that there is a high variability within Chilean universities, where faculties 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Most student services, although centrally organised, 
operate at this level where social and academic integration mechanisms operate. As 
the data do not allow reproducing the faculty structure, I use the course-within-
university as the level two grouping variable. I shall not estimate random slopes but 
only random intercepts. Identifying a group to which students belong with acceptable 
precision is crucial in order to deal with unobserved heterogeneity and intra-class 
correlation. 
 
5.4.5. Methods 
 
As the main theoretical frameworks consistently emphasise, persistence and dropout 
are longitudinal processes. Empirical research on dropout uses longitudinal data in 
different ways, as for instance ‘before and after’ data as some registration records –
when a student enrols and when leaves-; time to person records, where a status 
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variable tells whether or not an event of interest has occurred at the time ‘t’ for each 
value of t. These data structures depend on how the time variable is recorded. The 
shape of the dataset and how time is recorded, on the other hand, critically determine 
which methods are appropriate. Time to person records, as in my dataset, are more 
flexible as the introduction of time-varying covariates is allowed, whereas other 
structures where only starting and event occurrence time are recorded would only 
allow for time-invariant covariates.  
 
A common issue in longitudinal research is the presence of censoring. Censoring 
happens when the event(s) of interest might not have happened during the observation 
period as when there is not an outcome for a group of students, thus the researcher 
has no information on whether and when the event(s) will take place because 
observation periods are limited. This is called right censoring. On the other hand, 
censoring also occurs when researchers find some students which were not tracked 
during the observation period or when there are no observations for some subjects in 
some time periods, which is called interval censoring. 
 
Censoring affects critical distributional assumptions leading to biased estimators. 
Survival analysis, time to event or event history analysis are widely used methods to 
deal with censoring in several ways, by modelling time within the censored data 
framework (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May 2008; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012; 
Singer and Willett 1993, 2003; Willett and Singer 1991). Unlike some approaches that 
only use complete cases, by imputing censored values or dichotomising event/no event 
regardless censoring, survival analysis uses all the available information from the 
dataset (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999). 
 
Survival analysis has been intensively used in empirical research on time-to-degree 
and dropout (Bruinsma and Jansen 2009; Denson and Schumacker 1996; DesJardins, 
Ahlburg, and McCall 1999; DesJardins et al. 2002a; Ishitani and DesJardins 2002; 
Letkiewicz et al. 2014; Ortiz and Dehon 2013; Paura and Arhipova 2014; Petras et al. 
2011; Wao 2010) as well as in studies measuring the effect of student financing on 
persistence/dropout where most of them found aid as either improving time-to-degree 
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or reducing the risk of dropout  (Chen and DesJardins 2010; DesJardins et al. 2002b; 
van der Haert et al. 2014; Horn et al. 2014).  
 
Classic and widespread survival analysis techniques such as Cox’s regression requires 
knowing exactly when the event(s) of interest happened. Given the nature of the data, 
in this chapter, I deal with a discrete time survival analysis. For instance, my database 
allows knowing the year in which the events of interest occurred but not the exact 
date. However, students may depart from the university at any time within the year 
so this violates the core assumptions of the classic continuous time survival approach. 
 
 
5.4.6. Model specification 
 
In survival analysis, events of interest might be of binary, as withdraw/stay, live/dead, 
smoker/non-smoker, or multiple outcomes as dropout-graduate-continuing. The last 
case features the competing risks model –or a multiple absorbing model in the survival 
analysis jargon-, which is the approach I use in this chapter. The occurrence of 
completion/dropout would prevent any other event from ever happening.  A binary 
model would treat the other event as censored. 
 
Discrete-time competing risks survival models are an extension of multinomial logistic 
regression but adding specific time dummies. Instead of odd ratios, the multinomial 
model reports relative risk ratios (RRR). The interpretation of RRRs is similar to that 
of odds ratios but refers to a base event. For instance, in a binary model of 
dropout/non-dropout, an odd ratio of 1.5 for a given predictor would mean that a unit 
increase on the predictor would increase the odds of dropping out by 50 per cent. 
Instead, in a multinomial context where the base category is ‘continuing studies,’ 
coefficients report the RRR, where a value of 1.5 indicates that an increase on the 
predictor would increase the odds of dropping out by 50 per cent but relative to 
‘continuing studies’. 
 
The model specification for a competing risks model is 
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												log ቀ௛೔ሺ௞,௧ሻ௛೔ሺ଴,௧ሻቁ ൌ ߙ௞଴ ൅ ߙ௞ଵܦଵ௜ ൅ ߙ௞ଶܦଶ௜ ൅ ⋯൅ ߙ௞்ܦ௞் ൅ ߚ௞ ௜ܺ   [5.1] 
 
Where, ݄௜ሺ݇, ݐሻ is the hazard of experiencing event k, relative to non event ݄௜ሺ݇, 0ሻ , 
ܦ௜ are time dummies for each time period, ߙ௞௜	capturing the baseline hazard function 
(see e.g. Allison 2014; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012; Singer and Willett 2003; 
Willett and Singer 1991), and ௜ܺ being a vector of covariates. Not only should the 
non-event category be used as reference; it might be any one so long as coefficients 
are meaningful. I use dropout as base category but also look at the coefficients for 
completion relative to continuing studies (non-event). 
As explained above, I also introduce to [5.1] a random effect ߤ௞଴௝ at course j within 
university to control for unobserved heterogeneity, thus allowing intercepts to vary. 
 
												log ቀ௛೔ሺ௞,௧ሻ௛೔ሺ଴,௧ሻቁ ൌ ߙ௞଴+ߙ௞ଵܦଵ௜ ൅ ߙ௞ଶܦଶ௜ ൅ ⋯൅ ߙ௞்ܦ௞் ൅ ߚ௞ ௜ܺ௝ ൅ ߤ௞଴௝  [5.2] 
 
Although the use of random effects does not address the issue of unobserved variable 
bias as random effects and individual predictors are supposed to be orthogonal (i.e. 
zero correlation), it does introduce a factor consistent with the theory, as a random 
intercept at course level might well account for institutional factors, that I am not 
able to observe, at a level which is seen as critical from the integration model since 
social interactions and the academic experience occur mostly at faculty/course level. 
The use of random effects in the context of survival analysis is often referred to as 
frailty models (Blossfeld and Hamerle 1989; Hougaard 1995; Jones-White et al. 2009; 
Liu 2014; Steele, Diamond, and Wang 1996; Steele, Goldstein, and Browne 2004). 
Frailty models have a multiplicative effect (additive in the log-odds scale) on the 
baseline hazard function given by ߙ௞௜ in [5.1] and [5.2], which estimate the hazard 
function in the log-odds metric. 
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5.5.Results 
 
5.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Out of the 13,000 new students entering HE in 2006, I have selected a group of 5,859 
students entering 5-year courses at a university, leading to academic oriented 
professional qualifications, corresponding approximately to ISCED level 5A 
qualifications. This decision was made on the following basis: (i) five year courses are 
the most common in Chilean universities, where courses last 4.92 years on average 
(with a 0.75 year standard deviation) and (ii) the observation period, after the 
temporal adjustments made in order to match the status variable with more 
substantive definitions, rather than the bureaucratic ones as used by CAE 
management, is reduced to 6 years. So it seems reasonable to restrict the population 
this way. Had I considered longer courses, I would not have allowed for some extra 
time for completion, which may lead to artificially pessimistic predictions given that 
course completion goes beyond the formal duration very often. I did not consider 
shorter courses as they have a more vocational profile and are hardly comparable with 
five-year courses with regards to academic orientation, the level of skills required to 
succeed, selection criteria, and entry requirements. 
 
I dealt with missingness by both imputing the mean and regression-based techniques 
with variables not used as predictors in the estimates. PSU means were imputed for 
220 out of 5,859 individuals. The type of school attended was imputed by multinomial 
logistic regression taking the commune (local authority) as the predictor. The number 
of individuals with imputed values for the type of school was 117 out of 5,859. The 
number of imputed values is low enough to make sure they do not bias the variance. 
 
The main descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5.4 which follows. As shown, the 
consequences of the administrative error on the distribution of students by household 
income quintiles are more evident in this subpopulation than the whole population of 
CAE new students (as shown in Table 5.2) as it takes a pyramidal shape rather than 
the glass hour one. In addition, most of the effect is due to the fact that CRUCH 
universities better off students were disproportionally benefited in comparison to 
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private universities students. For instance, 84 per cent of CRUCH CAE students come 
from the richest quintiles (4 and 5), whereas the figure drops to 41 per cent in private 
universities. 
Table 5.4. Descriptive statistics. 5-year university courses 
 Individual Characteristics 
Predictors 
 5-year university 
courses 
  Mean SD 
Demographic characteristics    
  Gender (%)    
    Male 59.67 49.06 
    Female 40.33 49.06 
    Starting age 19.49 2.09 
Prior Academic achievement    
   GPA 580.58 54.99 
   PSU Score 566.13 58.67 
Socioeconomic characteristics    
Income quintile (%)    
1 16.11 36.76 
2 13.62 34.30 
3 15.67 36.35 
4 26.54 44.15 
5 28.06 44.93 
Type of Secondary School (%)    
  State 31.97 46.64 
  Private Maintained 54.84 49.77 
  Private Independent 13.19 33.84 
Debt Characteristics    
  Cumulated CAE debt ('000 CLP$)    
Year 1 1339.77 293.33 
 Year 2 2671.93 635.59 
Year 3 4088.29 1010.42 
Year 4 5680.80 1345.81 
Year 5 7329.82 1712.72 
Year 6 8933.95 2136.78 
Proportion of fees financed by CAE loan    
Year 1 94.59 14.78 
 Year 2 92.19 16.51 
Year 3 91.31 17.27 
Year 4 91.69 16.07 
Year 5 91.42 15.45 
Year 6 90.09 16.31 
 University Characteristics 
  Mean SD 
Type of entry HEI (%)    
  CRUCH University 30.82 46.17 
  Private University 69.28 46.13 
University complexity index 0.08 1.00 
 Profession Characteristics 
  Mean SD 
Expected Income ('000 CLP$) 892.88 301.26 
Total N 5859
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Sample hazard statistics and hazard functions are shown in Table 5.5 and Graphs 5.2, 
5.3 and 5.4 below. Dropout probabilities decrease with time whereas completion 
probabilities increase, which looks reasonable and consistent with available studies. 
There still remains, by year 6, an important proportion of students who have not yet 
completed their 5-year programmes. This is not surprising for Chilean standards since 
dropout rates are high and studies last longer than the formal duration. In fact, for 5-
year courses at Chilean universities, completing studies may easily take up to 7 years. 
Table 5.5. Sample hazard probabilities. 5-Year courses, universities 
 Events Hazard probabilities (%) 
Year 
Risk 
set Dropout Completion Dropout Completion 
Cum. 
Dropout 
Cum. 
Completion 
1 5,859 259 16 4.42% 0.27% 4.42% 0.27% 
2 5,573 190 19 3.41% 0.34% 7.68% 0.61% 
3 5,346 162 24 3.03% 0.45% 10.48% 1.06% 
4 5,141 130 181 2.53% 3.52% 12.74% 4.54% 
5 4,779 116 1,404 2.43% 29.38% 14.86% 32.59% 
6 3,194 69 1,058 2.16% 33.12% 16.70% 54.92% 
 
Graph 5.2. Dropout hazard   Graph 5.3. Completion hazard    Graph 5.4.Cumulated 
hazard 
 
 
 
Few students have been missed or were not completely tracked during the observation 
period. This does not represent an issue as the number -164- is too small in order to 
represent a real threat.  
 
5.5.2. Estimates 
 
Maximum likelihood estimates are provided in Table 5.6, starting with the baseline 
hazard model which only includes time dummies. The key variable of interest is debt 
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composition, which is coded as 1 for ‘partially CAE funded’ students and 2 for ‘totally 
CAE funded’ students. The reference category is ‘totally CAE funded’. 
 
I took the year of the first enrolment as a base category for time dummies. I also 
provide Wald’s chi-square tests for categorical variables in order to test whether or 
not their effect equal zero as well as goodness of fit statistics, namely log-likelihood, 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC)12, and Mc Fadden’s R-squares. Models were estimated by using clustered robust 
standard errors. 
 
Debt characteristics are the main variables of interest. Having controlled for social 
background variables, the model shows that for partially funded CAE students the 
relative risk of completing studies would be expected to decrease by 42 per cent. The 
effect of the debt composition dummy keeps significant with an important variation 
after introducing demographic controls, the RRR dropping to 39 per cent, but jumps 
to .61 once prior achievement and HEIs characteristics are controlled for. When 
introducing interactions, the coefficient for the main effect of debt composition 
becomes not significant but interaction effects are highly significant. In one way or 
another, the effect of debt composition is statistically significant for all the 
specifications where it is included.  Equations testing debt composition in RRR 
between continuing students and dropouts do not show any statistically significant 
coefficient. No statistically significant coefficients are found for cumulated debt.  
 
Nevertheless, the effect of the dummy variable ought to be studied for some 
subpopulations as partially funded students are defined by the policy rules shown in 
Table 5.1. For this purpose, I introduce interactions between debt, time and 
socioeconomic variables. The cumulated debt was squared in order to identify 
concavity. As expected, interactions between debt composition and income quintiles 
are highly significant for quintiles 4 and 5. The risk ratios for quintiles 4 and 5, taking 
                                         
12 To calculate BIC, instead of the number of observations or subjects, I use the number of events, 
following Raftery (1995) and Singer and Willet (2003) recommendations. 
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quintile 1 as the reference category adds up to the baseline odds. Nevertheless, 
interaction in nonlinear models should be taken carefully (Ai and Norton 2003).  
 
Predictive margins provide a clearer picture. What interaction coefficients show is that 
the relative risk for CAE partially financed students, relative to quintile 1 fully CAE 
funded students, improves for quintiles 4 and 5, at a higher rate in comparison to fully 
CAE financed students. By year 6, the probability of completion (hazard probability), 
for fully CAE supported students in quintile 1 is 2.27 times (.45/.20) as that of 
partially financed. For quintile 5 the ratio is 1.32 (.37/.28). That means that 
completion probabilities for partially supported students increase for quintiles 4 and 5 
and that the gap between fully and partially CAE supported students narrow as 
income level increases, as shown below in Graph 5.5. By year 5, I find a similar pattern. 
 164 
 
Table 5.6. Relative risk ratio estimates for competing risk models, comparing risks of continuing and course completion, relative to drop out  
 Baseline Add background and debt Add demographic 
characteristics  
Add academic 
achievement & HEIs 
Add expected income & 
interactions. 
 RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
Year  (Wald χ2) 29.01*** 656.70*** 18.72** 284.48*** 17.89** 308.78*** 17.74** 304.05*** 19.95** 202.60***
2 1.31* 1.62 1.21 1.68 1.31* 1.75 1.37* 1.96 1.44* 2.24
3 1.48*** 2.40** 1.24 2.58* 1.47* 2.78** 1.60* 3.51** 1.91* 4.29**
4 1.72*** 22.54*** 1.32 24.95*** 1.71* 28.10*** 1.95** 40.33*** 2.82** 63.02***
5 1.30 195.92*** 0.91 224.73*** 1.28 264.21*** 1.54 443.16*** 1.70 575.41***
6 1.39* 248.21*** 0.89 293.35*** 1.37 363.80*** 1.76 715.67*** 1.69 734.36***
Debt structure  
    Partially CAE funded 1.17 0.58** 1.18 0.61* 0.99 0.39*** 0.59 1.04
    Cumulative debt 1.18 0.96 1.18 0.97 1.07 0.75 1.08 0.70
    Sq_Cumulative Debt  1.10 1.13
Socioeconomic background  
   Income Quintile (Wald χ2) 11.07* 33.18*** 9.75* 30.71*** 5.33 9.83* 1.59 4.50
2 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.17 1.10 1.27
3 1.20 1.20 1.19 1.22 1.17 1.17 1.10 0.92
4 1.44** 1.66*** 1.41** 1.68*** 1.32* 1.43* 1.18 0.96
5 1.46** 2.01*** 1.41** 2.00*** 1.23 1.45** 1.14 0.78
   Secondary School (Wald χ2) 6.52* 6.01* 4.98 5.24 3.30 2.47 3.22 2.76
      Public 0.80 0.76* 0.80* 0.74* 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.89
      Maintained 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.97 1.04 0.97 1.03
Demographic chars.  
   Male=1 0.69*** 0.56*** 0.70*** 0.57*** 0.71*** 0.61***
  Age 0.92*** 0.95** 0.92*** 0.97 0.92*** 0.97
Prior achievement  
   PSU  1.26*** 1.61*** 1.28*** 1.72***
  GPA  1.13*** 1.31*** 1.13*** 1.34***
University Characteristics  
  Cruch University=1  1.53* 1.52 1.46* 1.51
  Complexity Index  0.82* 0.83 0.82* 0.76*
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 Baseline Add background and debt Add demographic 
characteristics  
Add academic 
achievement & HEIs 
Add expected income & 
interactions. 
 RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
Year * Partially CAE funded (Wald χ2)  21.31*** 15.50**
   Year=2 * Partially CAE funded  1.64 0.92
   Year=3 * Partially CAE funded   0.97 0.52
   Year=4 * Partially CAE funded   0.45** 0.15**
   Year=5 * Partially CAE funded  1.16 0.16**
   Year=6 * Partially CAE funded  1.47 0.24
Income Quintile*PartiallyCAE funded (Wald χ2)  11.13* 19.34***
   Income Quintile=2 * Partially CAE funded  1.56 0.78
   Income Quintile=3 * Partially CAE funded  1.65 1.36
   Income Quintile=4 * Partially CAE funded  2.09** 4.21***
   Income Quintile=5 * Partially CAE funded  2.10** 4.69***
Expected income  0.93 0.68***
Income quintile * St.Cum.Debt (Wald χ2)  2.06 5.12
   Income Quintile=2 * St. Cum. Debt  0.85 0.77
   Income Quintile=3 * St. Cum. Debt  0.92 1.06
   Income Quintile=4 * St. Cum. Debt  0.91 1.09
   Income Quintile=5 * St. Cum. Debt  0.84 1.21
Intercept 21.56*** 0.06*** 21.74*** 0.05*** 147.97*** 0.18*** 96.53*** 0.07*** 88.48*** 0.06***
N Obs 29892 29892 29892  29892 29892
N Individuals 5859 5859 5859  5859 5859
Goodness of fit statistics  
-2LL 20243 20112 20002 19825 19594
AIC 20267 20168 20066 19905 19734
BIC 20341 20342 20265 20152 20168
Pseudo R2 (+) 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
Note: Wald chi-sq were calculated to test the null hypothesis that the effect of categorical variables equals to zero       
(+) Pseudo R-sq= 1 - Log likelihood model/Log likelihood null model 
         
 
 166 
 
Graph 5.5. Fitted hazard probabilities of completing studies by income quintile (full 
single level model) 
 
 
On the other hand, by years 5 and 6, low income fully CAE funded outperformed their 
richer counterparts. This may suggest that poor students are more compelled to finish 
their courses on time than the richer ones when the debt is harsher but the differences 
are not statistically significant when looking at the boxplots above. In fact, within the 
fully CAE funded group, completion probabilities are similar across the socioeconomic 
spectrum. In contrast, within the partially CAE funded group, poor students show 
lower completion probabilities than their richer counterparts. This may have 
important implications as the model would predict that the harsher debts make the 
difference among poor students, whereas it would not amongst the better off.  
 
Instead of looking at hazard probabilities, a clearer picture might be obtained by 
examining the cumulated probabilities of either event for both debt composition 
groups, as shown in Graph 5.6 (dropout rates on the secondary axis). The cumulated 
probability ܥݑ݉	݄ሺ௔,்ሻ	of an event (excluding the non event) by time T can be defined 
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where ݄ሺ௔,௧ሻ is the hazard probability at time t and T corresponds to the time to which 
the cumulated probability is calculated. 
 
Fully CAE funded students also present lower dropout rates than partially funded 
ones, with the most noticeable gap being amongst poor students. Once again, the debt 
composition seems to make the difference on poor students, namely up to the middle-
income quintile, in contrast to students from quintiles 4 and 5 (grey area on Graph 
5.6) 
 
Graph 5.6. Cumulated probabilities by household income quintile. Year 6 
 
 
 
Although I have introduced controls at individual and institutional levels, there still 
remains some degree of uncertainty because debt composition, as the available data 
allow, only considers the proportion of tuition fees being financed by CAE. Due to the 
Chilean aid system rules, I have assumed that partially CAE funded students are also 
supported by another sort of aid from the government, HEIs or third sector 
organisations so that the proportion of CAE loans in relation to tuition fees for each 
student features a good proxy for debt composition.  
 
The estimates and predicted probabilities shown above may be subject to unobserved 
heterogeneity. For instance, student A belongs to the group G and student B to G’. 
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In the absence of heterogeneity, if both students had identical profiles (covariates), 
their predicted probabilities of dropping out would be the same. Now suppose that 
students in group G face more demanding academic requirements, a higher level of 
institutional support, or a higher quality of the facilities and IT than those from G’. 
All these variables are not observed and may lead to violating the assumption of 
independent observations: the true probabilities for two individuals with the same 
profile would not be equal. 
 
Theory on dropout and persistence would not support that the independence 
assumption holds. As discussed in section 5.3, theoretical developments have paid 
attention to students’ integration processes, which operate at the institutional level. 
As in the example above, I am not observing these variables but the intuition is that 
if the theory is correct, there will not be ground for the independent observation 
assumption to hold. As I have argued, in Chilean universities academic and social 
integration occur mostly at faculties, which in many cases are very autonomous from 
the central administration. Faculties structures are not reproduced by the data, thus 
I use programme/course-within-university as a proxy and use it as the clustering unit 
of interest. 
 
To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, I include a random intercept (Table 5.7). I 
also prevent that with the inclusion of a random effect address the unobserved variable 
bias will not be addressed as random effects are assumed as being orthogonal to fixed 
effects.
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Table 5.7. Relative risk ratio estimates for random effects competing risk models, comparing risks of continuing and course completion, relative to 
drop out  
 Baseline Add background and debt Add demographic 
characteristics  
Add academic 
achievement & HEIs 
Add expected income & 
interactions. 
 RRR 
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completio
n/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
Year  (Wald χ2) 27.22*** 723.47*** 19.00** 305.69*** 17.76** 310.07*** 17.37** 302.08*** 21.04*** 218.53***
2 1.30* 1.61 1.20 1.42 1.30* 1.49 1.35* 1.58 1.51* 1.74
3 1.46*** 2.38** 1.23 1.83 1.45* 2.03 1.57* 2.28* 2.07** 2.62*
4 1.69*** 23.32*** 1.30 15.30*** 1.67* 18.06*** 1.89* 22.03*** 3.20*** 33.32***
5 1.28 267.94*** 0.89 151.34*** 1.24 189.88*** 1.48 265.80*** 1.98 362.52***
6 1.35 438.33*** 0.86 213.39*** 1.32 286.79*** 1.67 464.54*** 1.99 546.35***
Debt structure   
    Partially CAE funded  1.18 0.72 1.19 0.73 1.01 0.59** 0.59 1.10
    Cumulative debt  1.18 1.34 1.19 1.35 1.08 1.14 0.99 1.24
    Sq_Cumulative Debt   1.11 1.06
Socioeconomic background   
   Income Quintile (Wald χ2)  16.24** 27.61*** 12.71* 24.84** 6.89 13.53** 2.50 3.56
2  1.16 1.12 1.17 1.13 1.18 1.12 1.10 1.31
3  1.24 1.26 1.21 1.26 1.20 1.20 1.12 1.06
4  1.48** 1.73*** 1.44** 1.72*** 1.36* 1.58** 1.22 1.44
5  1.50*** 1.80*** 1.43*** 1.75*** 1.26* 1.46** 1.16 1.21
   Secondary School (Wald χ2)  10.33** 5.77 7.10* 3.29 5.32 2.98 5.18 2.80
      Public  0.76* 0.89 0.78* 0.90 0.83 1.09 0.82 1.07
      Maintained  0.94 1.08 0.91 1.04 0.96 1.21 0.96 1.19
Demographic chars.   
   Male=1  0.72*** 0.53*** 0.73*** 0.57*** 0.73*** 0.58***
  Age  0.91*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.96* 0.92*** 0.96*
Prior achievement   
   PSU   1.27*** 1.98*** 1.28*** 2.05***
  GPA   1.13*** 1.51*** 1.13*** 1.52***
University Characteristics   
  Cruch University=1   1.56* 0.97 1.50* 0.99
   Complexity Index   0.83* 0.72** 0.83* 0.70**
Year * Partially CAE funded (Wald χ2)   21.80*** 13.24*
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 Baseline Add background and debt Add demographic 
characteristics  
Add academic 
achievement & HEIs 
Add expected income & 
interactions. 
 RRR 
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completio
n/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuing 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
RRR
Continuin
g 
/Dropout 
RRR
Completion
/Dropout 
Year=2 * Partially CAE funded   1.63 1.06
Year=3 * Partially CAE funded   0.94 0.72
Year=4 * Partially CAE funded   0.43** 0.22*
Year=5 * Partially CAE funded   1.11 0.21*
Year=6 * Partially CAE funded   1.41 0.31
Income Quintile*Part. Funded (Wald χ2)   10.12* 14.26**
Income Quintile=2*Partially CAE funded   1.57 0.87
Income Quintile=3*Partially CAE funded   1.65 1.12
Income Quintile=4*Partially CAE funded   2.03** 3.66**
Income Quintile=5*Partially CAE funded   2.03** 3.56**
Expected income   0.95 0.59***
Income quintile * St.Cum.Debt (Wald χ2)   2.05 3.63
Income Quintile=2 * St. Cum. Debt   0.85 0.73
Income Quintile=3 * St. Cum. Debt   0.91 0.97
Income Quintile=4 * St. Cum. Debt   0.92 0.86
Income Quintile=5 * St. Cum. Debt   0.85 0.90
Random effects Var / Cov   
 0.21** 1.03*** 0.18** 1.04*** 0.14* 0.99*** 0.13* 1.10*** 0.12 0.92***
 0.22* 0.20* 0.16*  0.15 0.11
 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.24 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.22
Intercept 23.47*** 0.05*** 22.97*** 0.05*** 158.61*** 0.23** 99.89*** 0.10*** 81.91*** 0.06***
N Obs 29892 29892 29892  29892 29892
N Individuals 5859 5859 5859  5859 5859
-2LL 19397 19273 19170 18918 18778
AIC 19427 19335 19240 19004 18924
BIC 19520 19527 19457 19271 19377
Pseudo R2 (+) 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
Note: Wald χ2s were calculated to test the null hypothesis that the effect of categorical variables equals to zero.       
(+) Pseudo R-sq= 1 - Log likelihood model/Log likelihood null model.         
ߪଶఓ೔ ߪఓభఓమ ߩ
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I have also introduced institutional controls in single and two-level models by including 
proxies for prestige and complexity. Entry scores, secondary GPA, and type of 
secondary school attended may also have an institutional correlate. This way, though 
I cannot make sure that random effects are orthogonal to individual characteristics, I 
maintain that, given the nature of the control variables used at individual level in the 
two-level model, it is sensible to state that my individual controls are likely to capture 
institutional factors which interact with the individual covariates. 
 
Estimates including a random effect are reported in Table 5.7 above. The coefficients 
look different from those on Table 5.6, but they do not necessarily show the same 
thing. In fact, when a random effect is included, the estimates refer to subject-specific 
effects or conditional RRRs, instead of a marginal probability only conditional on the 
covariates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012:529). In this case, the effects refer to 
course specific effects and the interpretation is slightly different. For instance, students 
A and B attend the same course at the same university but A is fully CAE funded 
and B is partially CAE funded. In the model introducing academic achievement and 
HEIs characteristics (fifth column on Table 5.7), a relative risk of 0.59 for partially 
funded means that the odds of completion for B are 41% lower than those of A, relative 
to dropout, but conditional on students attending a given course within a university. 
 
The effect of the debt composition dummy is statistically significant for the model 
controlling for demographic, prior achievement, socioeconomic and institutional 
variables, as well as in the interacted model. In fact, in the same pattern of models in 
Table 5.6, interaction effects add up to baseline odds in a similar fashion while 
coefficients are less extreme but, as already explained, they are conditional on given 
values of the random effect. 
 
Random effects are consistently significant for completion, whereas the one for 
continuation becomes non-significant as more controls are introduced. Intra-class 
correlation (ICC), in turn, remains within the 0.20-0.30 range in the completion 
equations. Although ICC is not particularly high, it suggests that the introduction of 
random effects does improve the models –as reported in goodness of fit statistics in 
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tables 5.6 and 5.7- and it also introduced the appropriate flexibility to allow for subject 
(course) specific hazard functions. Furthermore, the level of intra-class correlation 
found in this study is higher than what it is found in many school achievement models. 
 
The introduction of random effects and their contribution to the models are reported 
in Graph 5.7. The graph shows the estimated value of random effects with their 95% 
confidence intervals, taking a caterpillar shape. There is a number of subjects where 
the random effects are statistically different from zero, which are the boxes overlapping 
the zero line. Between the baseline model and the full interacted one, plots look very 
similar but the full model shows slightly more subjects with statistically significant 
random effects. 
Graph 5.7. Caterpillar plots for random effects for completion. Baseline (left) and full 
(right) models  
 
A different way of examining the contribution of random effects is by looking into the 
variations of the hazard function comparing the baseline single level (constant hazard 
function) and the baseline random effects models. Graphs 5.8 and 5.9 show examples 
of how the introduction of random effects results in more flexible hazard functions. 
Graph 5.8 refers to Law undergraduate programmes, while Graph 5.9 refers to 
Business programmes. Each cell represents a course within a university, so for instance 
courses 234 and 467 are Law programmes taught at different universities. The solid 
line is the constant hazard function and dashed lines represent hazard functions if 
random effects are introduced. I show the examples by using baseline models instead 
of full models for simplicity reasons. I have also selected courses in order to make the 
differences clear, as a number of random effects are not statistically different from 
zero.  
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
em
pir
ica
l B
ay
es
' m
ea
ns
 fo
r M
2[c
ou
rse
_id
]
0 100 200 300 400 500ref2rank
-4
-2
0
2
4
em
pir
ica
l B
ay
es
' m
ea
ns
 fo
r M
2[c
ou
rse
_id
]
0 100 200 300 400 500reb2rank
 173 
 
Random intercepts account for a set of characteristics to be found at the course level. 
Following Tinto’s (1975, 2010) student integration model, these characteristics, which 
I do not observe directly, may make the difference in terms of the student experience 
and, more critically, the matching between student’s and HEI’s expectations which 
is, according to that theory, the core mechanism behind the decision of withdrawing 
or persisting. 
Graph 5.8. Fitted completion hazard probabilities for law courses 
 
Graph 5.9. Fitted completion hazard probabilities for business courses 
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Interacted models in Table 5.7 are less extreme than the ones in Table 5.6. This does 
not necessarily mean that random effects attenuated the gaps for fully and partially 
CAE funded students but reflects the difference between coefficients referring to 
marginal and subject-specific effects. Anyway, there still remains the question of 
whether or not the introduction of random intercepts makes any difference. In order 
to illustrate this, I compare fitted probabilities between single level and random effects 
models (Graph 5.10). 
Graph 5.10. Fitted hazard probabilities of completion by income quintile; fully and 
partially CAE funded students. Single level and random effects models 
 
 
Dotted lines represent single-level fitted probabilities (as in Graph 5.5) whereas dashed 
lines correspond to random effect estimates. The introduction of random effects 
attenuates both the probabilities of completing studies for either partially and fully 
CAE funded students, as well as narrows the gap between both debt composition 
levels, which is consistent with the fact that coefficients are much less extreme in 
random effects models (as compared to single level models). These results must be 
taken with caution as the fitted probabilities shown are estimates at specific values of 
time and keeping the rest of the values as observed. That means that results would 
change if other values were used to calculate probabilities instead.  
 
The introduction of random effects, presumably representing a set of variables 
operating at institutional rather than individual level, slightly alters the estimates by 
attenuating the coefficients as well as the predicted probabilities. Nevertheless, it is 
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necessary to insist that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is not equivalent to 
deal with confounders at the individual level so it does not solve the issue of omitted 
variable bias.  
 
Another way of examining the results is taking average marginal effects for the 
variables. As marginal effects including random effects are computer intensive and 
extremely time demanding, I use the full single level model and report the effects in 
Table 5.8. Marginal effects inform the change in the probability when a particular 
predictor increase in one unit or when switching from one category to another in the 
case of categorical variables. 
 
Table 5.8. Average marginal effects (Standard errors) 
 Outcome 
 Continuing Dropout Completion 
  
݀ݕ
݀ݔ SE 
݀ݕ
݀ݔ SE 
݀ݕ
݀ݔ SE 
Year     
2 0.017 (0.009) -0.018 -0.009 0.001 (0.001) 
3 0.022 (0.013) -0.024 (0.012)* 0.002 (0.001) 
4 -0.005 (0.017) -0.031 (0.013)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
5 -0.296 (0.040)*** -0.032 (0.015)* 0.327 (0.037)*** 
6 -0.353 (0.055)*** -0.034 (0.014)* 0.387 (0.053)*** 
Partially CAE 
funded=1 0.040 (0.009)*** 0.003 (0.005) -0.044 (0.007)*** 
Cum. Debt 0.011 (0.010) 0.001 (0.005) -0.012 (0.008) 
Income Quintile     
2 0.010 (0.006) -0.006 (0.004) -0.003 (0.005) 
3 0.007 (0.006) -0.006 (0.004) -0.001 (0.006) 
4 0.003 (0.006) -0.010 (0.004)* 0.007 (0.005) 
5 -0.004 (0.006) -0.009 (0.004)* 0.013 (0.005)* 
Secondary School     
   Public -0.007 (0.007) 0.005 (0.003) 0.002 (0.006) 
   Maintained -0.004 (0.006) 0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.005) 
Male=1 0.000 (0.005) 0.011 (0.002)*** -0.010 (0.004)* 
Age -0.005 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.000)*** 0.003 (0.001)*** 
PSU -0.011 (0.004)** -0.008 (0.002)*** 0.019 (0.004)*** 
GPA -0.007 (0.002)** -0.004 (0.001)*** 0.011 (0.002)*** 
Cruch Uni=1 0.008 (0.011) -0.010 (0.005)* 0.003 (0.011) 
Complexity Index -0.001 (0.005) 0.006 (0.003)* -0.005 (0.005) 
Expected income 0.017 (0.005)*** 0.003 (0.001) -0.020 (0.005)*** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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If a student with given characteristics, being fully CAE supported, switched to 
partially CAE supported, their completion probabilities would decrease by 4.4 
percentage points. For the same case, probabilities of continuation would increase by 
4 percentage points. This suggests that for partially funded students their probabilities 
of completing courses decrease but at the same time their probabilities of being still 
enrolled are increased. This can be interpreted in different ways. First, it can be said 
that for students with less harsh finances is not an issue to spend more time before 
graduating. But a second plausible explanation could be that harsher finances actually 
encourage students to finish on time. I maintain that the most important mechanism 
here is a deterrent effect so this result should be seen as a harsher debt pushing 
students rather than softer debts favouring longer study periods. 
 
The effect of debt composition on dropout is rather negligible. If the debt composition 
variable were a proxy of harshness, the results presented in this chapter would suggest 
that harsher student loans affect completion positively. The effect is the opposite when 
the outcome is continuing studies. Nevertheless, these marginal effects are average 
effects at observed values and only provide a general picture.  
5.6.Final Remarks 
 
The present chapter provides some evidence suggesting that harsher loans are 
associated with higher probabilities of study completion and that the effect of debt 
composition is noticeable at low socioeconomic levels. Nevertheless, the positive effect 
of debt composition on course completion differ across the models specified. Indeed, 
debt composition was significant in all single level models but only in two random 
effects models. Data limitations and the extent to which these results explain the 
underlying mechanisms are powerful enough reasons in order to take these results with 
caution. 
 
Having seen the above results, the question that still remains is whether it is sensible 
to conclude that harsher debts boost completion probabilities for poor students, 
prevent them from dropping out, and that the debt composition does not make 
differences among the better-off students. It seems feasible to link this finding to the 
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fact that poor families are more risk averse, which is a well-documented fact in the 
literature, so that poor students, being fully supported by CAE, face a more distressing 
experience with regards to indebtedness and, in consequence, are more compelled to 
complete their studies or persist than partially CAE funded poor students. So the fact 
that debt composition only makes the difference for poor students seems plausible. I 
leave this as a hypothesis because I have no direct means of testing it.  
 
Nevertheless, there are other mechanisms operating that needs to be considered. First, 
fitted probabilities suggest that poor fully funded CAE students are more likely to 
finish their studies than their richer counterparts. Not only the harsh debt may be 
more effective to push poor students to complete studies but the explanation might 
be higher ability. Poor students have arrived at the same place but after a more 
difficult trajectory. Presumably they were educated at a lower quality school, had less 
exposition to educational and cultural assets in the family, and lack some soft skills 
that may be crucial to succeed in an academic environment. Richer students, in turn, 
have had advantages in school quality and a social environment that help them to 
succeed in the university. Hence, the higher performance of poor students with harsher 
loans, in comparison to better-off students might not be due to harsher debts not 
deterring richer student but reflect a different level of ability. 
 
Considering Chilean aid policy rules, partially CAE funded students are in fact 
supported by a combination of grants and income contingent loans. This happens to 
all students with the exception of those in the highest income quintile. Therefore, it is 
not risky to assume that poor students count on an appropriate level of financial 
support in order to pay tuition fees so not receiving the appropriate amount of support 
does not hold as an explanation.  
 
Results so far seem to indicate that debt composition, which I assume as a proxy of 
harshness, makes a difference on outcomes which is localised on the lower SES 
students. Nevertheless, the main policy implication should not be a move towards 
bank loans without first understanding the underlying process, identifying the most 
affected population –in positive or negative terms- and uncovering subtle behavioural 
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implications. This of course features a dilemma between a policy that seems to be 
effective in relation to the outcomes studied here and a deterrent effect unfairly 
affecting the poorest students. The analysis would also benefit from the introduction 
of a variable accounting for ability and, more crucially, the interplay between ability 
and the other variables included in models. How aid composition affects academic 
outcomes for students with different level of ability should be the question to answer 
in future research. Although it does not seem easy to find a measure of ability, 
currently Chilean administrative records allow tracking students back in the school 
system so that it would be feasible to model school trajectories, progression, rankings 
and other milestones in the school trajectory that may enrich the analysis. 
 
The introduction of random effects allowed for more flexible estimates but what they 
actually measure is still a sort of black box. More research is required on student 
academic support, curricular innovation and new pathways within the Chilean higher 
education system in order to reach a deeper understanding of what happens within 
universities. In the same line, it is necessary to understand the perception of 
indebtedness throughout the socio-economic spectrum and what sort of behavioural 
response it may trigger.  
 
No administrative dataset can provide the sort of insight required to study behavioural 
responses but there is an opportunity to open new research fields. However, the 
perception of indebtedness may also be modelled by specific cultural/national factors 
that may depend on the very features of HE access, i.e. admissions, funding, support, 
the perceived value of education, the student experience, and their social and 
individual returns. There might also be other country-specific characteristics such as 
a culture of repayment, the exposition of households to indebtedness, and the country 
income level that contend the generalisability of this chapter’s findings. 
  
 179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Main Findings 
 
I started this thesis by paying attention to three major issues. First, the increasing 
marketisation of HE, which has transformed one of the most resilient institutions in 
the western world, the university. Marketisation arrived together with massification 
and in fact, it was seen in some countries as a means of increasing HE supply without 
involving substantially more public expenditure. Although it may seem contradictory, 
rapid growing HE systems have relied on the market and the emergence of private 
funding mechanisms. The policy response to equity concerns has been student aid, 
which seeks specifically to overcome financial barriers. The second major issue is that, 
in terms of equity, a great deal is at stake outside HE. What HE policy and the own 
HEIs are able to do to assure social equity is more limited that one could think at a 
first sight. Segregation in the school system, quality of school education according to 
income, and, critically, an unequal distribution of learning outcomes are factors that 
impede equitable access to HE. The third issue is that the design of aid policies plays 
a key role in achieving equity goals in HE. Existing research, as well as this piece, 
supports tailoring and packaging student aid to a different type of students. For 
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example, the poorest students might be better supported through scholarships rather 
than loans because of risk aversion. Nevertheless, as seen in Chapter 5, the policy 
design matters even in the case of very specific aid programmes. As aid design may 
trigger unforeseen behavioural responses, it transpires that future research should take 
on the opportunity of studying attitudes and behavioural responses that student aid 
design may trigger. 
 
In this thesis, I have worked towards providing an answer to whether there is a cross 
country effect of inequality of school achievement on HE participation. Does an 
increase in the socioeconomic inequality of school achievement translate into lower 
participation in HE once as series of relevant variables are kept constant? Chapter 3 
was devoted to addressing this topic. The key results were that (i) inequality of school 
achievement is an obstacle for HE expansion, (ii) considering countries as the units of 
analysis, enrolment rates in HE are not related to an absolute level of performance as 
measured by PISA although what the first results suggested was that PISA 
performance does matter for increasing HE coverage. This finding was conflicting with 
the fact that not only do high achievement countries have high enrolment rates in HE 
but also coverage may be high in countries where school performance is comparatively 
poor. By controlling for unobserved time-invariant country fixed effects, I obtained 
estimates that might be seen as challenging. The clear effect of PISA reading score on 
HE enrolment rate vanished but a mild and significant effect of inequality of school 
achievement remained. These findings are in line with other research pieces which 
highlight the relevance of prior achievement in the school for access to HE but my 
estimates apply at country level. Despite data limitations, the results were robust to 
the inclusion of control variables as well as different treatments for missing values. 
Nevertheless, the most important methodological issues are the low statistical power 
and the likelihood of having obtained overfit estimates.  
 
A relevant amount of data and indicators at countries level are publicly accessible 
from international organisations but, with a few exceptions, they remain surprisingly 
underused. Even though macro data might oversimplify and provide less insightful 
evidence than microdata, providing fairly solid evidence indicating that HE 
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participation is country specific should be encouraging enough for researchers to make 
the most of it in the same way as the studies on the effect of education on economic 
growth.  In contrast to the common assumption of cross-country data being low quality 
and lacking comparability, a careful selection of indicators, a sensible revision of 
definitions, and a rather simple screening of data patterns in order to identify variables 
with the most observations made possible to build a panel with which, although 
limited, I obtained estimates on a substantive topic.   
 
I have also conducted an impact evaluation of a major reform to the student aid 
system in Chile. The reform was massive in terms of volume of investment and the 
number of students it benefited. Having appropriate data was the very challenge I had 
to deal with. Sensibly, I obtained a good approximation to the true causal effect of 
the 2005 reform. The evidence suggests an important effect on the probability of access 
to higher education. Between 2003 and 2009, the policy would increase the probability 
of access to HE for the poorest students by 6 percentage points. Considering that the 
probability of access for quintiles 1 and 2 was about 30 per cent prior the reform, the 
policy impact is indeed relevant. An alternative regression-based estimation technique 
generated consistent results.  
 
Nevertheless, working out the data and choosing the appropriate treatment and 
control groups required me to make assumptions and simplifications which, though 
unlikely to affect the results, may have hidden more complex mechanisms. In effect, I 
had to balance the chances of having better estimates with making sure that the 
differences between treatment and control groups were meaningful.  A key issue with 
the data was that sample estimates on the number of students having loans and 
scholarships were inconsistent with official figures so that I had to stick to the rules 
of student aid as stated in the legislation. Whether this was due to the sample design 
or an issue with the appropriate questionnaire formulation remains unanswered so far.  
 
Despite the above pitfalls, this is the only piece of research attempting to measure the 
impact of this massive policy change in Chile. Other investigations have used 
regression discontinuity approach to evaluate the impact of changes in specific 
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programmes rules or aid packages but for limited periods, and have struggled to find 
relevant results because of the difficulty of isolating specific instruments which operate 
jointly. More precise impact evaluations of the 2005 reform are not possible as there 
are no administrative records for the pre-reform years. Nevertheless, as enrolment 
rates by quintile continued to increase after the evaluation period along with more 
changes in aid policy, the following step is obviously to make use of new data sources. 
 
How aid is designed matters. As shown in the literature, student aid works better 
when it is tailored and packaged to meet the need and match the characteristics of 
different groups. Nevertheless, much of the discussion on aid design tries to address 
the issue of risk aversion of poor students. The main contribution I made with this 
regards is to link debt composition to harshness in terms of repayment.  The originality 
of this approach lies in a different understanding of deterrent effects, moving the focus 
from loan take up to persistence. The mechanism operates in a different fashion: 
instead of just deterring poor students from being indebted, harsh aid may also 
dissuade students from dropping out in relation to how severe the conditions agreed 
are perceived. In other words, debt conditions may deter students at different decision 
points: before and after loan take up. Research methods proved fit to purpose and 
made it possible to take full advantage of the unique data and circumstances. From a 
methodological point of view, the main innovation was to include a shared frailty -
individual frailties are the most common- in a discrete survival model which allowed 
me to estimate the variance of random intercepts. The meaning and interpretation of 
the random effect as a proxy for the concrete student experience and its smoothing 
effect compared to single level models are consistent with the theory. 
6.2. Policy Implications 
 
The findings that this thesis provides are of the highest importance for policymaking. 
They show that for a given country access to HE might be in part influenced by the 
socioeconomic distribution of achievement in school education. Some research 
referenced elsewhere in this thesis points out that low school achievement acts as a 
barrier for socioeconomic participation gaps to narrow in HE. Cross-country estimates 
suggest that there is a cross country effect of the socioeconomic distribution of 
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achievement on access to HE. The policy implication is clear: the claims for 
meritocratic access to HE, on the basis of individuals’ academic achievement 
disregarding social, cultural and economic considerations, does not hold without an 
equitable school education. Although necessary this is not a sufficient condition. 
 
The Chilean case illustrates the statement above. Indeed, it is a country with high HE 
participation regardless the high level of socioeconomic segregation affecting the school 
system. Chilean HE has experienced a steady growth which most politicians promote 
as an achievement. Nevertheless, as access opportunities have improved with student 
aid and so have low-income students’ opportunities, inequalities brought from the 
schools are transmitted to the higher level through the emergence of a residual-second-
tier sector serving poor students, which has developed at the expense of financial aid, 
in a similar fashion to American for-profit colleges. Chilean HE is divided between a 
bunch of academically and socially selective universities and a non-selective-low 
quality sector made up of either universities, IPs or CFTs. Non-university HE, without 
being academically selective, is divided between a handful of big-sized high-quality 
institutions ones and low-quality ones. 
 
A softly regulated HE with a relevant share of private independent HEIs, alongside a 
generous student aid, which is the government’s preferred channel to fund the system, 
at least needs an assessment. High tuition fees, which translates into high 
indebtedness, may not necessarily have a correlate in terms of education quality and, 
more crucially, valued qualifications. To the extent which the Chilean government 
does not undertake a substantial reform to the institutional foundations of HE, it may 
end up -if it has not already-  harming poor students by setting unrealistic expectations 
and incentivising them to contract harsh credits in exchange of low-value 
qualifications; deceiving them in other words. Although the benefits of expanding 
student aid to historical levels has had an enormous impact on chances of low income 
students’ participation, there needs to be policies directed to the supply side. For 
instance, the scale of the enrolment expansion has not had a correlate in terms of 
academic staff development; the quality assurance system need to be streamlined to 
the student experience as a whole, beyond management, and set higher standards to 
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a bunch of second tier HEIs which have relied on student aid. Both policies operating 
on the institutional side are crucial for the sustainability of the HE system and need 
to be taken alongside equity policies. 
 
As governments have been effective in making it possible for low SES to enter HE, at 
the same time it is expectable for HEIs to receive students lacking basic academic 
skills. There are just small-scale remediation policies and their effectiveness has not 
been assessed beyond specific HEIs. Yet Chilean HE is producing engineers with severe 
academic skills gaps in maths and science, school teachers with less than basic reading 
comprehension levels, and technicians with no relevant skills for the labour market.  
 
More critical, however, is that promising more access to HE without improving quality 
and equity at the secondary level will not bring good results. The lesson is that 
demand-side funding might boost participation figures but there needs to be an 
opportune governmental action beyond student funding in order to make sure that 
young people acquire relevant qualifications, instead of a broken promise of a life-
changing opportunity.  
 
The reform undertaken in 2005 had a significant impact on access to HE of the poorest 
student. Beyond the critique and the preventions that I made above, the new policy 
has proven effective in incorporating otherwise excluded students. One might say that 
Chile has been successful in giving access to HE to low SES students and there is 
ground for politicians to claim it as an achievement. Nevertheless, the priority needs 
a shift towards making big decisions and long-term goals. The radical reform 
introduced by the military dictatorship, without political opposition took about two 
decades in order to consolidate a new model. Reforms in democracy will not crystallise 
faster.  
6.3.Towards a Future Research Agenda 
 
I have identified the following research prospects on the basis of this as the natural 
continuation of the research undertaken. 
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Firstly, there is a potential for further research with cross-country data which are 
likely to improve their quality and cover more issues on education. There are more 
data sources to conduct research aimed at finding explanations to educational 
outcomes. The variety and expansion of international tests to countries other than 
OECD-developed ones will allow researchers to widen the study the relationships 
between skills and educational performance with social, economic and educational 
outcomes.    
 
Secondly, the design of student aid with the consequent behavioural effects it may 
induce remains as an unexplored field offering a high potential for research. 
Psychological mechanisms and the behavioural response to harsh and distressful 
conditions are central to a more thorough understanding of the subtle incentive 
structures behind aid design which are hardly accessible with quantitative methods so 
probably requiring a mixed methods approach. I maintain that research must go well 
beyond assessing the effectiveness of student aid to boost participation and persistence 
in HE but instead should seek to uncover otherwise hidden unfair mechanisms or even 
introduce ethical issues.  
 
Last, but not least, the use of random intercepts in chapter 5 should be the first 
attempt towards using the student experience as a key explanatory variable when 
using quantitative methods. Developing good proxies by recording and making use of 
process data such as attendance, use of libraries, borrowed books, IT connection times, 
study spaces, and participation in non-academic activities should guide data 
management at HEIs. From the point of view of government data sources, in the case 
of Chile, there currently exist high-quality administrative data sources in HE. It is 
only a matter of time to count on mature cohorts allowing the application of the 
econometric and statistical toolbox.  
  
 186 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adelman, Clifford. 2004. ‘Principal Indicators of Student Academic Histories in 
Postsecondary Education, 1972-2000.’ US Department of Education. 
Retrieved 26 June 2016 (http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED483154). 
Ai, Chunrong and Edward C. Norton. 2003. ‘Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit 
Models’. Economics Letters 80(1):123–129. 
Allison, Paul D. 2014. Event History and Survival Analysis. 2nd edition. Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Alon, Sigal. 2009. ‘The Evolution of Class Inequality in Higher Education 
Competition, Exclusion, and Adaptation’. American Sociological Review 
74(5):731–755. 
Anderson, Elizabeth S. 1999. ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109(2):287–337. 
Armanet, Pilar and Daniel Uribe. 2005. ‘Escenarios futuros de la educación superior 
chilena: desafíos de medición’. in Chile en la tarea de superar las brechas de 
la desigualidad / aspectos conceptuales y de medición. Santiago de Chile: 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. 
Arriagada, Patricio. 1989. Financiamiento de La Educación Superior En Chile 1960-
1988. Santiago de Chile: FLACSO. 
Aucejo, Esteban M. and Jonathan James. 2015. ‘The Path to College Education: Are 
Verbal Skills More Important than Math Skills?’ Retrieved 13 March 2016 
(https://wpcarey.asu.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/department-
economics/college.pdf). 
Baird, J. et al. 2011. Policy Effects of PISA. Oxford University Centre for Educational 
Assessment Oxford. 
Baker, Therese L. and William Vélez. 1996. ‘Access to and Opportunity in 
Postsecondary Education in the United States: A Review’. Sociology of 
Education 69:82–101. 
Barr, N. A. 2001. The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, 
and the Role of the State. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Barr, Nicholas. 2003. ‘Financing Higher Education: Comparing the Options’. London 
School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved 1 September 2013 
(http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/nb/Barr_HE_options030610.pdf). 
Barr, Nicholas. 2004. ‘Higher Education Funding’. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
20(2):264–83. 
Barr, Nicholas. 2005. ‘Financing Higher Education’. Finance and Development. 
Retrieved 9 March 2016 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/06/barr.htm). 
 187 
 
Barr, Nicholas. 2012. Economics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Barro, Robert J. 1991. ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(2):407–443. 
Barro, Robert J. 2001. ‘Human Capital and Growth’. The American Economic Review 
91(2):12–17. 
Barro, Robert J. and Jong Wha Lee. 2013. ‘A New Data Set of Educational Attainment 
in the World, 1950–2010’. Journal of Development Economics 104:184–98. 
Bean, John P. 1980. ‘Dropouts and Turnover: The Synthesis and Test of a Causal 
Model of Student Attrition’. Research in Higher Education 12(2):155–87. 
Bean, John P. 1981. ‘The Synthesis of a Theoretical Model of Student Attrition’. Los 
Angeles, CA. Retrieved 5 June 2015 (http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED202444). 
Bean, John P. 1982. ‘Conceptual Models of Student Attrition: How Theory Can Help 
the Institutional Researcher’. New Directions for Institutional Research 
1982(36):17–33. 
Bean, John P. 1985. ‘Interaction Effects Based on Class Level in an Explanatory 
Model of College Student Dropout Syndrome’. American Educational 
Research Journal 22(1):35–64. 
Becker, Gary Stanley. 1993. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
with Special Reference to Education. 3rd ed. Chicago ; London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Bernasconi, Andrés and Fernando Rojas. 2004. Informe Sobre La Educación Superior 
En Chile, 1980-2003. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria. 
Bernstein, Basil. 2003. Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language (Class, 
Codes and Control Vol 1). 1 edition. London; New York: Routledge. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. ‘How Much 
Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?’ The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 119(1):249–75. 
Bettinger, Eric. 2004. How Financial Aid Affects Persistence. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Retrieved 16 December 2015 
(http://www.nber.org/papers/w10242). 
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter and Alfred Hamerle. 1989. ‘Unobserved Heterogeneity in 
Hazard Rate Models: A Test and an Illustration from a Study of Career 
Mobility’. Quality and Quantity 23(2):129–141. 
Booij, Adam S., Edwin Leuven, and Hessel Oosterbeek. 2012. ‘The Role of 
Information in the Take-up of Student Loans’. Economics of Education 
Review 31(1):33–44. 
 188 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979. The Inheritors: French Students and Their Relation to Culture. 
Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1986. Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge. 
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 1976. Schooling in Capitalist America: 
Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life. New York: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2002. ‘Schooling in Capitalist America 
Revisited’. Sociology of Education 75(1):1–18. 
Braunstein, Andrew, Michael Mcgrath, and Donn Pescatrice. 1999. ‘Measuring the 
Impact of Income and Financial Aid Offers on College Enrollment 
Decisions’. Research in Higher Education 40(3):247–59. 
Brennan, John. 2010. ‘Burton Clark’s The Higher Education System: Academic 
Organization in Cross-National Perspective’. London Review of Education 
8(3):229–37. 
Brennan, John and Rajani Naidoo. 2008. ‘Higher Education and the Achievement 
(And/Or Prevention) of Equity and Social Justice’. Higher Education 
56(3):287–302. 
British Council. 2012. The Shape of Things to Come: Higher Education Global Trends 
and Emerging Opportunities to 2020. British Council. 
Bruinsma, Marjon and Ellen P. W. A. Jansen. 2009. ‘When Will I Succeed in My First‐
year Diploma? Survival Analysis in Dutch Higher Education’. Higher 
Education Research & Development 28(1):99–114. 
Brunner, José Joaquín. 1993. ‘Chile’s Higher Education: Between Market and State’. 
Higher Education 25(1):35–43. 
Brunner, José Joaquín and Daniel Uribe. 2007. Mercados universitarios: el nuevo 
escenario de la educación superior. Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Universidad 
Diego Portales. 
Button, Katherine S. et al. 2013. ‘Power Failure: Why Small Sample Size Undermines 
the Reliability of Neuroscience’. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 14(5):365–
76. 
Cabrera, Alberto F., Amaury Nora, and Maria B. Castañeda. 1992. ‘The Role of 
Finances in the Persistence Process: A Structural Model’. Research in Higher 
Education 33(5):571–93. 
Cabrera, Alberto F., Amaury Nora, and Maria B. Castaneda. 1993. ‘College 
Persistence: Structural Equations Modeling Test of an Integrated Model of 
Student Retention’. The Journal of Higher Education 64(2):123–39. 
Canton, Erik and Andreas Blom. 2004. ‘Can Student Loans Improve Accessibility to 
 189 
 
Higher Education and Student Performance?’ World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3425. Retrieved 2 September 2013 
(http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC16860.pdf). 
Canton, Erik and Andreas Blom. 2010. ‘Student Support and Academic Performance: 
Experiences at Private Universities in Mexico’. Education Economics 
18(1):49–65. 
Card, David. 1999. ‘The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings’. Handbook of Labor 
Economics 3:1801–1863. 
Card, David. 2000. Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent 
Econometric Problems. National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved 
28 May 2014 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w7769). 
Carneiro, Pedro Manuel and James J. Heckman. 2003. Human Capital Policy. 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Retrieved 27 May 2014 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=434544). 
Castañeda, Tarsicio. 1990. Para combatir la pobreza: política social y 
descentralización en Chile durante los ’80. Centro de Estudios Públicos. 
Cellini, Stephanie Riegg. 2010. ‘Financial Aid and for-Profit Colleges: Does Aid 
Encourage Entry?’ Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 29(3):526–
52. 
Chapman, Bruce. 2006. ‘Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: 
International Reforms’. Pp. 1435–1503 in Handbook of the Economics of 
Education, vol. 2, edited by E. Hanushek and F. Welch. Elsevier. Retrieved 2 
September 2013 
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574069206020253). 
Chapman, Bruce and Chris Ryan. 2005. ‘The Access Implications of Income-
Contingent Charges for Higher Education: Lessons from Australia’. 
Economics of Education Review 24(5):491–512. 
Chen, Jin and Desiree Zerquera. 2011. ‘A Methodological Review of Studies on 
Effects of Financial Aid on College Student Success’. in Annual Conference 
of the Association for Education Finance and Policy, Seattle, WA. Retrieved 
8 June 2015 
(https://aefpweb.org/sites/default/files/webform/Methodological%20Review
2.pdf). 
Chen, Rong and Stephen L. DesJardins. 2008. ‘Exploring the Effects of Financial Aid 
on the Gap in Student Dropout Risks by Income Level’. Research in Higher 
Education 49(1):1–18. 
Chen, Rong and Stephen L. DesJardins. 2010. ‘Investigating the Impact of Financial 
Aid on Student Dropout Risks: Racial and Ethnic Differences’. The Journal 
of Higher Education 81(2):179–208. 
Chowdry, Haroon, Claire Crawford, Lorraine Dearden, Alissa Goodman, and Anna 
 190 
 
Vignoles. 2013. ‘Widening Participation in Higher Education: Analysis 
Using Linked Administrative Data’. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: 
Series A (Statistics in Society) 176(2):431–457. 
Clark, Burton R. 1973. ‘Development of the Sociology of Higher Education’. 
Sociology of Education 46(1):2–14. 
Clark, Burton R. 1983. The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in 
Cross-National Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cohen, Jacob. 1988. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. 2 edition. 
Hillsdale, N.J: Routledge. 
Corak, Miles, Garth Lipps, and John Zhao. 2004. Family Income and Participation in 
Post-Secondary Education. St. Louis, United States: Federal Reserve Bank 
of St Louis. Retrieved 14 June 2016 
(http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/docview/1698642317?rfr_id=
info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo). 
Crawford, Claire. 2015. ‘Socio-Economic Differences in University Outcomes in the 
UK: Drop-Out, Degree Completion and Degree Class’. Labour 27:02. 
Darolia, Rajeev. 2013. ‘Integrity versus Access? The Effect of Federal Financial Aid 
Availability on Postsecondary Enrollment’. Journal of Public Economics 
106:101–14. 
De Gregorio, José De and Jong–Wha Lee. 2002. ‘Education and Income Inequality: 
New Evidence From Cross-Country Data’. Review of Income and Wealth 
48(3):395–416. 
Dearden, Lorraine, Emla Fitzsimons, and Gill Wyness. 2014. ‘Money for Nothing: 
Estimating the Impact of Student Aid on Participation in Higher Education’. 
Economics of Education Review 43:66–78. 
Denson, Katy and Randall E. Schumacker. 1996. ‘Student Choices: Using a 
Competing Risks Model of Survival Analysis.’ Retrieved 27 January 2015 
(http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED399341). 
DesJardins, S. L., D. A. Ahlburg, and B. P. McCall. 1999. ‘An Event History Model 
of Student Departure’. Economics of Education Review 18(3):375–90. 
DesJardins, Stephen L., Dennis A. Ahlburg, and Brian P. McCall. 2002a. ‘A Temporal 
Investigation of Factors Related to Timely Degree Completion’. The Journal 
of Higher Education 73(5):555–81. 
DesJardins, Stephen L., Dennis A. Ahlburg, and Brian P. McCall. 2002b. ‘Simulating 
the Longitudinal Effects of Changes in Financial Aid on Student Departure 
from College’. The Journal of Human Resources 37(3):653–79. 
DesJardins, Stephen L. and Brian P. McCall. 2010. ‘Simulating the Effects of 
Financial Aid Packages on College Student Stopout, Reenrollment Spells, 
and Graduation Chances’. Review of Higher Education 33(4):513–41. 
 191 
 
Desormeaux, Jorge and Matko Koljatic. 1990. ‘El financiamiento de la educación 
superior desde una perspectiva libertaria’. in Antecedentes y tendencias en el 
sistema de financiamiento de la educación superior chilena, edited by C. 
Lehmann. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Públicos. 
Díaz, Christian. 2008. ‘Modelo Conceptual Para La Deserción Estudiantil 
Universitaria Chilena’. Estudios Pedagógicos 34(2):65–86. 
Dill, David D. 1997. ‘Higher Education Markets and Public Policy’. Higher Education 
Policy 10(3–4):167–85. 
Donoso, Sebastián and Ernesto Schiefelbein. 2007. ‘Análisis de Los Modelos 
Explicativos de Retención de Estudiantes En La Universidad: Una Visión 
Desde La Desigualdad Social’. Estudios Pedagógicos 33(1):7–27. 
Dowd, Alicia C. and Tarek Coury. 2006. ‘The Effect of Loans on the Persistence and 
Attainment of Community College Students’. Research in Higher Education 
47(1):33–62. 
Dupont, William D. and Walton D. Plummer. 1998. ‘Power and Sample Size 
Calculations for Studies Involving Linear Regression’. Controlled Clinical 
Trials 19(6):589–601. 
Durkheim, Emil. 2006. On Suicide. Third Edition. London: Penguin Classics. 
Duru-Bellat, Marie and Bruno Suchaut. 2005. ‘Organisation and Context, Efficiency 
and Equity of Educational Systems: What PISA Tells Us’. European 
Educational Research Journal 4(3):181–94. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981. ‘What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’. Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 10(4):283–345. 
Dynarski, Mark. 1994. ‘Who Defaults on Student Loans? Findings from the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study’. Economics of Education Review 
13(1):55–68. 
Dynarski, Susan M. 2003. ‘Does Aid Matter? Measuring the Effect of Student Aid on 
College Attendance and Completion’. The American Economic Review 
93(1):279–88. 
Dynarski, Susan and Judith Scott-Clayton. 2013. ‘Financial Aid Policy: Lessons from 
Research’. The Future of Children 23(1):67–91. 
Elacqua, Gregory. 2009. ‘The Impact of School Choice and  Public Policy on 
Segregation:  Evidence from Chile’. Retrieved 15 August 2016 
(http://www.economiaynegocios.uahurtado.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/25-9-09.pdf). 
Espinoza, Oscar. 2008. ‘Creating (in) Equalities in Access to Higher Education in the 
Context of Structural Adjustment and Post-Adjustment Policies: The Case of 
Chile’. Higher Education 55(3):269–84. 
 192 
 
Espinoza, Oscar, Luis Eduardo González, and Daniel Uribe. 2009. ‘Movilidad Social 
En Chile: El Caso Del Gran Santiago Urbano’. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 
15(4):586–606. 
Finnie, Ross. 2012. ‘Access to Post-Secondary Education: The Importance of Culture’. 
Children and Youth Services Review 34(6):1161–70. 
Finnie, Ross and Alex Usher. 2006. ‘The Canadian Experiment in Cost-Sharing and 
Its Effects on Access to Higher Education, 1990–2002’. Pp. 159–87 in Cost-
Sharing and Accessibility in Higher Education: A Fairer Deal?, Higher 
Education Dynamics, edited by P. N. Teixeira, D. B. Johnstone, M. J. Rosa, 
and H. Vossensteyn. Springer Netherlands. Retrieved 8 September 2013 
(http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-4660-5_7). 
Fischbach, Antoine, Ulrich Keller, Franzis Preckel, and Martin Brunner. 2013. ‘PISA 
Proficiency Scores Predict Educational Outcomes’. Learning and Individual 
Differences 24:63–72. 
Fuchs, Thomas and Ludger Woessmann. 2006. ‘What Accounts for International 
Differences in Student Performance? A Re-Examination Using PISA Data’. 
Empirical Economics 32(2–3):433–64. 
Gamboa, Luis Fernando and Fábio D. Waltenberg. 2012. ‘Inequality of Opportunity 
for Educational Achievement in Latin America: Evidence from PISA 2006–
2009’. Economics of Education Review 31(5):694–708. 
Gilchrist, R., D. Phillips, and A. Ross. 2007. ‘Participation and Potential Participation 
in UK Higher Education’. Pp. 75–96 in Higher Education and Social 
Class:Issues of Exclusion and Inclusion. London,UK: Routledge Falmer. 
Glennerster, Howard, Stephen Merrett, and Gail Wilson. 1968. ‘A Graduate Tax’. 
Higher Education Review 1(1):26–38. 
Goldthorpe, John H. 2010. ‘Class Analysis and the Reorientation of Class Theory: The 
Case of Persisting Differentials in Educational Attainment’. The British 
Journal of Sociology 61:311–35. 
González, Luis Eduardo and Daniel Uribe. 2003. ‘Estimaciones Sobre La Repitencia 
Y Deserción En La Educación Superior’. Calidad de La Educación (Segundo 
semestre). Retrieved 16 June 2014 
(http://www.cned.cl/public/secciones/seccionpublicaciones/doc/35/cse_artic
ulo140.pdf). 
Gopal, Prashant Gopal. 2008. ‘Which College Grads Earn the Most?’ Bloomberg.com, 
August 7. Retrieved 15 August 2016 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-08-07/which-college-grads-
earn-the-most-businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-
advice). 
van der Haert, Margaux, Elena Arias Ortiz, Philippe Emplit, Véronique Halloin, and 
Catherine Dehon. 2014. ‘Are Dropout and Degree Completion in Doctoral 
Study Significantly Dependent on Type of Financial Support and Field of 
 193 
 
Research?’ Studies in Higher Education 39(10):1885–1909. 
Hansen, W.Lee. 1972. ‘Equity and the Finance of Higher Education’. Journal of 
Political Economy 80(3):S260–73. 
Hanushek, Eric A. and Dennis D. Kimko. 2000. ‘Schooling, Labor-Force Quality, and 
the Growth of Nations’. The American Economic Review 90(5):1184–1208. 
Hanushek, Eric A. and Ludger Woessmann. 2007. The Role of Education Quality in 
Economic Growth [Electronic Resource]. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Heckman, James J. 1976. ‘The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, 
Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator 
for Such Models’. Pp. 475–492 in Annals of Economic and Social 
Measurement, Volume 5, number 4. NBER. Retrieved 29 May 2014 
(http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10491.pdf). 
Heckman, James J., Lance J. Lochner, and Petra E. Todd. 2003. Fifty Years of Mincer 
Earnings Regressions. National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved 29 
May 2014 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w9732). 
Heckman, James J. and Dimitriy V. Masterov. 2007. The Productivity Argument for 
Investing in Young Children. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Retrieved 29 May 2014 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w13016). 
Herzog, Serge. 2005. ‘Measuring Determinants of Student Return VS. 
Dropout/Stopout VS. Transfer: A First-to-Second Year Analysis of New 
Freshmen’. Research in Higher Education 46(8):883–928. 
Hillman, Nicholas W. 2014. ‘College on Credit: A Multilevel Analysis of Student 
Loan Default’. Review of Higher Education 37(2):169–95. 
Himmel, Erika. 2002. ‘Modelos de Análisis de La Deserción Estudiantil En La 
Educación Superior’. Calidad de La Educación 17:91–108. 
Horn, Catherine, María Verónica Santelices, and Ximena Catalán. 2014. ‘Modeling 
the Impacts of National and Institutional Financial Aid Opportunities on 
Persistence at an Elite Chilean University’. Higher Education 68(3):471–88. 
Hosmer, David W. and Stanley Lemeshow. 1999. Applied Survival Analysis: Time-to-
Event. Wiley. 
Hosmer, David W., Stanley Lemeshow, and Susanne May. 2008. Applied Survival 
Analysis: Regression Modeling of Time to Event Data. 2 edition. Hoboken, 
N.J: Wiley-Interscience. 
Hougaard, Philip. 1995. ‘Frailty Models for Survival Data’. Lifetime Data Analysis 
1(3):255–73. 
INGRESA. 2015. ‘Estadísticas | Ingresa’. Retrieved 26 May 2015 
(http://portal.ingresa.cl/estadisticas-y-estudios/estadisticas/). 
 194 
 
Ishitani, Terry T. and Stephen L. DesJardins. 2002. ‘A Longitudinal Investigation of 
Dropout from College in the United States’. Journal of College Student 
Retention: Research, Theory & Practice 4(2):173–201. 
Jamison, Eliot A., Dean T. Jamison, and Eric A. Hanushek. 2007. ‘The Effects of 
Education Quality on Income Growth and Mortality Decline’. Economics of 
Education Review 26(6):771–88. 
Jerrim, John. 2012. ‘The Socio-Economic Gradient in Teenagers’ Reading Skills: How 
Does England Compare with Other Countries?*’. Fiscal Studies 33(2):159–
184. 
Jerrim, John and John Micklewright. 2013. ‘Socioeconomic Gradients in Children’s 
Cognitive Skills: Are Cross-Country Comparisons Robust to Who Reports 
Family Background?’ GINI Discussion  Paper 65. Retrieved 
(http://www.gini-
research.org/system/uploads/520/original/65.pdf?1380552594). 
Jerrim, John, Anna Vignoles, and Ross Finnie. 2012. ‘University Access for 
Disadvantaged Children: A Comparison across English Speaking Countries’. 
Johnstone, D.Bruce. 2003. ‘Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial 
Assistance, and Accessibility in a Comparative Perspective’. Sociologickỳ 
Časopis/Czech Sociological Review 351–374. 
Johnstone, D.Bruce. 2004. ‘The Economics and Politics of Cost Sharing in Higher 
Education: Comparative Perspectives’. Economics of Education Review 
23(4):403–10. 
Johnstone, D.Bruce and Pamela Marcucci. 2010. Financing Higher Education 
Worldwide: Who Pays? Who Should Pay? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Jones-White, Daniel R., Peter M. Radcliffe, Ronald L.Huesman Jr, and John P. 
Kellogg. 2009. ‘Redefining Student Success: Applying Different 
Multinomial Regression Techniques for the Study of Student Graduation 
Across Institutions of Higher Education’. Research in Higher Education 
51(2):154–74. 
Kass, Robert E. and Adrian E. Raftery. 1995. ‘Bayes Factors’. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 90(430):773–95. 
van der Klaauw, Wilbert. 2002. ‘Estimating the Effect of Financial Aid Offers on 
College Enrollment: A Regression–Discontinuity Approach*’. International 
Economic Review 43(4):1249–87. 
Knight, Carl. 2013. ‘Luck Egalitarianism’. Philosophy Compass 8(10):924–34. 
Le Grand, Julian. 1982. The Strategy of Equality: Redistribution and the Social 
Services. London, UK: Allen & Unwin. 
Le Grand, Julian. 2007. The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through 
 195 
 
Choice and Competition. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. 
Lehmann, Carla. 1990. ‘Antecedentes Y Tendencias En El Sistema de Financiamiento 
de La Educación Superior Chilena’. in Financiamiento de la educación 
superior: Antecedentes y desafíos, edited by C. Lehmann. Santiago de Chile: 
Centro de Estudios Públicos. 
Lemaitre, María José. 2005. ‘Equidad en la educación superior: un concepto 
complejo’. Retrieved 12 August 2016 
(https://repositorio.uam.es/handle/10486/660776). 
Letkiewicz, Jodi et al. 2014. ‘The Path to Graduation: Factors Predicting On-Time 
Graduation Rates’. Journal of College Student Retention: Research, Theory 
& Practice 16(3):351–71. 
Levy, Daniel C. 1986. Higher Education and the State in Latin America. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Liu, Xian. 2014. ‘Survival Models on Unobserved Heterogeneity and Their 
Applications in Analyzing Large-Scale Survey Data’. Journal of Biometrics 
& Biostatistics 5. Retrieved 2 February 2015 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4267525/). 
McDonough, P. and A. Fann. 2007. ‘The Study of Inequality’. Pp. 53–93 in Sociology 
of Higher Education. Contributions and their Contexts, edited by P. Gumport. 
Baltimore: The Jonhns Hopkins University Press. 
MDS. 2012. ‘Resultados Educación. CASEN 2011’. Retrieved 
(http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen/casen-
documentos.php?c=108&a=2011). 
MDS. 2013. ‘Observatorio Social - Ministerio de Desarrollo Social - Gobierno de 
Chile’. Retrieved 15 November 2013 
(http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen_obj.php). 
Melguizo, Tatiana, Fabio Sanchez, and Tatiana Velasco. 2016. ‘Credit for Low-
Income Students and Access to and Academic Performance in Higher 
Education in Colombia: A Regression Discontinuity Approach’. World 
Development 80:61–77. 
Mincer, Jacob. 1958. ‘Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income 
Distribution’. The Journal of Political Economy 66(4):281–302. 
MINEDUC. 2007. Country Background Report - Chile. OECD Thematic Review of 
Tertiary Education. Retrieved 16 June 2014 
(http://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-school/41473042.pdf). 
MINEDUC. 2011. ‘Resumen Resultados PISA 2009. Chile’. Retrieved 15 November 
2013 
(http://ww2.educarchile.cl/UserFiles/P0001/File/PISA/Resumen_Resultados
_PISA_2009_Chile.pdf). 
 196 
 
Ministry of Education. 2012. ‘Mi Futuro’. Retrieved 30 September 2013 
(http://www.mifuturo.cl/). 
Mizala, Alejandra. 2007. La Economía Política de La Reforma Educacional En Chile. 
CIEPLAN. Retrieved 15 August 2016 (http://educahoy.cl/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/mizala-economia-educacional.pdf). 
Mizala, Alejandra and Pilar Romaguera. 2004. ‘Remuneraciones Y Tasas de Retorno 
de Los Profesionales Chilenos’. in Oferta y demanda de profesionales y 
técnicos en Chile: El rol de la información pública, edited by J. J. Brunner 
and P. Meller. Santiago de Chile: RIL Editores. 
Mora, José‐Ginés. 1997. ‘Equity in Financing and Access to Higher Education’. 
Higher Education in Europe 22(2):145–54. 
Murdoch, Jake, Pierre Kamanzi, and Pierre Doray. 2011. ‘The Influence of PISA 
Scores, Schooling and Social Factors on Pathways to and within Higher 
Education in Canada’. Irish Educational Studies 30(2):215–35. 
Nakagawa, Shinichi and Innes C. Cuthill. 2007. ‘Effect Size, Confidence Interval and 
Statistical Significance: A Practical Guide for Biologists’. Biological Reviews 
82(4):591–605. 
OECD. 2004. OECD Handbook for Internationally Comparative Education Statistics: 
Concepts, Standards, Definitions and Classifications. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OECD. 2005. School Factors Related to Quality and Equity: Results from PISA 2000. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved 
13 September 2013 
(http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/programmeforinternationalstudentassessm
entpisa/34668095.pdf). 
OECD. 2008a. Education at a Glance 2007. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
OECD. 2008b. Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OECD. 2010. PISA 2009 Results: Overcoming Social Background. Equity in Learning 
Opportunities and Outcomes. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. 
OECD. 2012a. Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Develpoment. 
OECD. 2012b. PISA 2009 Technical Report. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Retrieved 22 January 2014 
(http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/programmeforinternationalstudentassessm
entpisa/pisa2009technicalreport.htm#PISA_2006_Technical_Report). 
OECD. 2014. Education at a Glance 2014. OECD Publishing. Retrieved 19 May 2016 
 197 
 
(http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2014_eag-
2014-en). 
OECD. 2015a. Education at a Glance 2015. OECD Publishing. 
OECD. 2015b. Education at a Glance 2015. OECD Publishing. Retrieved 1 December 
2015 (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-
2015_eag-2015-en). 
OECD. n.d. ‘PISA Products - Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development’. 
OECD and The World Bank. 2009. Reviews of National Policies for Education: 
Tertiary Education in Chile 2009. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
Oosterbeek, Hessel and Anja van den Broek. 2009. ‘An Empirical Analysis of 
Borrowing Behaviour of Higher Education Students in the Netherlands’. 
Economics of Education Review 28(2):170–77. 
Ortiz, Elena Arias and Catherine Dehon. 2013. ‘Roads to Success in the Belgian 
French Community’s Higher Education System: Predictors of Dropout and 
Degree Completion at the Université Libre de Bruxelles’. Research in Higher 
Education 54(6):693–723. 
Page, Lindsay C. and Judith Scott-Clayton. 2016. ‘Improving College Access in the 
United States: Barriers and Policy Responses’. Economics of Education 
Review 51:4–22. 
Paura, Liga and Irina Arhipova. 2014. ‘Cause Analysis of Students’ Dropout Rate in 
Higher Education Study Program’. Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences 109:1282–86. 
Petras, Hanno, Katherine E. Masyn, Jacquelyn A. Buckley, Nicholas S. Ialongo, and 
Sheppard Kellam. 2011. ‘Who Is Most at Risk for School Removal? A 
Multilevel Discrete-Time Survival Analysis of Individual- and Context-Level 
Influences.’ Journal of Educational Psychology 103(1):223–37. 
Psacharopoulos, George. 1988. ‘Education and Development: A Review’. The World 
Bank Research Observer 3(1):99–116. 
Psacharopoulos, George. 2008. ‘Funding Universities for Efficiency and Equity: 
Research Findings versus Petty Politics’. Education Economics 16(3):245–
60. 
Psacharopoulos, George and George Papakonstantinou. 2005. ‘The Real University 
Cost in a “free” Higher Education Country’. Economics of Education Review 
24(1):103–8. 
Psacharopoulos, George and Harry Anthony Patrinos. 2004. ‘Returns to Investment in 
Education: A Further Update’. Education Economics 12(2):111–34. 
 198 
 
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia and Anders Skrondal. 2012. Multilevel and Longitudinal 
Modeling Using Stata, Volumes I and II, Third Edition. 3 edition. College 
Station, Tex: Stata Press. 
Ramsey, Alan. 2008. ‘Graduate Earnings. An Econometric Analysis of Returns, 
Inequality and Derpivation across the UK’. Retrieved 15 August 2016 
(https://www.economy-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/del/Graduate%20Earnings%20An
%20econometric%20analysis%20of%20returns%2C%20inequality%20and
%20dep%20main%20report.pdf). 
Rolando, Rodrigo, Juan Salamanca, and Alfredo Lara. 2010. Retención de Primer Año 
En El Pregrado: Descripción Y Análisis de La Cohorte de Ingreso 2007. 
Retrieved 23 June 2014 
(http://www.mifuturo.cl/images/Estudios/Estudios_SIES_DIVESUP/retenci
on_primer_ao_pregrado.pdf). 
Santelices, María Verónica, Ximena Catalán, Diana Kruger, and Catherine Horn. 
2015. ‘Determinants of Persistence and the Role of Financial Aid: Lessons 
from Chile’. Higher Education 71(3):323–42. 
Sanyal, Bikas C. and D.Bruce Johnstone. 2011. ‘International Trends in the Public and 
Private Financing of Higher Education’. Prospects 41(1):157–75. 
Shavit, Yossi, Richard Arum, Adam Gamoran, and Gila Menachem. 2007. 
Stratification in Higher Education: A Comparative Study. Stanford 
University Press. 
Singer, J. D. and J. B. Willett. 1993. ‘It’s About Time: Using Discrete-Time Survival 
Analysis to Study Duration and the Timing of Events’. Journal of 
Educational and Behavioral Statistics 18(2):155–95. 
Singer, Judith D. and John B. Willett. 2003. Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis. 
Oxford University Press. Retrieved 8 June 2015 
(http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/97801951529
68.001.0001/acprof-9780195152968). 
Solis, Alex. 2013. Credit Access and College Enrollment. Working Paper, Department 
of Economics, Uppsala University. Retrieved 14 June 2016 
(http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/82577). 
Spady, William G. 1970. ‘Dropouts from Higher Education: An Interdisciplinary 
Review and Synthesis’. Interchange 1(1):64–85. 
St John, Edward P. and Jay Noell. 1989. ‘The Effects of Student Financial Aid on 
Access to Higher Education: An Analysis of Progress with Special 
Consideration of Minority Enrollment’. Research in Higher Education 
30(6):563–81. 
Stampen, Jacob O. and Alberto F. Cabrera. 1988. ‘The Targeting and Packaging of 
Student Aid and Its Effect on Attrition’. Economics of Education Review 
7(1):29–46. 
 199 
 
Steele, Fiona, Ian Diamond, and Duolao Wang. 1996. ‘The Determinants of the 
Duration of Contraceptive Use in China: A Multilevel Multinomial Discrete-
Hazards Mdeling Approach’. Demography 33(1):12–23. 
Steele, Fiona, Harvey Goldstein, and William Browne. 2004. ‘A General Multilevel 
Multistate Competing Risks Model for Event History Data, with an 
Application to a Study of Contraceptive Use Dynamics’. Statistical 
Modelling 4(2):145–159. 
Stratton, Leslie S., Dennis M. O’Toole, and James N. Wetzel. 2008. ‘A Multinomial 
Logit Model of College Stopout and Dropout Behavior’. Economics of 
Education Review 27(3):319–31. 
Teixeira, Pedro N., Johnstone, D. B., Maria J. Rosa, and Hans Vossensteyn. 2008. 
Cost-Sharing and Accessibility in Higher Education: A Fairer Deal? Berlin: 
Springer. 
Tinto, Vincent. 1975. ‘Dropout from Higher Education: A Theoretical Synthesis of 
Recent Research’. Review of Educational Research 45(1):89–125. 
Tinto, Vincent. 2006. ‘Research and Practice of Student Retention: What Next?’ 
Journal of College Student Retention: Research, Theory & Practice 8(1):1–
19. 
Tinto, Vincent. 2010. ‘From Theory to Action: Exploring the Institutional Conditions 
for Student Retention’. Pp. 51–89 in Higher Education: Handbook of Theory 
and Research, vol. 25, edited by J. C. Smart. Dordrecht: Springer 
Netherlands. 
Torche, Florencia. 2005. ‘Privatization Reform and Inequality of Educational 
Opportunity: The Case of Chile’. Sociology of Education 78(4):316–43. 
UNDP. 2005. Expansión de La Educación Superior En Chile. Hacia Un Nuevo 
Enfoque de La Calidad Y Equidad. United Nations Development Program. 
Retrieved 23 June 2014 
(http://www.desarrollohumano.cl/otraspub/pub10/Ed%20superior.pdf). 
UNESCO. n.d. ‘UNESCO Institute for Statistics’. Retrieved 22 January 2014 
(http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=1
36&IF_Language=eng&BR_Topic=0). 
Uribe, Daniel. 2004. ‘Oferta Educativa Y Oferta de Graduados de Educación 
Superior’. in Oferta y Demanda de Profesionales y Técnicos en Chile, edited 
by J. J. Brunner and P. Meller. Santiago de Chile: RIL Editores. 
Urzua, Sergio and Tomas Rau. 2012. Higher Education Dropouts, Access to Credit, 
and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Chile. Society for Economic 
Dynamics. Retrieved 8 June 2015 
(https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed012/228.html). 
Volkwein, J.Fredericks, Bruce P. Szelest, Alberto F. Cabrera, and Michelle R. 
Napierski-Prancl. 1998. ‘Factors Associated with Student Loan Default 
 200 
 
among Different Racial and Ethnic Groups’. The Journal of Higher 
Education 69(2):206–37. 
Walpole, Marybeth. 2007. ‘Economically and Educationally Challenged Students in 
Higher Education: Access to Outcomes’. ASHE Higher Education Report 
33(3):1–113. 
Wao, Hesborn O. 2010. ‘Time to the Doctorate: Multilevel Discrete-Time Hazard 
Analysis’. Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability 
22(3):227–47. 
Willett, John B. and Judith D. Singer. 1991. ‘From Whether to When: New Methods 
for Studying Student Dropout and Teacher Attrition’. Review of Educational 
Research 61(4):407. 
Woo, Jennie H. 2002. ‘Factors Affecting the Probability of Default: Student Loans in 
California’. Journal of Student Financial Aid 32(2):5–23. 
World Bank. 2000. Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2011. Chile’s State-Guaranteed Student Loan Program (CAE). The 
World Bank. Retrieved 1 June 2015 
(http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/03/16406290/chiles-state-
guaranteed-student-loan-program-cae). 
World Bank. n.d. ‘Education - Tertiary Education - Projects’. Retrieved 2 September 
2013a 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATI
ON/0,,contentMDK:20528441~menuPK:617592~pagePK:148956~piPK:21
6618~theSitePK:282386~isCURL:Y,00.html). 
World Bank. n.d. ‘The World Bank DataBank - Create Widgets or Advanced Reports 
and Share’. Retrieved 22 January 2014b 
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.
aspx?source=world-development-indicators). 
 
  
 201 
 
APPENDIX A (CHAPTER 3) 
 
Table A.1. Gross enrolment rates and inequality of school achievement by country and 
period 
 
  Gross Enrollment Rate (HE) 
Inequality of School 
Achievement (R2 ESCS) 
Country 2003 2006 2009 2012 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Albania 15.8 18.4 55.5     10.7 
Argentina 64.9 67.1 71.2 80.3    13.5 19.0 
Australia 72.7 71.2 75.9 86.3 17.4 14.2 11.8 12.7 
Austria 46.1 49.3 60.2 72.4 16.6 21.3 12.9 16.0 
Azerbaijan   19.0 20.4    7.2 7.4 
Belgium 59.7 62.6 67.5 70.8 18.9 22.8 16.0 19.3 
Brazil 22.3 25.6  13.9 8.6 13.7 13.0 
Bulgaria 41.1 45.7 53.0 62.7    22.7 20.2 
Canada 60.0   12.2 9.9 9.5 8.6 
Chile 42.9 46.7 59.2 74.4    18.6 18.7 
Colombia 24.7 32.0 37.1 45.0    10.3 16.0 
Croatia 39.0 45.1 49.2 61.6    10.2 11.0 
Czech Republic 36.7 49.3 60.7 64.2 22.9 15.5 12.5 12.4 
Denmark 67.4 78.9 74.4 79.6 16.1 16.3 10.7 14.5 
Estonia 64.8 65.8 62.7 76.7    7.7 7.6 
Finland 87.1 93.3 91.6 93.7 8.6 9.6 7.7 7.8 
France 54.4 55.4 54.5 58.3 19.0 19.5 16.4 16.7 
Germany   46.3 23.6 22.5 15.9 17.0 
Greece 72.2 93.1 89.4 116.6 12.2 10.9 10.7 12.5 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 31.5 33.4 57.2 60.1 7.8 5.3 6.3 4.5 
Hungary 52.6 66.4 61.7 59.6 25.4 21.7 19.4 26.0 
Iceland 62.2 72.7 74.1 81.4 7.4 4.0 4.9 6.2 
Indonesia 15.7 16.5 22.4 31.5 9.1 6.8 10.8 7.8 
Ireland 54.2 57.7 61.0 71.2 12.3 16.5 12.3 12.6 
Israel 56.8 57.7 62.5 67.9    8.2 12.5 
Italy 57.8 65.8 66.0 62.5 10.4 14.1 7.5 11.8 
Japan 52.0 57.6 59.0 61.5   10.8 7.3 8.6 
Jordan 34.4 37.7 41.8 46.6    11.3 7.9 
Kazakhstan 44.5 52.8 40.0 56.3     12.0 
Korea, Rep. 87.7 97.8 103.9 100.8 8.6 10.9 6.6 11.0 
Kyrgyz Republic 40.8 43.5 48.8 41.3    9.8 14.6 
Latvia 71.5 73.6 66.1 65.1 9.0 7.7 9.4 10.3 
Liechtenstein 20.7 29.8 34.4 42.5 17.1 18.6 18.1 8.4 
Lithuania 68.1 76.4 77.4 73.9    14.0 13.6 
Luxembourg 12.2 10.3 10.5 19.7   17.4 20.6 18.0 
Macao SAR, China 76.6 56.8 63.8 56.1   0.9 1.8 1.8 
Mexico 22.8 25.1 27.0 29.0 19.8 16.9 14.5 14.5 
Montenegro 16.8 25.8 44.9 55.5    6.0 10.0 
Netherlands 55.9 59.7 62.7 77.3   15.5 13.7 12.8 
New Zealand 68.9 78.7 82.7 79.8 15.2 16.7 14.9 16.0 
Norway 79.1 77.7 73.8 74.1 12.6 11.7 7.8 8.6 
Panama 46.5 44.6 44.6 43.5     18.0 
Peru 31.8 35.0 40.6     27.4 
Poland 60.2 65.5 70.5 73.2 14.3 15.8 13.3 14.8 
Portugal 54.6 55.4 62.2 68.9 18.0 12.8 17.9 16.5 
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  Gross Enrollment Rate (HE) 
Inequality of School 
Achievement (R2 ESCS) 
Country 2003 2006 2009 2012 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Qatar 15.2 19.3 10.1 12.1     4.0 
Romania 37.6 51.8 63.8 51.6    11.0 13.6 
Russian Federation 66.3 72.3 75.9 76.1 10.2 10.9 8.3 11.3 
Serbia   49.8 52.4    14.0 9.0 
Slovak Republic 33.9 44.3 54.2 55.1   20.9 14.9 14.6 
Slovenia 69.3 83.0 86.9 86.0    15.1 14.3 
Spain 64.0 68.0 73.2 84.6 15.8 11.4 10.5 13.6 
Sweden 81.4 79.3 70.8 70.0 11.7 14.2 8.5 13.4 
Switzerland 43.9 46.4 51.5 55.6 21.4 17.9 14.0 14.1 
Thailand 40.6 43.8 45.7 51.4 7.3 9.9 14.7 13.3 
Trinidad and Tobago 8.4 11.5      9.0 
Tunisia 26.8 31.8 34.4 35.2   7.6 8.5 8.1 
Turkey 28.7 36.0 45.8 69.4   20.3 13.1 19.0 
United Kingdom 61.7 58.9 58.5 61.9    12.2 13.7 
United States 81.2 82.6 89.1 94.3 19.3 18.0  16.8 
Uruguay 41.2 45.4 63.3 63.2   12.8 13.5 20.7 
Total 49.1 53.5 58.3 62.8 14.7 13.8 11.9 13.1 
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Table A.2. Valid and missing values by variable and country 
 
 
 
Country 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
 Valid 
values
Imputed 
values(*) 
% 
imputed 
Albania 3 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 0 0 16 14 47%
Argentina 4 2 3 3 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 33 7 18%
Australia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Austria 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Azerbaijan 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 18 2 10%
Belgium 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 38 2 5%
Brazil 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 20 0 0%
Bulgaria 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 35 5 13%
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 0%
Chile 4 2 3 3 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 33 7 18%
Colombia 4 2 2 2 2 4 1 4 4 4 4 29 11 28%
Croatia 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 28 12 30%
Czech Republic 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Denmark 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Estonia 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 32 8 20%
Finland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
France 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 36 4 10%
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 1 10%
Greece 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 38 2 5%
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 36 4 10%
Hungary 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Iceland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 38 2 5%
Indonesia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 34 6 15%
Ireland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Israel 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 35 5 13%
Italy 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
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Country 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
 Valid 
values
Imputed 
values(*) 
% 
imputed 
Japan 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 3 8%
Jordan 4 2 2 2 2 4 0 0 4 4 0 20 20 50%
Kazakhstan 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 4 4 0 3 21 19 48%
Korea, Rep. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Kyrgyz Republic 4 2 2 2 2 4 1 3 4 0 4 24 16 40%
Latvia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 39 1 3%
Liechtenstein 4 4 4 1 4 0 0 0 3 3 3 22 18 45%
Lithuania 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 30 10 25%
Luxembourg 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 0 33 7 18%
Macao SAR, China 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 1 4 33 7 18%
Mexico 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Montenegro 4 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 3 0 0 17 23 58%
Netherlands 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 36 4 10%
New Zealand 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Norway 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Panama 4 1 1 1 1 4 4 3 4 4 3 26 14 35%
Peru 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 15 15 50%
Poland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Portugal 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Qatar 4 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 0 15 25 63%
Romania 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 30 10 25%
Russian Federation 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 36 4 10%
Serbia 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 2 1 1 15 5 25%
Slovak Republic 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 36 4 10%
Slovenia 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 28 12 30%
Spain 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Sweden 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Switzerland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 0 0%
Thailand 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 36 4 10%
Trinidad and Tobago 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 16 4 20%
Tunisia 4 3 3 3 3 4 0 3 4 4 4 31 9 23%
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Country 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
 Valid 
values
Imputed 
values(*) 
% 
imputed 
Turkey 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 1 3 32 8 20%
United Kingdom 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 36 4 10%
United States 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 3 8%
Uruguay 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 32 8 20%
Valid values 228 177 187 179 187 221 185 202 222 179 192 1931 349 15%
Imputed values 0 51 41 49 41 7 43 26 6 49 36 349  
% imputed 0% 22% 18% 21% 18% 3% 19% 11% 3% 21% 16% 15%  
 
[1] GER HE; [2] R-sq ESCS; [3] PISA Reading score; [4] % variance within; [5] ESCS]; [6] Ln GDP per capita; [7] % Labour force TE al; [8] Unemployment TE % tot; [9] GER Secondary; [10] Expenditure in 
secondary as % of GDP p/c; [11] Expenditure in HE as % of GDP p/c 
(*) Values imputed through interpolation for independent variables. 
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Table A.3. OLS Estimates with and without Imputed Data 
 Imputed data Only full case 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure 
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -0.567 0.827 -2.368** -2.850** -2.253* -2.535** -2.059 -0.669 -3.669*** -5.027*** -1.943* -2.806** 
 -1.099 (1.233) (1.200) (1.257) (1.151) (1.170) -1.277 (1.480) (1.270) (1.329) (1.165) (1.188) 
ESCS 8.318*** 7.650*** 10.204*** 7.305** 9.034*** 5.110* 10.914*** 10.367*** 14.581*** 13.568*** 14.815*** 9.014** 
 -2.718 (2.597) (2.849) (2.820) (2.667) (2.612) -3.41 (3.320) (3.660) (4.406) (3.076) (3.676) 
PISA Reading (z 
scores) 8.379*** 8.736*** 10.509*** 9.754*** 9.876*** 9.376*** 7.595*** 7.813*** 12.076*** 10.268*** 6.517** 5.979** 
 -1.556 (1.541) (1.564) (1.618) (1.564) (1.597) -2.12 (2.021) (2.937) (2.736) (2.776) (2.648) 
% within variance  0.145* -0.094 -0.116 -0.092 -0.109 0.106 -0.133 -0.094 0.017 0.023 
  (0.075) (0.080) (0.079) (0.076) (0.072) (0.082) (0.091) (0.076) (0.076) (0.072) 
ln (GDP per capita 
PPP)   -11.706*** -11.695*** -8.902*** -8.216***  -14.042*** -23.468*** -2.137 -4.794 
   (2.557) (2.389) (2.475) (2.199)  (4.109) (4.230) (3.227) (4.064) 
% Lab force with HE   0.255* 0.240* 0.174 0.125  0.003 0.242 0.058 0.157 
   (0.132) (0.130) (0.134) (0.132)  (0.254) (0.251) (0.165) (0.193) 
HE Unemp (% total 
unemployment)   0.465*** 0.488*** 0.405** 0.438**  0.721** 0.585** 0.324 0.315 
   (0.170) (0.171) (0.172) (0.171)  (0.289) (0.283) (0.204) (0.243) 
GER Secondary   0.224** 0.233*** 0.219*** 0.232***  0.221** 0.247*** 0.139 0.200*** 
   (0.088) (0.082) (0.079) (0.071)  (0.097) (0.078) (0.086) (0.069) 
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.546*** 0.644***   0.734***  0.717*** 
    (0.151) (0.151)   (0.177)  (0.161) 
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     -0.217*** -0.266***    -0.399*** -0.464*** 
     (0.051) (0.058)    (0.086) (0.087) 
Constant 61.006*** 52.624*** 148.193*** 136.134*** 130.924*** 110.816*** 61.601*** 55.671*** 176.927*** 246.157*** 76.242** 78.844** 
  -1.487 (5.111) (24.205) (22.526) (23.249) (20.927) -1.598 (5.736) (40.709) (41.311) (32.844) (39.292) 
N Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 176 170.000 142.000 120.000 127.000 114.000 
R2 Adjusted 0.396 0.441 0.592 0.606 0.624 0.646 0.336 0.377 0.480 0.581 0.541 0.608 
AIC 1927.9 1911.9 1848.0 1841.7 1830.9 1819.1 1485.2 1423.013 1156.806 937.756 977.047 858.164 
BIC 1951.9 1942.8 1906.3 1906.9 1896.0 1891.1 1497.9 1438.692 1183.408 965.631 1005.489 888.262 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.4. Fixed effects estimates with and without imputed data 
 Imputed data Only full case 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
  b/se b/se   b/se b/se   b/se b/se   b/se b/se   
Ineq Sch Ach -3.645** -3.767** -2.142 -2.482* -2.451* -2.738** -3.061** -2.689* -1.431 -2.688** -3.299** -2.673** 
 -1.403 (1.445) (1.400) (1.257) (1.314) (1.290) -1.457 (1.582) (1.363) (1.153) (1.233) (1.203) 
PISA Reading 
(z scores) 4.441 5.033 5.597 2.961 6.534 3.374 11.094 10.806 8.432 5.722 8.050 5.594 
 -7.231 (7.040) (6.331) (6.878) (5.927) (6.527) -6.77 (6.828) (7.131) (7.207) (6.492) (7.362) 
% within 
variance 4.824 4.951 1.797 1.750 1.907 1.478 5.126 4.718 2.998 -1.174 -0.696 -1.250 
 -3.579 (3.592) (3.180) (3.215) (3.194) (3.161) -4.308 (4.653) (4.937) (4.610) (4.609) (4.613) 
ESCS  -0.012 -0.024 -0.085 -0.007 -0.062  -0.056 -0.010 -0.053 0.079 -0.041 
  (0.083) (0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068)  (0.099) (0.093) (0.091) (0.077) (0.095) 
ln (GDP per 
capita PPP)   15.102** 11.490* 18.986*** 14.863***   26.536*** 25.685** 22.102*** 25.375** 
   (6.650) (6.485) (6.011) (5.482)   (8.256) (10.380) (7.993) (10.578) 
% Lab force 
with HE   0.347*** 0.260** 0.330*** 0.256**   0.256* 0.187 0.206* 0.104 
   (0.126) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118)   (0.136) (0.119) (0.115) (0.125) 
HE Unemp (% 
total 
unemployment)   0.234 0.157 0.254* 0.164   0.485* 0.153 0.340 0.208 
   (0.155) (0.168) (0.142) (0.159)   (0.269) (0.232) (0.240) (0.245) 
GER Secondary   0.141 0.245*** 0.143* 0.235***   0.110 0.260** 0.139 0.263** 
   (0.087) (0.082) (0.086) (0.084)   (0.096) (0.097) (0.088) (0.099) 
Exp in 
secondary 
(%GDP)    0.718***  0.651***    0.658**  0.706*** 
    (0.198)  (0.200)    (0.250)  (0.251) 
Exp in HE 
(%GDP)     0.192 0.116     0.111 -0.050 
     (0.149) (0.126)     (0.153) (0.112) 
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 Imputed data Only full case 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition   
  b/se b/se   b/se b/se   b/se b/se   b/se b/se   
Constant 59.884*** 60.693*** -112.313* -95.779 -156.673** -131.067** 61.744*** 65.943*** 
-
225.561*** -239.307** -188.175** -233.707** 
  -1.918 (5.506) (66.142) (65.024) (60.219) (55.684) -1.508 (6.206) (81.081) (105.488) (80.635) (107.387) 
N Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 176 170 142 120 127 114 
N Groups 61 61 61 61 61 61 60 60 49 42 44 38 
R2 within 0.236 0.239 0.408 0.447 0.427 0.459 0.087 0.070 0.376 0.500 0.410 0.498 
Rho 0.827 0.827 0.881 0.869 0.912 0.897 0.824 0.816 0.933 0.938 0.908 0.904 
AIC 1501.8 1505.1 1461.6 1450.0 1458.3 1449.2 1133.7 1099.7 882.1 700.9 757.1 673.4 
BIC 1522.4 1532.5 1513.0 1508.3 1516.6 1514.4 1143.2 1112.2 905.7 726.0 782.7 700.8 
 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.5. OLS estimates. Missing values imputed by interpolation. All predictor lagged 
3 years 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -0.567 0.827 -2.368** -2.850** -2.253* -2.535**
 -1.099 (1.233) (1.200) (1.257) (1.151) (1.170)
ESCS 8.318*** 7.650*** 10.204*** 7.305** 9.034*** 5.110*
 -2.718 (2.597) (2.849) (2.820) (2.667) (2.612)
PISA Reading (z 
scores) 8.379*** 8.736*** 10.509*** 9.754*** 9.876*** 9.376***
 -1.556 (1.541) (1.564) (1.618) (1.564) (1.597)
% within variance  0.145* -0.094 -0.116 -0.092 -0.109
  (0.075) (0.080) (0.079) (0.076) (0.072)
ln (GDP per capita 
PPP)  -11.706*** -11.695*** -8.902*** -8.216***
  (2.557) (2.389) (2.475) (2.199)
% Lab force with HE  0.255* 0.240* 0.174 0.125
  (0.132) (0.130) (0.134) (0.132)
HE Unemp (% total 
unemployment)  0.465*** 0.488*** 0.405** 0.438**
  (0.170) (0.171) (0.172) (0.171)
GER Secondary  0.224** 0.233*** 0.219*** 0.232***
  (0.088) (0.082) (0.079) (0.071)
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)  0.546***  0.644***
  (0.151)  (0.151)
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)   -0.217*** -0.266***
   (0.051) (0.058)
Constant 61.006*** 52.624*** 148.193*** 136.134*** 130.924*** 110.816***
  -1.487 (5.111) (24.205) (22.526) (23.249) (20.927)
N Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
R2 Adjusted 0.396 0.441 0.592 0.606 0.624 0.646
AIC 1927.9 1911.9 1848.0 1841.7 1830.9 1819.1
BIC 1951.9 1942.8 1906.3 1906.9 1896.0 1891.1
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.6. Fixed effects estimates. Missing values imputed by interpolation. All 
predictor lagged 3 years 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition 
Add 
Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -3.645** -3.767** -2.142 -2.482* -2.451* -2.738**
 (1.403) (1.445) (1.400) (1.257) (1.314) (1.290)
ESCS 4.441 5.033 5.597 2.961 6.534 3.374
 (7.231) (7.040) (6.331) (6.878) (5.927) (6.527)
PISA Reading (z 
scores) 4.824 4.951 1.797 1.750 1.907 1.478
 (3.579) (3.592) (3.180) (3.215) (3.194) (3.161)
% within variance  -0.012 -0.024 -0.085 -0.007 -0.062
  (0.083) (0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068)
ln (GDP per capita 
PPP)   15.102** 11.490* 18.986*** 14.863***
   (6.650) (6.485) (6.011) (5.482)
% Lab force with HE   0.347*** 0.260** 0.330*** 0.256**
   (0.126) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118)
HE Unemp (% total 
unemployment)   0.234 0.157 0.254* 0.164
   (0.155) (0.168) (0.142) (0.159)
GER Secondary   0.141 0.245*** 0.143* 0.235***
   (0.087) (0.082) (0.086) (0.084)
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.718*** 0.651***
    (0.198) (0.200)
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     0.192 0.116
     (0.149) (0.126)
Constant 59.884*** 60.693*** -112.313* -95.779 -156.673** -131.067**
  (1.918) (5.506) (66.142) (65.024) (60.219) (55.684)
N Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
N Groups 61 61 61 61 61 61
R2 within 0.236 0.239 0.408 0.447 0.427 0.459
Rho 0.827 0.827 0.881 0.869 0.912 0.897
AIC 1501.8 1505.1 1461.6 1450.0 1458.3 1449.2
BIC 1522.4 1532.5 1513.0 1508.3 1516.6 1514.4
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.7. OLS estimates. Missing values imputed by interpolation. Predictor and PISA 
variables lagged 6 years, all the remaining lagged  3 years 
 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -3.517*** -3.279** -3.487*** -3.087** -3.093** -2.566** 
 (1.167) (1.387) (1.261) (1.211) (1.247) (1.125) 
ESCS 12.594*** 12.992*** 12.355*** 10.381*** 12.013*** 9.445*** 
 (2.731) (2.721) (3.206) (3.239) (3.081) (3.053) 
PISA Reading (z scores) 6.550*** 7.151*** 9.189*** 9.181*** 8.390*** 8.322*** 
 (1.436) (1.499) (1.773) (1.819) (1.766) (1.892) 
% within variance  -0.056 -0.166** -0.157** -0.139 -0.125 
  (0.079) (0.083) (0.077) (0.086) (0.076) 
ln (GDP per capita 
PPP)   -10.536*** -10.549*** -7.871*** -7.592*** 
   (2.273) (2.240) (2.399) (2.264) 
% Lab force with HE   0.277** 0.240* 0.172 0.110 
   (0.131) (0.133) (0.125) (0.126) 
HE Unemp (% total 
unemployment)   0.483*** 0.535*** 0.471*** 0.539*** 
   (0.175) (0.179) (0.179) (0.184) 
GER Secondary   0.181 0.181* 0.160 0.160* 
   (0.110) (0.104) (0.101) (0.092) 
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.359**  0.460** 
    (0.178)  (0.181) 
Exp in tertiary (%GDP)     -0.227*** -0.267*** 
     (0.085) (0.093) 
Constant 64.559*** 68.993*** 147.530*** 138.157*** 131.516*** 118.023*** 
 (1.590) (5.452) (22.172) (21.606) (22.292) (21.475) 
N Observations 170 170.000 170.000 170.000 170.000 170.000 
R2 Adjusted 0.438 0.471 0.602 0.607 0.619 0.629 
AIC 1420.785 1412.369 1371.203 1370.945 1365.616 1362.653 
BIC 1442.736 1440.591 1424.511 1430.525 1425.196 1428.505 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.8. Fixed effects estimates. Missing values imputed by interpolation. Predictor 
and PISA variables lagged 6 years, all the remaining lagged 3 years 
 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition
Add 
Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -4.394*** -4.323*** -3.888*** -3.545** -3.644*** -3.301** 
 (1.470) (1.467) (1.286) (1.420) (1.195) (1.313) 
ESCS 2.844 3.085 -5.002 -2.016 -3.817 -0.820 
 (6.023) (6.136) (6.194) (6.367) (6.132) (6.110) 
PISA Reading (z scores) -2.037 -1.282 -1.747 0.041 -1.304 0.133 
 (3.719) (3.591) (3.904) (3.827) (3.902) (3.714) 
% within variance  0.071 0.057 0.059 0.054 0.053 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) 
ln (GDP per capita 
PPP)   10.314 10.871 8.381 7.693 
   (8.675) (8.472) (9.781) (9.017) 
% Lab force with HE   0.300** 0.213 0.301** 0.209 
   (0.149) (0.133) (0.143) (0.126) 
HE Unemp (% total 
unemployment)   0.305 0.213 0.309 0.182 
   (0.261) (0.251) (0.273) (0.251) 
GER Secondary   0.111 0.226** 0.120 0.248** 
   (0.106) (0.102) (0.108) (0.108) 
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.634**  0.752*** 
    (0.244)  (0.260) 
Exp in tertiary (%GDP)     -0.008 -0.196 
     (0.147) (0.133) 
Constant 60.447*** 56.276*** -69.641 -96.332 -51.414 -63.409 
 (1.687) (5.987) (84.571) (85.209) (96.856) (90.496) 
N Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170
N Groups 60 60 60 60 60 60
R2 within 0.251 0.272 0.344 0.389 0.354 0.398
Rho 0.907 0.901 0.893 0.875 0.891 0.859
AIC 1053.6 1052.6 1049.0 1040.7 1050.4 1042.4
BIC 1072.4 1077.7 1096.1 1094.0 1103.7 1101.9
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.9. OLS estimates. Missing values imputed by using within-country means. All 
predictor lagged 3 years 
 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
compositio
n 
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditur
e 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditur
e 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditur
e 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -0.514 0.884 -2.558** -3.433** -1.510 -2.144* 
 (1.103) (1.242) (1.241) (1.386) (1.102) (1.182) 
ESCS 8.248*** 7.654*** 11.362*** 7.913* 13.759*** 7.289** 
 (2.726) (2.598) (3.132) (4.016) (2.771) (3.531) 
PISA Reading (z 
scores) 8.422*** 8.777*** 11.245*** 11.010*** 5.363*** 5.730*** 
 (1.569) (1.558) (1.835) (2.164) (1.993) (2.123) 
% within variance  0.139* -0.119 -0.147* -0.017 -0.042 
  (0.076) (0.084) (0.083) (0.071) (0.076) 
ln (GDP per capita 
PPP)   -13.124*** -13.823*** 1.638 2.844 
   (2.936) (3.304) (2.775) (3.077) 
% Lab force with 
HE   0.222 0.270 -0.020 0.116 
   (0.140) (0.230) (0.115) (0.183) 
HE Unemp (% 
total 
unemployment)   0.534*** 0.589** 0.409*** 0.302 
   (0.182) (0.276) (0.153) (0.227) 
GER Secondary   0.231** 0.238*** 0.117 0.139* 
   (0.092) (0.091) (0.075) (0.074) 
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.524***  0.468*** 
    (0.190)  (0.166) 
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     -0.364*** -0.419*** 
     (0.064) (0.083) 
Constant 
60.989**
* 52.969*** 
163.058**
* 156.647*** 42.949 18.513 
 (1.488) (5.173) (28.730) (32.647) (27.286) (30.510) 
N Observations 228 228 210 191 194 182
R2 Adjusted 0.396 0.441 0.571 0.568 0.611 0.628
AIC 1927.9 1912.1 1713.8 1563.4 1529.3 1434.2
BIC 1951.9 1943.0 1767.4 1621.9 1588.1 1498.2
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  
 214 
 
Table A.10. Fixed effects estimates. Missing values imputed by using within-country 
means. All predictor lagged 3 years 
 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
compositio
n 
Add 
Socio 
economi
c 
variable
s 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditur
e 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditur
e 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditur
e 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -3.386** -3.533** -2.280 -2.362 -2.474* -2.699* 
 (1.439) (1.477) (1.479) (1.429) (1.444) (1.475) 
ESCS 3.572 4.217 6.381 4.976 10.484 5.878 
 (7.389) (7.162) (6.775) (7.824) (6.440) (7.932) 
PISA Reading 
(z scores) 4.651 4.827 3.277 4.213 3.868 4.688 
 (3.597) (3.600) (3.524) (3.588) (3.855) (3.962) 
% within 
variance  -0.039 -0.046 -0.114 -0.053 -0.095 
  (0.101) (0.092) (0.083) (0.086) (0.083) 
ln (GDP per 
capita PPP)   15.857** 11.086 18.248*** 14.642* 
   (6.522) (7.484) (6.362) (7.356) 
% Lab force 
with HE   0.259** 0.293*** 0.238** 0.245** 
   (0.109) (0.104) (0.113) (0.112) 
HE Unemp (% 
total 
unemployment)   0.290* 0.307 0.390** 0.407 
   (0.168) (0.244) (0.160) (0.272) 
GER Secondary   0.134 0.191** 0.100 0.161* 
   (0.091) (0.083) (0.087) (0.086) 
Exp in 
secondary 
(%GDP)    0.630***  0.554** 
    (0.221)  (0.211) 
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     0.228 0.160 
     (0.168) (0.118) 
Constant 
59.648*** 62.168*** 
-
116.560* -87.230 -140.332** -121.180 
 (1.967) (6.371) (65.822) (73.360) (63.858) (73.123) 
N Observations 228 228 210 191 194 182
N Groups 61 61 56 51 51 48
R2 within 0.23 0.232 0.391 0.403 0.377 0.432
Rho 0.828 0.829 0.885 0.877 0.895 0.87
AIC 1503.8 1506.9 1364.0 1221.6 1248.9 1167.4
BIC 1524.3 1534.4 1414.2 1276.9 1304.4 1228.3
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.11. OLS estimates. All predictor lagged 3 years. Full case 
 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
compositio
n 
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditur
e 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditur
e 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditur
e 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -2.059 -0.669 -3.669*** -5.027*** -1.943* -2.806** 
 (1.277) (1.480) (1.270) (1.329) (1.165) (1.188) 
ESCS 10.914*** 10.367*** 14.581*** 13.568*** 14.815*** 9.014** 
 (3.410) (3.320) (3.660) (4.406) (3.076) (3.676) 
PISA Reading 
(z scores) 7.595*** 7.813*** 12.076*** 10.268*** 6.517** 5.979** 
 (2.120) (2.021) (2.937) (2.736) (2.776) (2.648) 
% within 
variance  0.106 -0.133 -0.094 0.017 0.023 
  (0.082) (0.091) (0.076) (0.076) (0.072) 
ln (GDP per 
capita PPP)   -14.042*** -23.468*** -2.137 -4.794 
   (4.109) (4.230) (3.227) (4.064) 
% Lab force 
with HE   0.003 0.242 0.058 0.157 
   (0.254) (0.251) (0.165) (0.193) 
HE Unemp (% 
total 
unemployment
)   0.721** 0.585** 0.324 0.315 
   (0.289) (0.283) (0.204) (0.243) 
GER 
Secondary   0.221** 0.247*** 0.139 0.200*** 
   (0.097) (0.078) (0.086) (0.069) 
Exp in 
secondary 
(%GDP)    0.734***  0.717*** 
    (0.177)  (0.161) 
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     -0.399*** -0.464*** 
     (0.086) (0.087) 
Constant 
61.601*** 55.671*** 
176.927**
* 246.157*** 76.242** 78.844** 
  (1.598) (5.736) (40.709) (41.311) (32.844) (39.292) 
N Observations 176 170 142 120 127 114
R2 Adjusted 0.336 0.377 0.48 0.581 0.541 0.608
AIC 1485.2 1423.0 1156.8 937.8 977.0 858.2
BIC 1497.9 1438.7 1183.4 965.6 1005.5 888.3
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.12. Fixed effects estimates. All predictor lagged 3 years. Full case 
 
  
Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition 
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -3.061** -2.689* -1.431 -2.688** -3.299** -2.673** 
 (1.457) (1.582) (1.363) (1.153) (1.233) (1.203) 
ESCS 11.094 10.806 8.432 5.722 8.050 5.594 
 (6.770) (6.828) (7.131) (7.207) (6.492) (7.362) 
PISA Reading (z 
scores) 5.126 4.718 2.998 -1.174 -0.696 -1.250 
 (4.308) (4.653) (4.937) (4.610) (4.609) (4.613) 
% within variance  -0.056 -0.010 -0.053 0.079 -0.041 
  (0.099) (0.093) (0.091) (0.077) (0.095) 
ln (GDP per 
capita PPP)   26.536*** 25.685** 22.102*** 25.375** 
   (8.256) (10.380) (7.993) (10.578) 
% Lab force with 
HE   0.256* 0.187 0.206* 0.104 
   (0.136) (0.119) (0.115) (0.125) 
HE Unemp (% 
total 
unemployment)   0.485* 0.153 0.340 0.208 
   (0.269) (0.232) (0.240) (0.245) 
GER Secondary   0.110 0.260** 0.139 0.263** 
   (0.096) (0.097) (0.088) (0.099) 
Exp in secondary 
(%GDP)    0.658**  0.706*** 
    (0.250)  (0.251) 
Exp in tertiary 
(%GDP)     0.111 -0.050 
     (0.153) (0.112) 
Constant 61.744*** 65.943*** -225.561*** -239.307** -188.175** -233.707** 
 (1.508) (6.206) (81.081) (105.488) (80.635) (107.387) 
N Observations 176 170 142 120 127 114
N Groups 60 60 49 42 44 38
R2 within 0.087 0.07 0.376 0.5 0.41 0.498
Rho 0.824 0.816 0.933 0.938 0.908 0.904
AIC 1133.66 1099.702 882.062 700.873 757.14 673.4
BIC 1143.171 1112.246 905.709 725.961 782.737 700.762
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table A.13. Fixed effects estimates. All predictor lagged 3 years. Multiple imputation 
estimates 
 
  Base  
Add PISA 
variance 
composition
Add Socio 
economic 
variables 
Add 
Secondary 
expenditure 
Add 
Tertiary 
expenditure 
Add Sec & 
Tert 
expenditure
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Ineq Sch Ach -3.206** -3.210** -2.174 -2.809** -2.468* -2.968** 
 (1.523) (1.536) (1.412) (1.303) (1.373) (1.301) 
ESCS 1.354 1.318 2.621 -0.726 4.421 0.443 
 (7.827) (7.884) (7.534) (7.010) (7.278) (6.999) 
PISA Reading (z scores) 6.734* 6.747* 0.291 0.455 1.392 1.040 
 (3.653) (3.680) (2.957) (2.869) (3.116) (3.092) 
% within variance  0.005 -0.025 -0.090 -0.034 -0.095 
  (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.082) (0.084) 
ln (GDP per capita PPP)   20.367*** 14.721*** 22.163*** 15.908*** 
   (5.470) (5.361) (5.551) (5.748) 
% Lab force with HE   0.297** 0.220* 0.295** 0.220* 
   (0.129) (0.128) (0.127) (0.124) 
HE Unemp (% total 
unemployment)   0.331 0.177 0.352 0.193 
   (0.223) (0.206) (0.234) (0.218) 
GER Secondary   0.173* 0.316*** 0.167* 0.306*** 
   (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.092) 
Exp in secondary (%GDP)    0.836***  0.795*** 
    (0.259)  (0.274) 
Exp in tertiary (%GDP)     0.166 0.081 
     (0.152) (0.154) 
Constant 
55.793*** 55.497*** 
-
170.742*** -138.915*** -191.162*** -150.415** 
 (2.152) (6.002) (53.572) (50.946) (55.448) (55.082) 
N Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252
N Groups 63 63 63 63 63 63
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Graph A.1. Power estimates for fixed effects models, 3-year lagged (*) 
 
(*) Power estimates (left to right): .7642, .8252, .3532, .5369, .4936, .6015 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
critical F =  3.88331
αβ
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 5 10 15 20
critical F =  3.88388
αβ
0
0.5
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
critical F =  3.88591
α
β
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 1 2 3 4 5
critical F =  3.88634
α
β
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 1 2 3 4 5
critical F = 3.88634
α
β
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
critical F =  3.88677
α
β
 219 
 
 
Graph A.2. Power estimates according to sample size and p-level, full model.  
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APPENDIX B (CHAPTER 4) 
 
 
Graph B.1. Enrolment by income quintile and type of HEI, 2003, 2006 and 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph B.2. Share of undergraduate enrolment by income quintile and type of HEI, 2003, 
2006 and 2009 
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Graph B.4. Number of students receiving student aid and undergraduate enrolment by 
type of HEI (2005-2009) 
 
 
 
 
Table B.5. Differences-in-differences estimates. Logit estimates (odds ratio) 
 Base model 
Individual 
controls 
Household 
controls 
Background 
controls 
  OR/se OR/se OR/se OR/se 
Treatment=1 0.590*** 0.426*** 0.451*** 0.553*** 
 (0.052) (0.039) (0.042) (0.053) 
Year 2006=1  1.087 1.195** 1.171* 1.262** 
 (0.094) (0.108) (0.108) (0.122) 
Year  2009=1 1.202** 1.161* 1.134 1.109 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.105) 
Treatment=1*Year 2006=1 1.216* 1.227* 1.264* 1.177 
 (0.140) (0.150) (0.156) (0.149) 
Treatment=1*Year 2009=1 1.314** 1.383*** 1.396*** 1.401*** 
 (0.146) (0.162) (0.167) (0.172) 
Age  7.174*** 7.313*** 8.216*** 
  (2.259) (2.322) (2.697) 
Age2  0.959*** 0.958*** 0.956*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Female=1  1.068 1.137*** 1.163*** 
  (0.050) (0.054) (0.057) 
Married=1  0.224*** 0.364*** 0.374*** 
  (0.029) (0.051) (0.052) 
Employed==1  0.214*** 0.217*** 0.249*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Head of household woman=1   0.872** 0.797*** 
   (0.048) (0.050) 
N Siblings   1.283*** 1.168*** 
   (0.046) (0.044) 
Household size   0.740*** 0.763*** 
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 Base model 
Individual 
controls 
Household 
controls 
Background 
controls 
  OR/se OR/se OR/se OR/se 
   (0.020) (0.021) 
Urban=1   2.040*** 1.263*** 
   (0.093) (0.067) 
Mother's education     
Secondary=1    1.606*** 
    (0.092) 
Tertiary=1    3.162*** 
    (0.429) 
Unknown=1    0.687** 
    (0.111) 
Head of household occupation      
Clerks and sales=1    0.738*** 
    (0.083) 
Farming and Agriculture=1    0.572*** 
    (0.073) 
Craftmen and operators=1    0.593*** 
    (0.063) 
Unqualified worker=1    0.545*** 
    (0.060) 
Unknown=1    0.711*** 
    (0.079) 
Head of household years of schooling    1.102*** 
    (0.010) 
Constant 0.739*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 27631 27628 27628 27590
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.109 0.129 0.184
-2LL 2261679 2034261 1988296 1859637
BIC 2261740 2034374 1988449 1859883
AIC 2261691 2034283 1988326 1859685
* p<.10, **p<.05, *** p<.01     
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APPENDIX C (CHAPTER 5) 
 
Table C.1. Relative risk ratios estimates for competing risk models, comparing risk of 
continuing/completion, relative to drop out. Single level models. Clustered standard errors 
reported  
 
 Baseline 
Add 
background 
and debt 
Add 
demographic 
characteristics  
Add 
academic 
achievent & 
HEIs chars. 
Add 
expected 
income & 
interactions
  RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se 
Outcome: Continuing registration      
Year 2= 1 1.309 1.205 1.311 1.368 1.443 
 (0.140) (0.160) (0.172) (0.183) (0.258) 
Year 3= 1 1.477 1.245 1.474 1.604 1.905 
 (0.162) (0.227) (0.266) (0.303) (0.528) 
Year 4= 1 1.723 1.321 1.709 1.951 2.818 
 (0.186) (0.310) (0.398) (0.472) (0.973) 
Year 5= 1 1.303 0.907 1.277 1.545 1.703 
 (0.186) (0.264) (0.362) (0.470) (0.707) 
Year 6= 1 1.389 0.889 1.372 1.759 1.689 
 (0.217) (0.340) (0.520) (0.700) (0.762) 
Partially CAE = 1  1.166 1.180 0.986 0.588 
  (0.150) (0.151) (0.136) (0.171) 
Cumulated debt  1.182 1.176 1.066 1.080 
  (0.161) (0.154) (0.139) (0.230) 
Quintile 2=1  1.149 1.163 1.175 1.100 
  (0.122) (0.126) (0.123) (0.119) 
Quintile 3=1  1.199 1.189 1.173 1.095 
  (0.132) (0.131) (0.128) (0.124) 
Quintile 4=1  1.437 1.408 1.322 1.184 
  (0.191) (0.184) (0.166) (0.164) 
Quintile 5=1  1.460 1.410 1.231 1.138 
  (0.172) (0.162) (0.137) (0.139) 
Public school =1  0.799 0.798 0.858 0.856 
  (0.092) (0.091) (0.096) (0.097) 
Private mantained school=2  0.948 0.907 0.971 0.968 
  (0.103) (0.098) (0.105) (0.105) 
Male=1   0.694 0.702 0.709 
   (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Age   0.916 0.924 0.924 
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
PSU    1.261 1.280 
    (0.075) (0.076) 
GPA    1.133 1.130 
    (0.026) (0.026) 
Cruch Uni=1    1.526 1.459 
    (0.260) (0.253) 
Complexity index    0.825 0.820 
    (0.072) (0.073) 
   Year=2 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.642 
     (0.600) 
   Year=3 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.968 
     (0.316) 
   Year=4 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.451 
     (0.136) 
   Year=5 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.162 
     (0.448) 
   Year=6 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.469 
     (0.734) 
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 Baseline 
Add 
background 
and debt 
Add 
demographic 
characteristics  
Add 
academic 
achievent & 
HEIs chars. 
Add 
expected 
income & 
interactions
  RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se 
   Income Quintile=2 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     1.561 
     (0.544) 
   Income Quintile=3 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     1.653 
     (0.668) 
   Income Quintile=4 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     2.092 
     (0.534) 
   Income Quintile=5 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     2.104 
     (0.558) 
Expected income     0.933 
     (0.046) 
c.zcaedebt#c.z~t     1.099 
     (0.107) 
   Income Quintile=2 * St. Cum. Debt     0.853 
     (0.115) 
   Income Quintile=3 * St. Cum. Debt     0.916 
     (0.106) 
   Income Quintile=4 * St. Cum. Debt     0.915 
     (0.111) 
   Income Quintile=5 * St. Cum. Debt     0.843 
     (0.112) 
Constant 21.560 21.739 147.972 96.534 88.476 
  (1.690) (4.354) (45.890) (30.027) (32.485) 
Outcome: Completed studies      
Year 2= 1 1.619 1.683 1.748 1.961 2.242 
 (0.645) (0.673) (0.689) (0.771) (0.985) 
Year 3= 1 2.398 2.576 2.784 3.506 4.287 
 (0.779) (0.978) (1.050) (1.357) (2.160) 
Year 4= 1 22.538 24.947 28.097 40.329 63.025 
 (7.111) (10.670) (11.838) (17.862) (40.236) 
Year 5= 1 195.925 224.729 264.207 443.165 575.413 
 (58.451) (99.084) (113.358) (204.774) (359.699) 
Year 6= 1 248.208 293.346 363.797 715.667 734.359 
 (72.888) (150.015) (181.861) (393.174) (489.518) 
Partially CAE = 1  0.580 0.605 0.391 1.035 
  (0.120) (0.123) (0.085) (0.708) 
Cumulated debt  0.959 0.969 0.745 0.701 
  (0.160) (0.156) (0.132) (0.216) 
Quintile 2=1  1.154 1.168 1.173 1.265 
  (0.157) (0.164) (0.161) (0.247) 
Quintile 3=1  1.203 1.220 1.166 0.915 
  (0.189) (0.190) (0.184) (0.197) 
Quintile 4=1  1.657 1.678 1.430 0.965 
  (0.245) (0.250) (0.203) (0.232) 
Quintile 5=1  2.010 2.005 1.450 0.779 
  (0.288) (0.289) (0.199) (0.201) 
Public school =1  0.758 0.744 0.899 0.889 
  (0.106) (0.105) (0.120) (0.121) 
Private mantained school=2  0.919 0.870 1.036 1.027 
  (0.119) (0.113) (0.132) (0.132) 
Male=1   0.555 0.572 0.605 
   (0.056) (0.059) (0.061) 
Age   0.951 0.970 0.970 
   (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
PSU    1.606 1.721 
    (0.137) (0.150) 
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 Baseline 
Add 
background 
and debt 
Add 
demographic 
characteristics  
Add 
academic 
achievent & 
HEIs chars. 
Add 
expected 
income & 
interactions
  RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se 
GPA    1.315 1.343 
    (0.058) (0.063) 
Cruch Uni=1    1.524 1.508 
    (0.381) (0.388) 
Complexity index    0.830 0.758 
    (0.092) (0.093) 
   Year=2 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.924 
     (0.834) 
   Year=3 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.518 
     (0.402) 
   Year=4 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.153 
     (0.107) 
   Year=5 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.159 
     (0.107) 
   Year=6 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.240 
     (0.182) 
   Income Quintile=2 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     0.777 
     (0.421) 
   Income Quintile=3 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     1.362 
     (0.746) 
   Income Quintile=4 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     4.213 
     (1.774) 
   Income Quintile=5 *Partially CAE 
funded=1     4.686 
     (2.131) 
Expected income     0.675 
     (0.058) 
c.zcaedebt#c.z~t     1.127 
     (0.124) 
   Income Quintile=2 * St. Cum. Debt     0.772 
     (0.160) 
   Income Quintile=3 * St. Cum. Debt     1.055 
     (0.200) 
   Income Quintile=4 * St. Cum. Debt     1.087 
     (0.211) 
   Income Quintile=5 * St. Cum. Debt     1.215 
     (0.253) 
Constant 0.062 0.049 0.175 0.072 0.057 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.080) (0.034) (0.032) 
N Obs 29892.000 29892.000 29892.000 29892.000 29892.000 
AIC 20266.962 20168.490 20066.329 19904.526 19734.295 
BIC 20366.626 20401.040 20332.100 20236.740 20315.670 
ll -10121.481 -10056.245 -10001.164 -9912.263 -9797.148 
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Table C.2. Relative risk ratio estimates for competing risk models, comparing risk of 
continuing/completion, relative to drop out. Random effects models. Clustered standard errors 
reported  
 
 Baseline 
Add 
background 
and debt 
Add 
demographic 
characteristics  
Add 
academic 
achievent & 
HEIs chars. 
Add 
expected 
income & 
interactions
 RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se 
Outcome: Continuing registration           
Year 2= 1 1.302 1.198 1.300 1.353 1.505 
 (0.140) (0.152) (0.165) (0.174) (0.263) 
Year 3= 1 1.460 1.229 1.450 1.569 2.073 
 (0.160) (0.222) (0.266) (0.298) (0.566) 
Year 4= 1 1.695 1.297 1.669 1.889 3.195 
 (0.184) (0.320) (0.416) (0.489) (1.122) 
Year 5= 1 1.276 0.885 1.240 1.482 1.985 
 (0.185) (0.257) (0.361) (0.460) (0.824) 
Year 6= 1 1.350 0.862 1.321 1.668 1.986 
 (0.215) (0.341) (0.527) (0.701) (0.923) 
Partially CAE = 1  1.183 1.189 1.007 0.595 
  (0.159) (0.159) (0.142) (0.175) 
Cumulated debt  1.183 1.187 1.081 0.993 
  (0.171) (0.170) (0.157) (0.204) 
Quintile 2=1  1.156 1.167 1.176 1.100 
  (0.124) (0.128) (0.124) (0.119) 
Quintile 3=1  1.236 1.210 1.196 1.118 
  (0.139) (0.135) (0.133) (0.129) 
Quintile 4=1  1.484 1.441 1.362 1.218 
  (0.181) (0.178) (0.166) (0.165) 
Quintile 5=1  1.495 1.426 1.258 1.163 
  (0.160) (0.154) (0.139) (0.140) 
Public school =1  0.764 0.776 0.826 0.824 
  (0.085) (0.086) (0.092) (0.092) 
Private mantained school=2  0.937 0.906 0.962 0.958 
  (0.101) (0.097) (0.105) (0.105) 
Male=1   0.723 0.732 0.734 
   (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Age   0.915 0.923 0.923 
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
PSU    1.273 1.283 
    (0.077) (0.078) 
GPA    1.131 1.128 
    (0.027) (0.027) 
Cruch Uni=1    1.564 1.501 
    (0.276) (0.269) 
Complexity index    0.829 0.832 
    (0.073) (0.075) 
   Year=2 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.631 
     (0.597) 
   Year=3 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.945 
     (0.309) 
   Year=4 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.433 
     (0.132) 
   Year=5 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.109 
     (0.435) 
   Year=6 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.414 
     (0.724) 
   Income Quintile=2 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.572 
     (0.550) 
   Income Quintile=3 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.649 
     (0.675) 
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 Baseline 
Add 
background 
and debt 
Add 
demographic 
characteristics  
Add 
academic 
achievent & 
HEIs chars. 
Add 
expected 
income & 
interactions
 RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se 
   Income Quintile=4 *Partially CAE funded=1     2.028 
     (0.515) 
   Income Quintile=5 *Partially CAE funded=1     2.034 
     (0.545) 
Expected income     0.948 
     (0.054) 
c.zcaedebt#c.z~t     1.110 
     (0.113) 
   Income Quintile=2 * St. Cum. Debt     0.852 
     (0.115) 
   Income Quintile=3 * St. Cum. Debt     0.915 
     (0.105) 
   Income Quintile=4 * St. Cum. Debt     0.923 
     (0.109) 
   Income Quintile=5 * St. Cum. Debt     0.850 
     (0.110) 
Constant 23.468 22.969 158.606 99.893 81.913 
 (1.912) (4.406) (48.309) (31.187) (30.158) 
Outcome: Completed studies           
Year 2= 1 1.605 1.418 1.495 1.583 1.743 
 (0.643) (0.566) (0.591) (0.629) (0.766) 
Year 3= 1 2.381 1.825 2.033 2.282 2.620 
 (0.777) (0.679) (0.750) (0.856) (1.233) 
Year 4= 1 23.315 15.305 18.064 22.029 33.322 
 (7.489) (5.959) (7.026) (8.837) (18.843) 
Year 5= 1 267.943 151.344 189.876 265.802 362.521 
 (81.613) (61.671) (77.562) (115.285) (206.438) 
Year 6= 1 438.329 213.387 286.791 464.540 546.349 
 (132.723) (105.365) (141.816) (246.716) (331.856) 
Partially CAE = 1  0.718 0.735 0.585 1.101 
  (0.137) (0.139) (0.116) (0.775) 
Cumulated debt  1.338 1.354 1.143 1.245 
  (0.229) (0.229) (0.207) (0.332) 
Quintile 2=1  1.115 1.126 1.124 1.309 
  (0.162) (0.169) (0.162) (0.266) 
Quintile 3=1  1.263 1.261 1.202 1.059 
  (0.200) (0.199) (0.191) (0.240) 
Quintile 4=1  1.730 1.718 1.578 1.435 
  (0.250) (0.254) (0.232) (0.313) 
Quintile 5=1  1.801 1.747 1.464 1.214 
  (0.248) (0.242) (0.209) (0.295) 
Public school =1  0.887 0.897 1.087 1.067 
  (0.120) (0.122) (0.151) (0.148) 
Private mantained school=2  1.077 1.041 1.208 1.190 
  (0.138) (0.134) (0.159) (0.156) 
Male=1   0.535 0.570 0.584 
   (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) 
Age   0.937 0.959 0.962 
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
PSU    1.981 2.052 
    (0.159) (0.163) 
GPA    1.506 1.519 
    (0.091) (0.094) 
Cruch Uni=1    0.975 0.990 
    (0.246) (0.246) 
Complexity index    0.718 0.697 
    (0.084) (0.081) 
   Year=2 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.059 
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 Baseline 
Add 
background 
and debt 
Add 
demographic 
characteristics  
Add 
academic 
achievent & 
HEIs chars. 
Add 
expected 
income & 
interactions
 RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se RRR/se 
     (0.964) 
   Year=3 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.720 
     (0.556) 
   Year=4 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.222 
     (0.152) 
   Year=5 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.208 
     (0.140) 
   Year=6 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.313 
     (0.236) 
   Income Quintile=2 *Partially CAE funded=1     0.869 
     (0.485) 
   Income Quintile=3 *Partially CAE funded=1     1.117 
     (0.662) 
   Income Quintile=4 *Partially CAE funded=1     3.656 
     (1.609) 
   Income Quintile=5 *Partially CAE funded=1     3.559 
     (1.636) 
Expected income     0.591 
     (0.051) 
Sq-cumulated debt     1.064 
     (0.120) 
   Income Quintile=2 * St. Cum. Debt     0.731 
     (0.157) 
   Income Quintile=3 * St. Cum. Debt     0.972 
     (0.186) 
   Income Quintile=4 * St. Cum. Debt     0.857 
     (0.166) 
   Income Quintile=5 * St. Cum. Debt     0.901 
     (0.191) 
Constant 0.051 0.048 0.229 0.095 0.060 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.112) (0.048) (0.037) 
Random effects      
 1.230 1.203 1.149 1.139 1.128 
 (0.089) (0.081) (0.068) (0.066) (0.071) 
2.787 2.841 2.701 3.010 2.522 
 (0.437) (0.454) (0.423) (0.510) (0.406) 
ߪఓబఓమ 1.245 1.219 1.171 1.159 1.115 
 (0.114) (0.105) (0.094) (0.093) (0.095) 
N Obs 29892.000 29892.000 29892.000 29892.000 29892.000 
AIC 19427.305 19334.845 19240.236 19004.187 18924.429 
BIC 
 
19551.885 19592.311 19530.923 19361.317 19530.719 
ll -9698.652 -9636.423 -9585.118 -9459.094 -9389.214 
 
  
ߪଶఓబ
ߪଶఓమ
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Table C.3. Relative risk ratios estimates for competing risk models, comparing risk of 
completion/dropout, relative to continuing  
 
Completion/ Continuing, 
single level 
Completion/ Continuing, 
random effects 
Year  (Wald χ2) 496.14*** 551.79*** 
2 1.55 1.16 
3 2.25 1.26 
4 22.36*** 10.43*** 
5 337.87*** 182.66*** 
6 434.72*** 275.06*** 
Debt structure   
Partially CAE funded=1 1.76 1.85 
    Cumulative debt 0.65 1.25 
    Sq_Cumulative Debt 1.03 0.96 
Socieconomic background   
   Income Quintile (Wald χ2) 6.17 2.51 
2 1.15 1.19 
3 0.84 0.95 
4 0.81 1.18 
5 0.68 1.04 
   Secondary School (Wald χ2) 0.58 9.08* 
      Public 1.04 1.30** 
      Maintained 1.06 1.24** 
Demoraphic chars.   
   Male=1 0.85* 0.80*** 
  Age 1.05*** 1.04** 
Prior achievement   
   PSU 1.34*** 1.60*** 
  GPA 1.19*** 1.35*** 
University Chatacteristics   
  Cruch University=1 1.03 0.66* 
  Complexity Index 0.93 0.84** 
Year * Private debt (Wald χ2) 26.19 28.09*** 
   Year=2 * Partially CAE funded=1 0.56 0.65 
   Year=3 * Partially CAE funded=1 0.54 0.76 
   Year=4 * Partially CAE funded=1 0.34 0.51 
   Year=5 * Partially CAE funded=1 0.14** 0.19** 
   Year=6 * Partially CAE funded=1 0.16** 0.22* 
Income Quintile *Private debt (Wald χ2) 18.16*** 13.99** 
   Income Quintile=2 * Partially CAE funded=1 0.50 0.55 
   Income Quintile=3 * Partially CAE funded=1 0.82 0.68 
   Income Quintile=4 * Partially CAE funded=1 2.01* 1.80 
   Income Quintile=5 * Partially CAE funded=1 2.23* 1.75 
Expected income 0.72*** 0.62*** 
Income quintile * St.Cum.Debt (Wald χ2) 9.91* 5.55 
   Income Quintile=2 * St. Cum. Debt 0.91 0.86 
   Income Quintile=3 * St. Cum. Debt 1.15 1.06 
   Income Quintile=4 * St. Cum. Debt 1.19 0.93 
   Income Quintile=5 * St. Cum. Debt 1.44* 1.06 
Intercept 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Random effects    
n/a 0.83*** 
n/a 0.14 
N 29892 29892 
Goodness of fit statistics   
-2LL 19594 18778 
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AIC 19734 18924 
BIC 20316 19531 
Pseudo R2  0.25 0.28 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
Note: Wald χ2 provided to test the null hypothesis that the effect of categorical variables equals to zero 
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Table C.4. Predicted probabilities by type of university, income quintile and year (full single level model) 
   CRUCH Universities Private independent universities   
      Year Year 
Cumulated 
probabilities by 
year 6 
 
Income 
quintile 
CAE 
funded 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cruch 
Unis 
Private 
Unis 
D
r
o
p
o
u
t
 
1 
Partial 
     
0.081  
     
0.036  
     
0.046  
     
0.064  
     
0.037  
     
0.028  
     
0.114  
     
0.052  
     
0.065  
     
0.090  
     
0.054  
     
0.040  
     
0.260  
     
0.351  
Total 
     
0.050  
     
0.035  
     
0.027  
     
0.018  
     
0.018  
     
0.017  
     
0.071  
     
0.050  
     
0.039  
     
0.025  
     
0.027  
     
0.024  
     
0.154  
     
0.215  
2 
Partial 
     
0.049  
     
0.022  
     
0.027  
     
0.039  
     
0.024  
     
0.018  
     
0.070  
     
0.031  
     
0.039  
     
0.055  
     
0.034  
     
0.026  
     
0.166  
     
0.231  
Total 
     
0.046  
     
0.032  
     
0.024  
     
0.016  
     
0.016  
     
0.014  
     
0.065  
     
0.046  
     
0.035  
     
0.023  
     
0.023  
     
0.021  
     
0.139  
     
0.196  
3 
Partial 
     
0.047  
     
0.020  
     
0.026  
     
0.037  
     
0.022  
     
0.017  
     
0.067  
     
0.030  
     
0.037  
     
0.053  
     
0.032  
     
0.024  
     
0.158  
     
0.220  
Total 
     
0.046  
     
0.032  
     
0.025  
     
0.016  
     
0.018  
     
0.016  
     
0.065  
     
0.046  
     
0.035  
     
0.023  
     
0.026  
     
0.024  
     
0.144  
     
0.201  
4 
Partial 
     
0.035  
     
0.015  
     
0.019  
     
0.027  
     
0.014  
     
0.010  
     
0.050  
     
0.022  
     
0.028  
     
0.038  
     
0.021  
     
0.015  
     
0.114  
     
0.161  
Total 
     
0.042  
     
0.030  
     
0.023  
     
0.015  
     
0.017  
     
0.015  
     
0.061  
     
0.043  
     
0.033  
     
0.022  
     
0.024  
     
0.022  
     
0.134  
     
0.189  
5 
Partial 
     
0.036  
     
0.016  
     
0.020  
     
0.027  
     
0.015  
     
0.011  
     
0.051  
     
0.022  
     
0.029  
     
0.040  
     
0.022  
     
0.016  
     
0.118  
     
0.167  
Total 
     
0.044  
     
0.031  
     
0.024  
     
0.016  
     
0.018  
     
0.017  
     
0.063  
     
0.045  
     
0.034  
     
0.023  
     
0.027  
     
0.025  
     
0.141  
     
0.198  
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
n
g
1 
Partial 
     
0.915  
     
0.960  
     
0.950  
     
0.910  
     
0.819  
     
0.767  
     
0.883  
     
0.945  
     
0.930  
     
0.885  
     
0.809  
     
0.762  
     
0.395  
     
0.317  
Total 
     
0.948  
     
0.962  
     
0.968  
     
0.937  
     
0.576  
     
0.518  
     
0.927  
     
0.947  
     
0.957  
     
0.931  
     
0.579  
     
0.522  
     
0.147  
     
0.098  
2 
Partial 
     
0.949  
     
0.977  
     
0.970  
     
0.945  
     
0.887  
     
0.851  
     
0.928  
     
0.967  
     
0.958  
     
0.929  
     
0.880  
     
0.847  
     
0.607  
     
0.550  
Total 
     
0.952  
     
0.964  
     
0.970  
     
0.932  
     
0.545  
     
0.486  
     
0.933  
     
0.950  
     
0.960  
     
0.927  
     
0.549  
     
0.490  
     
0.123  
     
0.079  
3 Partial 
     
0.951  
     
0.977  
     
0.971  
     
0.944  
     
0.872  
     
0.830  
     
0.931  
     
0.968  
     
0.960  
     
0.929  
     
0.866  
     
0.827  
     
0.579  
     
0.526  
 232 
 
   CRUCH Universities Private independent universities   
      Year Year 
Cumulated 
probabilities by 
year 6 
 
Income 
quintile 
CAE 
funded 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cruch 
Unis 
Private 
Unis 
Total 
     
0.953  
     
0.965  
     
0.971  
     
0.945  
     
0.617  
     
0.561  
     
0.933  
     
0.951  
     
0.961  
     
0.939  
     
0.619  
     
0.564  
     
0.206  
     
0.161  
4 
Partial 
     
0.959  
     
0.980  
     
0.973  
     
0.929  
     
0.767  
     
0.691  
     
0.945  
     
0.973  
     
0.965  
     
0.919  
     
0.767  
     
0.694  
     
0.399  
     
0.364  
Total 
     
0.956  
     
0.967  
     
0.973  
     
0.947  
     
0.624  
     
0.567  
     
0.938  
     
0.955  
     
0.963  
     
0.942  
     
0.626  
     
0.570  
     
0.222  
     
0.180  
5 
Partial 
     
0.959  
     
0.979  
     
0.973  
     
0.931  
     
0.778  
     
0.705  
     
0.943  
     
0.973  
     
0.965  
     
0.921  
     
0.778  
     
0.708  
     
0.417  
     
0.380  
Total 
     
0.954  
     
0.967  
     
0.973  
     
0.952  
     
0.660  
     
0.606  
     
0.936  
     
0.953  
     
0.963  
     
0.947  
     
0.661  
     
0.608  
     
0.265  
     
0.222  
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
1 
Partial 
    
0.004  
    
0.003  
     
0.004  
     
0.027  
     
0.144  
     
0.205  
    
0.003  
    
0.003  
     
0.004  
     
0.025  
     
0.138  
     
0.197  
     
0.345  
     
0.333  
Total 
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.005  
     
0.046  
     
0.405  
     
0.465  
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.005  
     
0.044  
     
0.395  
     
0.454  
     
0.700  
     
0.687  
2 
Partial 
    
0.002  
    
0.002  
    
0.003  
     
0.016  
     
0.090  
     
0.131  
    
0.002  
    
0.002  
    
0.002  
     
0.015  
     
0.086  
     
0.127  
     
0.227  
     
0.219  
Total 
     
0.002  
     
0.004  
     
0.006  
     
0.052  
     
0.439  
     
0.500  
     
0.002  
     
0.004  
     
0.005  
     
0.050  
     
0.428  
     
0.489  
     
0.737  
     
0.725  
3 
Partial 
    
0.003  
    
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.019  
     
0.106  
     
0.154  
    
0.002  
    
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.018  
     
0.102  
     
0.148  
     
0.264  
     
0.255  
Total 
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.004  
     
0.039  
     
0.365  
     
0.423  
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.004  
     
0.037  
     
0.355  
     
0.412  
     
0.651  
     
0.638  
4 
Partial 
    
0.006  
    
0.005  
     
0.007  
     
0.045  
     
0.219  
     
0.299  
    
0.006  
    
0.005  
     
0.007  
     
0.043  
     
0.212  
     
0.291  
     
0.486  
     
0.475  
Total 
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.004  
     
0.038  
     
0.360  
     
0.418  
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.004  
     
0.036  
     
0.350  
     
0.407  
     
0.644  
     
0.631  
5 
Partial 
    
0.006  
    
0.005  
     
0.007  
     
0.041  
     
0.207  
     
0.284  
    
0.005  
    
0.005  
     
0.007  
     
0.040  
     
0.200  
     
0.276  
     
0.465  
     
0.453  
Total 
     
0.001  
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.032  
     
0.321  
     
0.377  
     
0.001  
     
0.002  
     
0.003  
     
0.031  
     
0.312  
     
0.367  
     
0.594  
     
0.581  
 
Note: Non-significant probabilities in italics 
 233 
 
Graph C.1.  Fitted completion hazard probabilities. Biochemistry programmes 
 
 
 
Graph C.2.  Fitted completion hazard probabilities. Nursing programmes 
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Graph C.3.  Fitted completion hazard probabilities. Journalism programmes 
 
 
Graph C.4.  Fitted completion hazard probabilities. Psicology programmes 
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Graph C.5.  Fitted completion hazard probabilities. Social work programmes 
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